In re Chase
Decision Date | 25 September 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 18914.,18914. |
Parties | In the Matter of Frederick J. CHASE, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
William C. Cunningham, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York City, for appellant.
James R. Thompson, U. S. Atty., Gary L. Starkman, John Peter Lulinski, Jeffrey Cole, Asst. U. S. Attys., Chicago, Ill., for appellee.
Before CUMMINGS, PELL and STEVENS, Circuit Judges.
Rehearing En Banc Denied October 24, 1972.
In June 1969, appellant Frederick Chase and ten others were indicted for destroying government property, mutilating government records, interfering with the working of the Selective Service Act by force and violence, and conspiracy to commit those three offenses. After a lengthy jury trial, Chase was found guilty on all four counts. He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment on Counts III and IV, to run concurrently; as to the remaining two counts, he was placed on probation for five years commencing with the expiration of the other sentences.
When the trial of the eleven defendants commenced on May 6, 1970, Chase refused to stand when the trial judge entered the courtroom, and he continued to do so whenever the judge or the jury entered or left the courtroom during the trial.
At the opening of the afternoon session on May 8, Chase's counsel read into the record a note from Chase explaining his refusal to rise. This note reads as follows:
Chase then told the court:
In response, the judge stated:
Thereafter, the following colloquy occurred between the court and Chase:
Subsequently Chase advised the court that he did not belong to any formal religion but was "from a catholic background." He said that since the community of man was his god, he could not place anything above his respect for human life and therefore could stand for the trial judge only as a man rather than as a judge.
At the close of the proceedings on May 15, Chase again explained his attitude, stating:
During the course of the trial and at its conclusion, a total of five certifications of criminal contempt for persistence in refusing to stand on the entrance of the court or jury were read to Chase pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.2 The first certification was rendered on May 11 and was accompanied by the following prefatory remarks:
In the first certification of contempt, 3-day consecutive sentences were imposed for seven refusals to rise when the court or jury entered the courtroom on the afternoon of May 8 and again on May 11. The second certification of contempt occurred on May 15 and covered eleven similar refusals to rise, again resulting in 3-day sentences consecutive to those imposed on May 11. The third certification, handed down on May 19, covered 15 later identical contempts, resulting in a 45-day consecutive sentence; the fourth certification, rendered May 21, covered 13 later contempts resulting in a 39-day consecutive sentence; and the final certification, given at the close of the trial on June 9, covered 53 similar refusals to rise, again resulting in 3-day consecutive sentences for each. Together the five certifications covered 99 identical acts of contempt,3 resulting in a total sentence of 297 days to be served prior to the 5-year prison term imposed upon conviction of the offenses for which he was indicted.
Chase first contends that the certifications of criminal contempt must be vacated because his refusals to rise do not constitute misbehavior obstructing the administration of justice within the meaning of the contempt statute.4 We ruled to the contrary in United States ex rel. Robson v. Malone, 412 F.2d 848, 850, stating that the rising "requirement is sufficiently related to maintaining order in the actual presence of the court, so that an infraction can be dealt with summarily under Rule 42(a) * * *."5 As we pointed out, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
U.S. v. Snider
...sometimes might not rise to the level of an actual and material obstruction of the judicial process.' Finally, in In re Chase, 468 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1972), the Seventh Circuit found that a refusal to stand coupled with what the court deemed to be necessary interruption of the trial by reas......
-
R.A. V. v. City of St Paul, Minnesota
...v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 201, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1685, 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 6. Cf. In re Chase, 468 F.2d 128, 139-140 (CA7 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that defendant who, for reasons of religious belief, refused to rise and stand as the trial judge entere......
-
U.S. v. Miller
...review generally seems to have been afforded without such a requirement. See, e. g., Mitchell v. Fiore, supra 470 F.2d at 1149; In re Chase, 468 F.2d 128 (7 1972); United States v. Bukowski, supra 435 F.2d at 1094; United States v. Snyder, 428 F.2d 520 (9 Cir. 1970), Cert. denied, 400 U.S. ......
-
United States v. Farah
...is no indication that appellant was called for the sole purpose of being bludgeoned with contempt penalties....”); In the Matter of Chase, 468 F.2d 128 (7th Cir.1972) (allowing multiple criminal contempts when defendant repeatedly refused to stand up during a lengthy trial in defiance of th......