In re Clara S. Robinson's Will

• Decision Date: 24 January 1929
• Parties: IN RE CLARA S. ROBINSON'S WILL
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

144 A. 457

101 Vt. 464

IN RE CLARA S. ROBINSON'S WILL

Supreme Court of Vermont

January 24, 1929

November Term, 1928

Courts---Appeal from Probate Court to Supreme Court---G. L 3451---Construction of Writings---Wills---Rules of Construction To Determine Whether Legatee Receives Fee or Life Estate with Remainder over to Another---Intent of Testator---Meaning of "Requires" and "Personal Benefit" as Used in Will---Inheritance Tax as Part of Decree of Distribution---Acts 1925, No. 30---Power of Probate Court To Appoint Trustee---G. L. 3487.

1. Under G. L. 3451, direct appeal from a decree of probate court making final distribution of estate of decedent may be taken to Supreme Court "in the manner provided in cases of appeals from the court of chancery," which are effected by motions filed with the clerk of that court.

2. Only office of judicial construction being to remove doubt and uncertainty, where terms of a writing are plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction, but it is to be given effect according to its own language, and use of a term susceptible of two or more meanings does not necessarily make meaning of sentence in which it appears ambiguous or doubtful.

3. Where property is given by will to one absolutely, together with power, express or implied, of unlimited disposition of it, and by another clause of will it is attempted to give over an undisposed-of remainder of property, limitation over is void for repugnancy, since fee, having been given, its essential attributes cannot be curtailed.

4. Where a life estate only is given by will, and life tenant is endowed with power of disposition, limitation over of such of property as remains undisposed of by life tenant at his death is valid.

5. When an absolute estate is in terms given by will, if subsequent passages therein plainly show that it was intended that beneficiary should take life interest only, gift is restricted accordingly.

6. Where estate given by will is not especially limited to life of donee, it may be enlarged into a fee by an unlimited power of disposition.

7. A qualified power of disposition does not create a fee simple estate, whether it be annexed to life estate expressly given or to a general devise which does not specify quality of estate.

8. Cardinal rule of construction of wills is that meaning intended by testator is to be ascertained and given effect in so far as legally possible.

9. To determine testator's intent, court should take instrument by its four corners, consider it in all its parts, and give effect to its language read in light of relation of parties concerned and circumstances attending its execution, also giving effect to all its provisions, if they can be so reconciled as to make them lawful.

10. In bequest to certain person of property "to be used for his own personal benefit in so far as he requires it," with provision that remainder, if any, at his death, should go to another, held that word "requires" was used in sense of "demands," and that term "personal benefit" did not limit him merely to so much as was necessary for his support, "benefit" being a much broader term than "support," and not obliging him to restrict himself to his present scale of living, or to resort to his own or his wife's industry or resources but that in his calls upon estate he must act reasonably and in good faith toward remainderman.

11. Under Acts 1925, No. 30, probate court must make amount of inheritance tax part of final decree of distribution.

12. Where will gave certain property to person "to be used for his own personal benefit so far as he requires it," with remainder, if any, at his death to another, probate court had authority under G. L. 3487 to appoint a trustee to handle property, and application for such appointment was addressed to discretion of probate court.

APPEAL to Supreme Court from decree of distribution, made by probate court for the district of Orleans, of property under the will of Clara S. Robinson.

Decree reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings and decree in accordance with the views herein expressed. Let Davis recover his costs in this Court. To be certified to the probate court.

E. A. Cook and Searles, Graves & Waterman for appellant Davis.

Erwin M. Harvey, commissioner of taxes, for the State.

J. W. Redmond for the appellee.

Present: WATSON, C. J., POWERS, SLACK, MOULTON, and CHASE, JJ.

OPINION

POWERS

This is a direct appeal from a decree of the probate court making final distribution of the estate of the late Clara S. Robinson. Some suggestion is made that the appeal is defective in the manner of its taking; but the statute provides (G. L. 3451) that such appeals as this may be taken to this Court "in the manner provided in cases of appeals from the court of chancery." Chancery appeals are effected by motions filed with the clerk of that court--without more. Hyde Park v. St. J. & L. C. R. R. Co., 84 Vt. 326, 79 A. 873; Gove v. Gove's Admr., 87 Vt. 468, 470, 89 A. 868. So under a statute quite like the one here involved, appeals from the orders of the Public Service Commission are taken by motions filed with its clerk. Hyde Park v. St. J. & L. C. R. R. Co., 83 Vt. 562, 563, 77 A. 913. Such motions, though informal or inaccurate, are sufficient to bring up the case. Bufton v. Crane et ux., 101 Vt. 276, 143 A. 382, 383.

Clara S. Robinson died testate, leaving an estate amounting to about $ 37,000. By her will, after making several specific bequests, she disposed of the bulk of her property by a clause reading as follows: "I will and bequeath to Carroll A. Davis the residue of my property, to be used for his own personal benefit in so far as he requires it, if there should be any of my estate left after his death, then it is my will that the residue of my estate be converted into money and the same be holden in trust by the trustees of the Orleans County Memorial Hospital Association, the income to be used for the general purposes of the Hospital."

The question submitted to us is, What did Davis take under this will?

It is claimed in his behalf that he takes a fee in the residue, and that the attempted gift over is void for repugnancy. Or, if this claim is untenable, he takes, it is argued, a life estate in the residue with the right to consume so much of it as he may desire. The hospital disputes both these claims, and takes the position that he gets nothing but a privilege of resorting to this property, principal or interest, if and when, after exhausting his own resources, his necessities require.

We quite agree with counsel for the hospital when he argues that the only office of judicial construction is to remove doubt and uncertainty. It is the settled doctrine of our decisions that where the terms of a writing, whatever its character, are plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction and it is to be given effect according to its own language. We agree, too, that the use of a term susceptible of two or more meanings does not necessarily make the meaning of the sentence in which it appears ambiguous or doubtful. Apt illustrations of cases of this kind were suggested at the argument. But as Mr. Justice Holmes says, "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425, 62 L.Ed. 372, 376, 38 S.Ct. 158, 159, L.R.A. 1918D, 254. And, though the claim of the hospital was presented with much confidence, we cannot agree that the meaning of this residuary clause is so clear and unmistakable as to render our services unnecessary. In reaching this conclusion, we are only adopting the attitude of the court in Hull v. Holloway, 58 Conn. 210, 20 A. 445, 446--a case much relied upon by the hospital--wherein the clause under consideration was in much the same terms as the one before us, which terms the court characterized as "ambiguous language."

The following propositions are unquestionably established as the law: (1) Where property is given by will to one absolutely together with the power, express or implied, of unlimited disposition of it, and by another clause of the will it is attempted to give over an undisposed-of remainder of the property, the limitation over is void for repugnancy; because, if you give a fee, you cannot curtail its essential attributes. (2) Where a life estate only is given, and the life tenant is endowed with the power of disposition, the limitation over of such of the property as remains undisposed of by the life tenant at his death is valid. Stowell v. Hastings, 59 Vt. 494, 496, 8 A. 738, 59 A. R. 748; Judevine's Exrs. v. Judevine, 61 Vt. 587, 593, 18 A. 778, 7 L.R.A. 517; Morse v. Stoddard's Estate, 90 Vt. 479, 485, 98 A. 991. (3) Even when an absolute estate is in terms given by the will, if subsequent passages therein plainly show that it was intended that the beneficiary should take a life interest only, the gift is restricted accordingly. McCloskey v. Gleason, 56 Vt. 264, 267, 48 A. R. 770; Stowell v. Hastings, supra; Conant's Exrs. v. Palmer, 63 Vt. 310, 313, 21 A. 1101; Chaplin v. Doty, 60 Vt. 712, 715, 15 A. 362; Judevine's Exrs. v. Judevine, supra; Crossman v. Crossman's Estate, 100 Vt. 407, 411, 138 A. 730. (4) Where the estate given is not especially limited to the life of the donee, it may be enlarged into a fee by an unlimited power of disposition. Stowell v. Hastings, supra; Parks' Admr. v. American Home Missionary Soc., 62 Vt. 19, 22, 20 A. 107. (5) A qualified power of disposition does not create a fee-simple estate, whether it be annexed to a life estate expressly given or to a...