In re City of Rochester

• Decision Date: 22 April 1913
• Parties: In re CITY OF ROCHESTER.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

208 N.Y. 188

101 N.E. 875

In re CITY OF ROCHESTER.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 22, 1913.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Application by the City of Rochester to acquire lands of the Otis Elevator Company for the widening of Frank street. From an order of the Appellate Division (139 N. Y. Supp. 1119) modifying and affirming, as modified, the confirmation by the common council of the report of commissioners, the Otis Elevator Company appeals. Reversed, and proceedings remitted to the County Court, with directions to appoint other commissioners.

Edward C. Randall, of Buffalo, for appellant.

Albert L. Shepard, of Rochester, for respondent.

COLLIN, J.

The appellant, Otis Elevator Company, asserts that the common council of the city of Rochester should have rejected the report of the commissioners in this proceeding, for the reason, among others, that two of the three commissioners were interested, because each owned lands within the district upon which their award was to be assessed.

The proceeding was instituted, under provisions of the charter of the city of Rochester, to acquire lands for the widening of Frank street of that city. The appellant owned a large part of those lands. Regularly in the course of the proceeding the common council directed that the expense of the public improvement be assessed upon all the lots and parcels of land located in 9 designated wards of the city. There were in the city 22 wards. Thereafter the city applied, after due notice to the interested parties, to the County Court of Monroe county for the appointment of commissioners to ascertain and report to the common council the compensation to be awarded to the owners of the property to be taken. The appellant appeared upon the application and consented that commissioners be appointed, and the court thereupon appointed three persons such commissioners. The total compensation awarded was $56,750, of which $50,000 was to the appellant. Pursuant to the provisions of the charter of the city, the common council assigned a time and place for hearing the objections of any person interested in the confirmation of the award, and at the hearingappellant duly raised the objection, among others, that two of the commissioners were disqualified to act, because each of them owned land in the district to be assessed and was personally interested in the award by reason of his liability to pay a part of it, and introduced proof that the appellant and its counsel were ignorant of such fact until after the award was made. The confirmation of the report and award was made, and was affirmed by the Appellate Division upon the appeal, permitted by a provision of the charter of the city, of the Otis Elevator Company.

[1] A provision of the charter authorized the court, the prescribed antecedent acts having been done, to ‘appoint three commissioners of appraisal who are residents and freeholders of the city * * * not interested in any of the real estate, rights or easements sought to be taken, nor of kin to any owner thereof, or to any person having any estate, right or interest therein, or lien, charge or incumbrance thereon.’ L. 1907, c. 755, § 438. The fact that a commissioner of appraisal owned land to be assessed was not, therefore, a disqualification under the language of this provision, and the counsel for the respondent asserts that the provision specifically and affirmatively qualified the commissioners objected to. We have reached a contrary conclusion.

The common council of the city, pursuant to a provision of the charter, directed that the whole of the expense of the improvement be assessed ‘per front foot’ upon the property within the designated wards. Manifestly, therefore, and it is an unquestioned fact, the part of the expense to be paid by each landowner of those wards depended upon the aggregate expense of the improvement, and consequently upon the awards of compensation by the commissioners of appraisal. An award to the appellant greater than that actually made would have increased the sum to be paid by each of such owners, including the two commissioners. The property rights and interests of the two commissioners were therefore affected by their action and award.

The plain dictates of justice and fair dealing, compliance with which, through general principles and precedents investing it with certitude and continuity, is the vitality of the law, require that a man shall not be a judge in his own cause. ‘The learned wisdom of enlightened nations and the unlettered ideas of ruder societies are in full accordance upon this point; and wherever tribunals of justice have existed all men have agreed that a judge shall never have the power to decide where he is himself a party.’ Washington Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Price, 1 Hopk. Ch. 1. The rule is rooted in sound reason. Self-interest and selfishness are persuasive or compelling forces in all ordinary affairs, and rare, indeed, is the person in whom mental rectitude and a clear and impartial judgment are not impaired by them in determining an issue between himself and another. It is, moreover, essential to the purpose and the perpetuity of the law as the supreme power enforcing justice and order among men that it and the tribunals which declare and administer it secure to themselves without intermission or substantial diminution the respect and confidence of those subject to their jurisdiction. In People ex rel. Roe v. Suffolk Common Pleas, 18 Wend. 550, 552, Judge Bronson well said: ‘Next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge.’ So vital is deemed the observance of this principle that it has been held that a judge disqualified under a statute cannot act even with the consent of the parties interested, because the law was not designed merely for the protection of the parties to the suit, but for the general interests of justice. Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 547;St. John v. Andrews Institute, 192 N. Y. 382, 387,85 N. E. 143.

The Constitution of the state expressly guards the citizen against an unjust or illegal exercise of the right to deprive him of his property through eminent domain. It provides that just compensation shall be made for all property thus taken, injured, or destroyed, to be ascertained by a jury or by not less than three commissioners appointed by a court of record, as shall be prescribed by law. Constitution, art. 1, §§ 6, 7. The rule that the courts should zealously secure to all the parties in actions or proceedings submitted to them an unbiased hearing and decision should be as rigidly adhered to in a proceeding affecting the right to own and enjoy property as in an action in a duly constituted court. The exercise of the right of eminent domain involves a hearing upon notice to the parties interested, the receiving and weighing of evidence, a determination based upon the evidence, is judicial in character, and the commissioners of appraisal should not have an interest, as the law defines the word, in the proceeding.

The courts of this state extend to the rule that a man shall not be a judge in his own cause a broad signification and a liberal application. The accuracy of such statement is attested by the exceptions to the rule. In People ex rel. Howlett v. Mayor, etc., of Syracuse, 63 N. Y. 291, 295, one of three commissioners to award compensation and assess the expense in eminent domain was a trustee of a church liable to...