In re Change of Name of E.M.L. To E.M.S.Appeal of L.D. And J.L.

• Decision Date: 07 April 2011
• Parties: In re Change of Name of E.M.L. to E.M.S.Appeal of L.D. and J.L., Birth Parents.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

19 A.3d 1068

2011 PA Super 71

In re Change of Name of E.M.L. to E.M.S.Appeal of L.D. and J.L., Birth Parents.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Nov. 1, 2010.Filed April 7, 2011.

William G. Tressler, Bellefonte, for appellants.David R. Crowley, Public Defender, Bellefonte, for appellee.BEFORE: STEVENS, SHOGAN and COLVILLE ^*, JJ.OPINION BY SHOGAN, J.:

L.D. and J.L. (“Appellants”), birth parents of E.M.L., appeal from the order entered on May 18, 2010, in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, granting the petition of E.M.L. to change his surname. Upon review, we affirm.

Fifteen-year-old E.M.L. had been living with the same foster family since he was removed from the care of his birth parents at the age of one and a half. E.M.L. approached his attorney, Assistant Public Defender John P. Pendergast, with a request to change his surname from that of his birth father, J.L., to that of his foster family's. On March 23, 2010, E.M.L., through Attorney Pendergrast, filed a Petition for Special Relief, which contained the Petition for Change of Name.

On May 18, 2010, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing where testimony was taken from E.M.L. and E.M.L.'s birth mother, L.D. Centre County Children and Youth Services, as E.M.L.'s legal custodian, took no position in the proceeding. At the conclusion of the proceeding, the trial court granted E.M.L.'s petition and entered the Decree of Name Change.

On June 17, 2010, Appellants filed the instant appeal from that order. They subsequently filed a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and the trial court authored a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion.

Appellants present the following two questions for our review:

I. Did the minor child lack standing to bring the petition on his own behalf?

II. Did the Court abuse its discretion in finding that the name change would be in the minor child's best interest?

Appellants' Brief at 5.

The appellate standard of review involving a petition for change of name, regardless of the age of the petitioner, is whether or not there was an abuse of discretion. In re Change of Name of Zachary Thomas Andrew Grimes to Zachary Thomas Andrew Grimes–Palaia, 530 Pa. 388, 390, n. 1, 609 A.2d 158, 159, n. 1 (1992). When considering a petition to change the name of a minor child, the best interest of the child should be the standard by which a trial court exercises its discretion. Id. This Court has further held:

the party petitioning for the minor child's change of name has the burden of coming forward with evidence that the name change requested would be in the child's best interest, and that where a petition to change a child's name is contested, the court must carefully evaluate all of the relevant factual circumstances to determine if the petitioning parent has established that the change is in the child's best interest.

In re: C.R.C., 819 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa.Super.2003).

Appellants first argue that E.M.L. lacked standing to bring the petition on his own behalf because he is a minor. Appellants' Brief at 8. Appellants make the assertion that, as a matter of public policy, “minor children should not be accorded standing to initiate such legal actions absent express statutory authority.” Id. Appellants also assert that legal custody of E.M.L. resides with Centre County Children and Youth Services, and since they did not bring or join in the Petition for Special Relief/Petition for Change of Name, there was no standing for the action to be brought. Id. Appellants further claim that there is no statutory authority entitling E.M.L. to change his own name. Id.

The relevant statute pertaining to name changes provides:

The court of common pleas of any county may by order change the name of any person resident in the county.

54 Pa.C.S.A. § 702. In addressing this statute in the context of a petition for the name change of a minor, our Supreme Court has concluded:

The statutory scheme sets forth no criteria for the court to consider when exercising its discretion upon a petition for change of name. The only prohibition within the statute appears at § 705: “Any person violating the provisions of this chapter for purpose of avoiding payment of taxes or other debts commits a summary offense.”

In Re: Grimes, 530 Pa. at 391, 609 A.2d at 160. The Court also noted the procedural requirements for the petition.¹ After considering these provisions, the Court further stated:

The focus of the statute and the procedures thereunder, indicate a liberal policy regarding change of name requests. The necessity for judicial involvement centers on governmental concerns that persons not alter their identity to avoid financial obligations. Beyond requiring compliance with the notice provisions, the statute provides no additional guidance for courts considering petitions for change of name. Absent any legislative criteria, courts reviewing petitions for change of name exercise their discretion “in such a way as to comport with good sense, common decency and fairness to all concerned and to the public.”In Re: Grimes, 530 Pa. at 392, 609 A.2d at 160 (quoting Petition of Falcucci, 355 Pa. 588, 592, 50 A.2d 200, 202 (1947)).

While Appellants assert there is no statutory authority entitling E.M.L. to petition to change his name, we find no statutory authority prohibiting E.M.L. from seeking a name change. 54 Pa.C.S.A. § 702 itself sets forth no criteria for the court to consider when exercising its discretion upon a petition for change of name, aside from residency requirements, and Appellants make no claims that the residency requirement was not met.

Additionally, as outlined in In Re: Grimes, as long as the procedural requirements are met and the change of name is not sought for purposes of defrauding creditors, the court has broad discretion in considering a petition for name change. In Re: Grimes, 530 Pa. at 392, 609 A.2d at 160. Again, Appellants make no claims that the procedural requirements were not met, or that the name change was sought for fraudulent purposes.

Contrary to Appellants' assertions, there is no indication, statutorily or in case law, that 54 Pa.C.S.A. § 702 does not apply specifically to minor children, or that a minor is not entitled to the benefits of section 702 until attaining majority.² This Court has stated that while “a court would be reluctant to grant a very youthful minor's petition for a change of name ... our reluctance does not constitute a prohibition against granting a minor's petition for change of name.” Petition of Christjohn, 286 Pa.Super. 112, 428 A.2d 597, 599 (1981). Additionally, Appellants rely on the Court's statement in In re: Grimes that “such petitions are commonly brought by the child's natural or legal guardian pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 2026, et seq.” to establish that a minor cannot bring such a petition. Appellants' Brief at 9. This statement is simply commentary on the procedure commonly followed in bringing such a petition and does not establish that a petition for a minor may only be brought by the child's natural or legal guardian. See In re: Grimes, 530 Pa. at 392, n. 3, 609 A.2d at 160, n. 3.

Furthermore, with regard to actions brought by minors, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2027 provides:

When a party to an action, a minor shall be represented by a guardian who shall supervise and control the conduct of the action in behalf of the minor.

Rule 2026 defines “guardian” as the party representing the interest of a minor party in any action, whether a guardian appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction, a person in the nature of a next friend, or a guardian ad litem. Pa.R.C.P. 2026. Additionally, Rule 2031(a) provides that a minor plaintiff may select a guardian. Pa.R.Civ.P. 2031(a). Here, Attorney Pendergrast, as guardian ad litem, brought the petition on E.M.L.'s behalf. He adequately supervised and controlled the conduct of the action on behalf of E.M.L. We also note that no one has more of “a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the subject-matter litigation” than E.M.L., which is the requirement for standing recognized by Appellants in their brief. See Appellants' Brief at 8.

In summary, neither the statutory scheme nor case law prohibits E.M.L. from bringing a petition for a name change as a minor. E.M.L. proceeded via his guardian ad litem throughout the proceedings. Accordingly, Appellants' claim that E.M.L., by and through his guardian ad litem, lacked standing to bring this petition is without merit.

Appellants next contend that the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion that the name change was in E.M.L.'s best interest. Appellants' Brief at 9. In adopting the “best interests of the child” standard of review in appeals from the grant of a petition for the name change of a minor, our Supreme Court has stated:

Specific guidelines [for a child's best interests] are difficult to establish, for the circumstances in each case will be unique, as each child has individual physical, intellectual, moral, social and spiritual needs. However, general considerations should include the natural bonds between parent and child, the social stigma or respect afforded a particular name within the community, and, where the child is of sufficient age, whether the child intellectually and rationally understands the significance of changing his or her name.In Re: Grimes, 530 Pa. at 394, 609 A.2d at 161.

In this case, E.M.L. was removed from his birth parents' care and placed with his foster family when he was one and a half years old. N.T., 5/18/10, at 6. At the time of the hearing, E.M.L. was fifteen years old and had been living with his foster family for twelve and a half years. Id. During the hearing, E.M.L. testified that he considers his foster family to be his family. Id. When asked about his connection with his biological parents, E.M.L. responded: “Connection? There's not much connection anymore because we don't visit anymore...