In re Carter's Estate
Decision Date | 05 April 1927 |
Docket Number | 38016 |
Parties | IN RE ESTATE OF JAMES CARTER |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jones District Court.--F. O. ELLISON, Judge.
Application for the construction of a will. From a judgment construing the will as contended by the applicant, Charles E. Blayney appeals.
Reversed.
James E. Remley, for appellant.
Clifford B. Paul and George C. Gorman, for appellees.
ALBERT J. EVANS, C. J., and DE GRAFF and MORLING, JJ., concur.
James Carter was the father of seven children, among whom was a daughter named Olive. She was married to Charles E. Blayney, appellant herein. They were the parents of three children: Jessie (who subsequently married one Scott), Edgar E., and Gladys Blayney. It is with Olive and her children that we are principally concerned. Olive was dead, at the time of the making of the will in controversy herein. The daughter Gladys died after the will was made, but before the testator. She never married, and died without issue. Her father, appellant herein, claims her share. On the 20th day of March, 1914, James Carter executed his last will and testament. The material part thereof, so far as this controversy is concerned, is as follows:
The controversy herein arises because of the death of Gladys Blayney before that of her grandfather, James Carter. As suggested above, her father, Charles E. Blayney, insists that he is entitled to the share bequeathed to Gladys Blayney, because he was her only surviving parent, and she died without issue. His opponent contends that, because of her having predeceased her grandfather, the share given to her under the terms of the will lapsed, and therefore her father, Charles E., took nothing.
It is the claim of appellant that, under the terms of this will, the bequest provided for the children of Olive Blayney was a gift to a class, and therefore, since Olive E. Blayney was not alive at the time of the death of her grandfather, neither she nor her heirs took anything under the terms of the will.
We have settled the rule in Iowa that, where the gift is to a class, without naming them, only those of the class who are living at the decease of the testator take under the terms of the will. This doctrine was elaborately discussed in the case of In the Matter of the Will of Nicholson, 115 Iowa 493, 88 N.W. 1064. This rule has been followed in Parish v. Welton, 194 Iowa 1274, 190 N.W. 947; Redinbaugh v. Redinbaugh, 199 Iowa 1053, 203 N.W. 246. In the Nicholson case, the will read: "The balance of my property to be divided equally between all my nephews and nieces." In the Parish case the will read: "The above property shall be divided up with all my children equally." In the Redinbaugh case the will read: "I direct that my property then remaining shall be divided among her children share and share alike." The question is whether or not the case at bar is controlled by the above pronouncements of this court, they being the rules of construction adopted and followed in this jurisdiction.
It goes without saying that the real question to be determined in all cases of construction of wills is, What was the intent of the testator? It seems to be equally well settled that, where the beneficiaries are designated by name, it prima facie indicates an intention to give to them only as individuals. 28 Ruling Case Law 262. Where legatees are named as individuals, and also described as a class, and there is nothing more to show the testator's intention, the construction is that the gift by name constitutes a gift to the individual, to which class description is added by way of identification. In re Estate of Murphy, 157 Cal. 63 (106 P. 230); Carter v. Carter, 234 Ill. 507 (85 N.E. 292); Peck v. Peck, 76 Wash. 548 (137 P. 137). The court attaches great importance to the designation of the devisees severally by name, and a provision that they shall share the gift in a fixed and definite proportion. Moffett...
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