In re Calvin's Estate

• Decision Date: 17 November 1936
• Docket Number: 26225.
• Citation: 188 Wash. 283,62 P.2d 461
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: IN RE CALVIN'S ESTATE.

62 P.2d 461

188 Wash. 283

IN RE CALVIN'S ESTATE.

No. 26225.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 17, 1936

Proceedings in the matter of the estate of Reason L. Calvin deceased wherein T. O. Evanson was appointed administrator and wherein the administrator and Jessie E. Calvin, widow of the deceased, filed their respective petitions asking that the entire estate be set over to widow. The petitions were opposed by Clyde Calvin and others. From an adverse order the objectors appeal.

Affirmed.

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Lewis County; Herbert H. Sieler, Judge pro tem.

C.D Cunningham, of Centralia, and James A. Stinson and H. E Donohoe, both of Chehalis, for appellants.

C. Dell Floyd, of Washington, D.C. and Allen, Froude & Hilen, of Seattle, for respondent.

STEINERT Justice.

This is an appeal from an order setting aside to a widow the whole estate of her deceased husband and directing that the estate be closed. The appeal is prosecuted by a daughter and the grandchildren of the deceased, claiming to be heirs to his estate.

Reason L. Calvin, a resident of Toledo, Wash., died July 6, 1935, at the age of about 88 years. He left surviving him his widow, Jessie E. Calvin, who was his second wife, and a number of children and grandchildren by a former marriage. The second marriage, which took place in 1918, was without issue.

Upon the petition of the widow, one T.O. Evanson was appointed, and thereafter duly qualified, as administrator. The estate, consisting of real and personal property, was appraised at a value of $3,036.19. The total claims allowed and paid amounted to $428.78, leaving the estate with a net value of $2,607.41.

Shortly after the appraisement had been made, the administrator and the widow filed their respective petitions asking that the entire estate be set over to the to widow. A demurrer to the petition of the administrator, and objections to the petition of the widow, were filed by a daughter and certain of the grandchildren of the deceased. The objections assigned were to the effect (a) that all the property affected by the administration was the separate property of Reason L. Calvin; (b) that Reason L. Calvin and Jessie E. Calvin had, prior to their marriage, entered into an agreement with each other which provided that, upon the death of either, the survivor would not take or claim any property of the other; and (c) that Reason L. Calvin had left a will devising and bequeathing all of his property to his heirs exclusive of Jessie E. Calvin.

A hearing was had Before the court upon the two petitions and the objections above referred to, and considerable evidence was offered by the respective parties. The court found that the prior proceedings had been due and regular; that all claims, funeral expenses, and expenses of administration had been paid or provided for; that the net value of the estate was less than $3,000; and that no homestead had previously been declared upon the real estate. Upon these findings, the court entered its order awarding all the property of the estate to the widow and directing that there be no further administration.

We shall hereinafter refer to the objectors as the appellants and to the widow as though she were the sole respondent.

There are two assignments of error: (1) That the court erred in awarding the estate to the respondent, upon her claim; and (2) that the court erred in refusing to admit certain proof of the contents of the alleged will of the deceased.

Rem.Rev.Stat. §§ 1473 and 1474, provide for awarding to the surviving spouse property, inclusive of the home and household goods or of the homestead, if any has been declared, having in all a value of not exceeding $3,000. These statutes, taken together, further provide that such award shall not be taken from the separate property of the deceased if otherwise disposed of by will, when there is no minor child living as the issue or adopted child of the surviving spouse and the deceased.

The respondent concedes that the estate was the separate property of Reason L. Calvin, the deceased, and we shall proceed upon the theory that such was its status. It is also the understood fact that there was no minor child living as the issue or adopted child of the respondent and the deceased. So far as the above statutes are concerned, the question then narrows itself to whether Reason L. Calvin left a will.

The appellants assumed the burden of proving that Reason L. Calvin did leave a will and that the will devised and bequeathed his property to persons including appellants but excluding respondent.

In their attempt to supply the necessary proof, appellants first served upon the respondent a written demand to produce the prenuptial agreement. Respondent failed to produce it and denied that any such agreement was ever made

Appellants then produced several witnesses, some interested and one disinterested, who testified that on various occasions, and in their presence, Reason L. Calvin and respondent had declared that they had entered into a prenuptial agreement with respect to their respective separate properties. The disinterested witness, who was an attorney at law, testified that Reason L. Calvin and respondent had at one time consulted him with respect to a contract which they said they had entered into with each other prior to, and in contemplation of, their marriage. The attorney further testified that the contract was...