T.W. v. D.A.
| Decision Date | 10 November 2015 |
| Citation | 2015 PA Super 233,127 A.3d 826 |
| Parties | T.W., Appellant v. D.A., Appellee. T.W., Appellant v. D.A., Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Benjamin E. Orsatti, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Ashley E. Sharek, Pittsburgh, for appellee.
T.W. (“Father”) appeals from the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County denying his petition to change his minor son's name from D.A.'s (“Mother”) surname to match his own, or have his son's name hyphenated to include both parents' surnames. Father also appeals the order denying his petition for reconsideration.1
The child is three years old. The parties share legal and physical custody.2 After our review, we affirm the trial court's order docketed at 337 WDA 2015, and we quash the appeal docketed at 336 WDA 2015.
Father raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in entering an order dismissing Father's petition to change the name of a minor child, which order was not in the best interests of the child in question;
2. Whether the trial court erred in disregarding the natural bonds between Father and the child, with whom he has equally shared physical custody, and the respect afforded Father's name within the community;
3. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in failing to find that Mother's reluctance to use Father's name for the child was rooted in hostility between Mother and Father;
4. Given that the standard for adjudication of a name change is the best interests of the child, whether the trial court erred by not setting forth in writing the statutory best interest factors;
5. Whether the trial court erred by failing to grant reconsideration and scheduling a subsequent day for adjudication of Father's name change petition where the trial court, in so doing, failed to “ensure that as full and complete a record as possible is created when a decision as important as the welfare of a child is at issue,” thereby not fulfilling “the duty of the trial court to make the fullest record possible inquiry in custody actions.” Moore v. Moore 535 Pa. 18, 634 A.2d 163, 167 (Pa.1993).
As Father's first three claims are related, we address them together.
Our standard of review involving a petition for change of name, regardless of the age of the petitioner, is whether there was an abuse of discretion. In re Change of Name of Zachary Thomas Andrew Grimes to Zachary Thomas Andrew Grimes–Palaia, 530 Pa. 388, 609 A.2d 158, 159 n. 1 (1992). An abuse of discretion exists if the trial court has overridden or misapplied the law, or if the evidence is insufficient to sustain the order. Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Pa.Super.2003). Further, resolution of factual issues is for the trial court, and a reviewing court will not disturb the trial court's findings if those findings are supported by competent evidence. It is not enough for reversal that we, if sitting as a trial court, may have made a differing finding or reached a different result. Id.
The statute pertaining to name changes provides: “The court of common pleas of any county may by order change the name of any person resident in the county.” 54 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(a). Other than providing for the granting of a petition in the absence of any lawful objection, the statute sets forth no standards for the court's exercise of its discretion. Our Supreme Court has directed the lower courts to exercise their discretion, in name change cases, in such a way as to “comport with good sense, common decency and fairness to all concerned and to the public.” Petition of Falcucci, 355 Pa. 588, 50 A.2d 200, 202 (1947).
In 1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that when considering a contested petition to change the name of a minor child, the best interest of the child is the standard by which a trial court exercises its discretion. See Grimes, 609 A.2d at 161 (Pa.1992) ().3 In adopting the “best interests of the child” standard, our Supreme Court stated:
The statutory scheme sets forth no criteria for the court to consider when exercising its discretion upon a petition for change of name. The only prohibition within the statute appears at § 705: “Any person violating the provisions of this chapter for purpose of avoiding payment of taxes or other debts commits a summary offense.” ... Specific guidelines [for a child's best interests] are difficult to establish, for the circumstances in each case will be unique, as each child has individual physical, intellectual, moral, social and spiritual needs. However, general considerations should include the natural bonds between parent and child, the social stigma or respect afforded a particular name within the community, and, where the child is of sufficient age, whether the child intellectually and rationally understands the significance of changing his or her name.
Id. at 160, 161 (emphasis added). The Court further stated: “Beyond requiring compliance with the notice provisions, the statute provides no additional guidance for courts considering petitions for change of name.” Id. at 160 (quoting Petition of Falcucci, supra at 202.) See also In re Change of Name of E.M.L. to E.M.S., 19 A.3d 1068 (Pa.Super.2011).
In In re: C.R.C., 819 A.2d 558 (Pa.Super.2003), this Court stated that the party petitioning for the minor child's change of name has the burden of coming forward with evidence that the name change would be in the child's best interest. Id. at 560. Further, where a petition to change a child's name is contested, the court must carefully evaluate all of the relevant factual circumstances to determine if the petitioning parent has established that the change is in the child's best interest. Id.; see also Petition of Christjohn, 286 Pa.Super. 112, 428 A.2d 597 (1981).
Here, the trial court concluded that Father did not meet his burden of showing that the proposed name change was in the child's best interests. Instead, the court determined that Father sought to change the child's name to further his own interest in the survival of his surname. With the above considerations and standards in mind, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's petition for name change.
The trial court found that Father's preference that his surname carries on was insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a name change was in the child's best interests. Father stated that the child has a half-sister with Father's surname, and that his name is known in the community because he coaches youth sports and intends to coach his son. N.T. Hearing, 1/9/15, at 13–16. Father also stated at the hearing that his motivation for the name change was for his son “to be able to identify with two people that are very big parts of his life, myself and his only sibling.” Id. at 14. However, the trial court did not find this testimony credible. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/2/15, at 6. On the contrary, the trial court found Father's “credible evidence established that he sought to change child's name to further his own interest in the survival of his surname, and because he believes children should have their father's last name.” Id. at 4. See In re: Name Change of C.R.C., 819 A.2d 558 (Pa.Super.2003) ().
Father's testimony is replete with references to his own desires, beliefs and concerns, including testimony that his “only son is able to carry on” his family name, and his belief that his son may be “embarrassed” or “bullied” if he has a different surname than Father. N.T. Hearing, supra at 12–15. Although we do not disagree that these concerns and considerations are of great significance to Father regarding his son, Father offered minimal support for the more relevant issue of whether the name change would affirmatively be in the child's best interest.
Our Supreme Court has not provided definitive factors to consider in a name change case, instead requiring only that the courts consider the natural bonds between parent and child, the social stigma or respect afforded a particular name within the community, and, where the child is of sufficient age, whether the child intellectually and rationally understands the significance of changing his or her name. Grimes, supra. Here, the trial court found Father presented no evidence that changing the child's surname would strengthen his current, admittedly strong bond with the child. Further, Father presented no evidence that the child's name compromised the child's bond with him or with his half-sister. The court also found speculative Father's testimony that his surname was afforded respect in the community beyond that afforded to child's current surname.
The court acknowledged that Father presented evidence that he had shared legal and physical custody of the child, however, this alone does not provide sufficient evidence that a name change is in the child's best interest.4 In light of the growing prevalence of blended families and the evolving definition of the family structure, we are unable to evaluate the fact that Father shares equal custody with Mother as anything but neutral. Absent legislative guidance, we refuse to assign greater weight to a shared custody award.
Because we are bound by the court's credibility findings that are supported in the record and our narrow standard of review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Father failed to meet his burden of establishing that a name change was in the child's best interest. See D.K. v. S.P.K., 102 A.3d 467, 478 (Pa.Super.2014) (...
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