In re Coffman

• Citation: 766 F.3d 1246
• Decision Date: 04 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–10016.,13–10016.
• Parties: In re Michael Reese COFFMAN, Petitioner.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

766 F.3d 1246

In re Michael Reese COFFMAN, Petitioner.

No. 13–10016.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Sept. 4, 2014.

Robert G. Davies, Randall Joseph Hensel, Lennard B. Register, III, Pamela C. Marsh, U.S. Attorney's Office, Pensacola, FL, for United States of America.

Valarie Linnen, Valarie Linnen, Esq., Atlantic Beach, FL, Michael Reese Coffman, Pollock, LA, for Michael Reese Coffman.

On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the Northern District of Florida. D.C. Docket No. 3:05–cr–00017–RV–MD–3.

Before WILSON, PRYOR, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PRYOR, Circuit Judge:

This petition requires us to decide whether a federal prisoner may apply for “an order establishing” a “lost or destroyed record of [a] proceeding in [a] court,” 28 U.S.C. § 1734, when the prisoner failed to allege any legal need for the record. A jury convicted Michael Reese Coffman of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(A)(viii). After his unsuccessful direct appeal and collateral attack of his sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Coffman has returned to our Court because he wants—for no apparent reason—a copy of an exhibit from his trial. The clerk of the district court destroyed the exhibit from Coffman's closed case in accordance with local rules, but Coffman later applied to the district court to “establish” the record, id. §§ 1734, 1735. The district court denied the application, and Coffman filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in our Court to require the district court to hold a hearing to establish the record. After briefing and oral argument, we deny Coffman's petition because he failed to allege any need for the record in any pending or contemplated legal proceeding.

I. BACKGROUND

A federal grand jury indicted Coffman on one count of conspiracy to manufacture and to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)( l )(A)(viii), 846. Because the United States failed to introduce any evidence at trial that Coffman intended to manufacture the drug, the district court suggested that it redact “to manufacture” from the indictment before providing it to the jury for deliberations. The parties agreed, and the court redacted the indictment, marked it as Court Exhibit 2, and gave it to the jury.

The jury returned a guilty verdict against Coffman on the single count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, and the district court sentenced him to life imprisonment. We affirmed his sentence on direct appeal, United States v. Coffman, 188 Fed.Appx. 945 (11th Cir.2006), and the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, Coffman v. United States, 549 U.S. 1235, 127 S.Ct. 1316, 167 L.Ed.2d 126 (2007). Coffman then filed a motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied. We denied his request for a certificate of appealability, and the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, Coffman v. United States, 558 U.S. 1061, 130 S.Ct. 772, 175 L.Ed.2d 538 (2009). Coffman filed a motion for reconsideration, Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), which the district court denied, and we again denied his request for a certificate of appealability. See28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).

Seven months later, Coffman wrote a letter to the clerk of the district court requesting a copy of the redacted indictment from his trial. But the mandate had issued more than 30 days before Coffman sent his letter, and the clerk had disposed of the record according to a local rule. The clerk advised Coffman that the record was “not available” because “Northern District of Florida Local Rule 5.2 calls for the disposition of exhibits thirty days after the mandate on direct appeal.”

Unsatisfied with the response from the clerk, Coffman applied for an “order establishing the lost or destroyed record.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1734, 1735. The district court denied the application and stated that “Government Exhibit 2 (a quantity of methamphetamine) was returned to the [Drug Enforcement Agency], as customary.” The district court apparently mistook Government Exhibit 2, which related to the quantity of drugs, for Court Exhibit 2, which was the redacted indictment. Coffman then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus to require the district court to hold a hearing to establish the record. A judge of this Court appointed counsel to represent Coffman.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because a writ of mandamus is an action against the district court judge, “the remedy ... is a drastic one” that “only exceptional circumstances, amounting to a judicial usurpation of power, will justify.” In re Moody, 739 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir.2014). We will issue a writ only if a petitioner establishes that he “ha[s] no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires” and that his right to the issuance of the writ is “clear and indisputable.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380–81, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 2586–87, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We also “must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Id. at 381, 124 S.Ct. at 2587.

III. DISCUSSION

We decline to issue a writ of mandamus to the district court to establish the lost or stolen record because Coffman has no right to relief under sections 1734 or 1735. Our Court has never interpreted those sections, but the plain text and statutory context make clear that those sections are evidentiary rules used to recreate a record for a pending or contemplated judicial, administrative, or other legal proceeding. Section 1734 prescribes a process for a court to establish a lost or destroyed record when an interested person needs the record for some legal proceeding, but Coffman has alleged no such need. And section 1735 applies in only two limited circumstances, neither of which is present here.

As an initial matter, Coffman filed his application under both sections 1734 and 1735, but he clearly falls outside of the ambit of section 1735. That section applies only in two circumstances: when the United States is a party to the matter and a certified copy of the record is available, 28 U.S.C. § 1735(a), or when the United States is the interested party seeking to establish the record, id. § 1735(b). Even though the United States prosecuted Coffman at his trial, nothing in the record suggests that a certified copy of the redacted indictment is available or that the United States is interested in establishing it.

To evaluate whether Coffman's request falls within the scope of section 1734, we begin with the text of the section. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1537, 71 L.Ed.2d 748 (1982) (“As in all cases involving statutory construction, our starting point must be the language employed by Congress ....” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Section 1734 comprises two subsections. Subsection (a) provides that “[a] lost or destroyed record of any proceeding in any court of the United States may be supplied on application of any interested person not at fault, by substituting a copy certified by the clerk of any court in which an authentic copy is lodged.” 28 U.S.C. § 1734(a). This subsection does not apply to Coffman because the clerk of the court in which the authentic copy was lodged has since disposed of the record. Subsection (b) provides the process for establishing a lost or destroyed record by verified application, service on interested persons, and a hearing:

Where a certified copy is not available, any interested person not at fault may file in such court a verified application for an order establishing the lost or destroyed record.

Every other interested person shall be served personally with a copy of the application and with notice of hearing on a day stated, not less than sixty days after service....

If, after the hearing, the court is satisfied that the statements contained in the application are true, it shall enter an order reciting the substance and effect of the lost or destroyed record. Such order, subject to intervening rights of third persons, shall have the same effect as the original record.

Id. § 1734(b). Coffman contends that this subsection entitles him to a hearing.

Coffman argues that subsection (b) does not require him to provide a reason why he needs the establishment of the record, but he misinterprets the text as a whole. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012) (“The text must be construed as a whole[,] ... consider[ing] the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts.”); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1818, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988) (“In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.”). The phrases “interested person,” “subject to the intervening rights of third persons,” and “shall have the same effect as the original record,” limit the availability of that process to persons who need the record for a pending or contemplated legal proceeding.

Coffman is not an “interested person” because he fails to allege a “reasonable interest” in establishing the record. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 256, 124 S.Ct. 2466, 2478, 159 L.Ed.2d 355 (2004). In Intel Corp., the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “interested person” in the context of another section, 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which is in the same title of the United States Code as section 1734. That section permits an “interested person” to apply for the assistance of the United States judiciary in a foreign tribunal. Id. The Supreme Court ruled that the person who ...