In re Cerrone
Decision Date | 26 August 2021 |
Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 20CA0816 |
Citation | 2021 COA 116,499 P.3d 1064 |
Parties | IN RE the MARRIAGE OF Jill Louise CERRONE, Appellee, and Dennis John Cerrone, Appellant. |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Ammarell Deasy, LLP, Daniel N. Deasy, Patrick N. Hoover, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Appellee
The Burnham Law Firm, P.C., Aaron Belzer, J.P. Prentiss, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
¶ 1 Dennis John Cerrone (husband) appeals the district court's order adopting a magistrate's ruling denying his motion for a declaratory judgment that his maintenance obligation to Jill Louise Cerrone (wife) under the parties' separation agreement ended automatically on wife's remarriage. Because the separation agreement did not expressly provide that maintenance would continue after wife remarried, we conclude that husband's maintenance obligation terminated by operation of law once she did so. We therefore reverse the order and remand the case to the district court with directions to grant husband's motion and determine the amount wife must reimburse him for maintenance he paid after the date of her remarriage.
¶ 2 The parties' twenty-four-year marriage ended in 2016. The district court approved their separation agreement and incorporated it into the decree.
¶ 4 Three years after the court entered the decree, husband moved for a declaratory judgment that his maintenance obligation had automatically terminated by operation of law as of wife's May 25, 2018, remarriage. See § 14-10-122(2)(a)(III), C.R.S. 2020 ().
¶ 5 A district court magistrate denied husband's motion, concluding that, by stating in their separation agreement that maintenance was contractual and nonmodifiable, the parties had "agreed in writing" that husband's maintenance obligation would survive wife's remarriage.
¶ 6 Husband petitioned for district court review of the magistrate's order. The district court affirmed and adopted the magistrate's order.
¶ 7 Husband contends that the magistrate and district court erred by ruling that his obligation to pay wife maintenance continued after her remarriage rather than automatically terminating under section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III). He asserts that In re Marriage of Parsons , 30 P.3d 868, 869 (Colo. App. 2001), which the magistrate found controlling, was wrongly decided. In the alternative, he argues that Parsons is distinguishable from the present case based on the specific language of the parties' separation agreement.
¶ 8 We agree that the magistrate and district court erroneously concluded that husband's maintenance obligation continued after wife's remarriage. In reaching this conclusion, we decline to follow Parsons to the extent it holds that the mere presence of a nonmodification clause is, on its own, sufficient under section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III) to continue a maintenance obligation after a recipient spouse's remarriage. See Chavez v. Chavez , 2020 COA 70, ¶ 13, 465 P.3d 133 ( ). We further conclude that the particular separation agreement language at issue is materially distinguishable from that in Parsons and is not sufficient to continue husband's maintenance obligation after wife's remarriage. Therefore, we reverse the district court's order.
¶ 9 We review de novo the language of the governing statute and the parties' separation agreement. See In re Marriage of Williams , 2017 COA 120M, ¶ 11, 410 P.3d 1271.
¶ 10 Section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III) states, in relevant part, that "[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon ... [t]he remarriage of ... the party receiving maintenance." Accordingly, the issue, as it was in the district court, is whether the parties "agreed in writing" in their separation agreement that maintenance would continue for the full 138-month term even if wife remarried. See id. ; cf. Williams , ¶ 10 ( ).
¶ 11 A division of this court addressed a predecessor version of section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III) in Spratlen v. Spratlen , 30 Colo. App. 91, 93-94, 491 P.2d 608, 609-10 (1971). That statute provided that "[t]he remarriage of a party entitled to [maintenance] ... shall relieve the other party from further payments of said [maintenance]; but nothing in this section shall preclude the parties from providing otherwise by written agreement or stipulation." Id. at 93, 491 P.2d at 609 (quoting § 46-1-5(5), C.R.S. 1963). The separation agreement at issue in Spratlen provided that the husband would pay maintenance to the wife "until the death of his father." Id. at 92, 491 P.2d at 609. The division held that the statute "require[d] an express statement that [maintenance] continue after remarriage, and the failure of the agreement in question to specify this point" was fatal to the wife's argument that her maintenance continued until the death of the husband's father regardless of her remarriage. Id. at 94, 491 P.2d at 610.
¶ 12 Spratlen relied on In re Estate of Kettering , 151 Colo. 202, 206-07, 376 P.2d 983, 986 (1962), in which the supreme court, applying common law principles, held that maintenance ends with an obligor spouse's death unless the agreement otherwise "expressly or by clear implication" provides that maintenance payments continue. Thus, in Kettering , the agreement's language — which specified only that maintenance would continue "so long as the wife may live and remain unmarried" — did not require the husband's estate to continue paying the wife maintenance after his death. Id. at 207, 376 P.2d at 986 ; see also Williams , ¶¶ 9 n.1, 12-21 ( ); cf. Int'l Tr. Co. v. Liebhardt , 111 Colo. 208, 218, 139 P.2d 264, 267 (1943) ( ).
¶ 13 Ten years after Spratlen , a division of this court decided In re Marriage of Hahn , 628 P.2d 175 (Colo. App. 1981), again addressing whether particular separation language was explicit enough to continue maintenance payments after the recipient spouse's remarriage. The Hahn division interpreted a previous but materially similar version of section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III), which provided, "[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance." Id. at 176 (quoting § 14-10-122(2), C.R.S. 1973 ).
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ARTICLE 10
...L. 71: R&RE, p. 520, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 46-1-3.ANNOTATION Applied in In re Parsons, 30 P.3d 868 (Colo. App. 2001). But see In re Cerrone, 2021 COA 116, 499 P.3d 1064. ■ 14-10-104.5. Legislative declaration. The general assembly recognizes that it is in the best interests of the parties to ......
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Summaries of Published Opinions
...that Gallegos's right to be free of parental obligations also applied to intestate succession by his heirs. The judgment was affirmed. 2021 COA 116. No. 20CA0816. In re the Marriage of Cerrone. CRS § 14-10-122(2) (a) (hI) —Maintenance Obligation—Nonmodification Clause. The district court ap......