In re Chappell's Estate

• Decision Date: 14 March 1923
• Docket Number: 17574.
• Citation: 124 Wash. 128,213 P. 684
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In re CHAPPELL'S ESTATE. v. CHAPPELL et al. CHAPPELL

213 P. 684

124 Wash. 128

In re CHAPPELL'S ESTATE.

CHAPPELL v. CHAPPELL et al.

No. 17574.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 14, 1923

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; King Dykeman, Judge.

In the matter of the estate of William Chappell, deceased. Petition by Edmond Chappell to have certain provisions of the will of deceased set aside, opposed by Margaret F. Chappell and others, as executors and trustees. From a judgment of dismissal, the petitioner appeals. Affirmed.

Bausman Oldham, Bulitt & Eggerman, of Seattle, Gavin McNab, of San Francisco, Cal., and Walter L. Nossaman, of Seattle, for appellant.

John B Hart and Griffin & Griffin, all of Seattle, for respondents.

TOLMAN J.

Appellant by a petition filed in this cause, then pending in the probate department of the superior court for King county sought to have set aside certain provisions of the will of William Chappell, deceased, upon the ground that Chappell, at the time of the making of the will, and at the time of his death, was domiciled in, and a resident of the sate of California; that the property involved, though situated in this state, is personal property, and must be administered according to the law of the domicile of the decedent; that under the laws of California, which are pleaded, the trust provisions of the will are void, and therefore the decedent died intestate as to such property. The petitioner, being a son and the only descendant of the deceased, seeks to have the property belonging to the estate within the jurisdiction of the court released from the trust, and distributed according to the laws of descent one-half to himself and one-half to the widow. A demurrer to the petition was sustained, and petitioner electing to stand upon his petition, a judgment of dismissal followed, from which he has appealed.

The will, which is by reference made a part of the petition, and all of which we have fully considered, has a provision as follows:

'Fifth: The trust hereby created shall continue and my said trustees herein named and their successors hereafter to be selected shall hold, manage, and control my property and the rents, issues, profits and renewals thereof as herein provided for a period of sixty years from and after the time of my death. Provided, however, that if all of my brothers and sisters herein named and all of my nephews and nieces, children of my said brothers and sisters, who shall be living at the date of my death, shall die before forty years from the date of my death, then said trust period shall cease and my estate shall be settled and distributed as herein provided twenty years after the date of the death of the last surviving brother or sister, nephew or niece, who shall be living at the time of my death. At the expiration of said trust period, hereby designated, after the day of my death, the estate then remaining in the hands of my trustees shall be then divided, distributed and conveyed as follows: To my wife, Margaret E. Chappell, if living, and to her legal heirs in the event of her death an undivided one-third of any and all of my property and estate, both personal and real wherever the same is situated. The remaining two-thirds of my estate, both personal and real wherever situated shall be divided equally, share and share alike, among my said mother, Angeline E. Chappell, and my sisters, Annie Chappell Monroe, Dora Chappell Robinson, Vietta Chappell Robinson, and Lillie Chappell Wetherill, and my brothers, James B. Chappell, Charles Chappell, and Marion J. Chappell. And in the event of the death of my said mother, or either or any of my sisters or brothers, then the portion which would have been distributed to such mother, sister or brother had he or she lived, shall be distributed to the legitmate legal descendants of such deceased person or persons if any there be, each taking by representation, and if there shall be no legitimate legal descendant of any one or more of the said sisters or brothers living, the amount which would have been distributed to such sister or brother shall be divided equally among my remaining sisters and brothers and their legitimate living descendants taking by representation. Provided that my two nephews, one the son of my sister Vietta by her first husband, and one the son of my brother Marion J. Chappell by his first wife, shall receive one dollar ($1.00) each and no more, in the payments and distribution of my estate.'

It appears to be conceded that under the common-law rule prevalent in this state the continuance of the trust throughout a period covered by lives in being and 20 years thereafter are not unlawful, but it is contended that the California law must be applied because of the allegation that the decedent was there domiciled, and that the California law on the subject of restraints on alienation is such as to make the quoted conditions of the will absolutely void. Assuming the California law to be as stated, and passing the question of whether the allegations of the petition to the effect that the decedent was domiciled in California are sufficient on demurrer to overcome the recital in the will. 'I, William Chappell, of King county, Washington,' we approach what seems to us to be the main and important question in the case without circumlocution.

The general rule undoubtedly is that, as applied to personal property, the law of the domicile governs. Various reasons have been given for this rule, but none seems to us more satisfactory than that the testator is presumed to be familiar with the laws of his domicile; to have prepared his will in the light of those laws, and to apply any other law would be at great risk of defeating his intent, unless it is manifest that the testator had the laws of some other place, or country, in view. As said by Mr. Justice Story in Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Pet. 483, 9 L.Ed. 201:

'The language of wills is not of universal interpretation, having the same precise import in all countries, and under all circumstances. They are supposed to speak the

...