In re Chisholm's Will
| Decision Date | 16 October 1918 |
| Docket Number | 283. |
| Parties | IN RE CHISHOLM'S WILL. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Hoke County; Calvert, Judge.
Proceeding for the probate of the alleged last will of John Chisholm deceased, brought by Mrs. Sallie Covington and others proponents, and opposed by M. A. Chisholm, caveator. From the judgment rendered, the proponents appeal. Reversed.
In this proceeding a consent judgment was entered at August term 1917, of Hoke, providing, among other things, that the caveator, M. A. Chisholm, was indebted to the propounders Mrs. Sallie Covington, Mrs. Maude Steele, and Zebbie Harris, in the sum of $6,000, to be paid within 90 days after the signing of the judgment. Payment was not made or tendered until 3 1/3 months after the said 90 days had expired. The propounders claim interest at 6 per cent. on the $6,000 for said 3 1/3 months. From the judgment that the propounders were not entitled to interest on the said $6,000 for the 3 1/3 months, the propounders appealed.
The caption of a statute may be called in aid of construction, but it cannot control the text, when the text itself is clear.
J. W. Currie, of Raeford, for appellants.
The only exception is for error in disallowing the $100 interest for the 3 1/3 months elapsing after the expiration of the 90 days. The $6,000 was paid 6 1/3 months after judgment signed, without prejudice to either side as to the liability for the said interest.
A consent judgment is a contract between the parties thereto. Bank v. Commissioners, 119 N.C. 214, 25 S.E. 966; Bunn v. Braswell, 139 N.C. 135, 51 S.E. 927. The consent judgment specifies that the $6,000 should be a lien upon the land of the caveator which was pledged as security for the indebtedness. The caveator not having paid at the specified date, we can find no reason that said sum should not bear interest during the delay to make payment after the stipulated date. Rev. § 1954, in the chapter on "Interest," provides:
"All sums of money due by contract of any kind whatsoever, excepting money due on penal bonds, shall bear interest, and when a jury shall render a verdict therefor they shall distinguish the principal from the sum allowed as interest; and the principal sum due on all such contracts shall bear interest from the time of rendering judgment thereon until it be paid and satisfied."
Said section further provides:
"In like manner, the amount of any judgment or decree, except the costs, rendered or adjudged in any kind of action, though not on contract, shall bear interest till paid, and the judgment and decree of the court shall be rendered...
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