In re Moody

• Decision Date: 10 January 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–12657.,13–12657.
• Citation: 739 F.3d 1289
• Parties: In re Walter Leroy MOODY, Jr., Petitioner.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

739 F.3d 1289

In re Walter Leroy MOODY, Jr., Petitioner.

No. 13–12657.

United States Court of Appeals,Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 10, 2014.

Anne E. Borelli, William Ermine, Federal Defender Program, Inc., Montgomery, AL, for Petitioner.

Ramona Albin, Michael B. Billingsley, U.S. Attorney's Office, Birmingham, AL, James Roy Houts, Henry M. Johnson, Attorney General's Office, Montgomery, AL, for Mandamus Respondent.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. D.C. Docket No. 2:12–cv–04139–LSC.

Before WILSON, MARTIN, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Walter Leroy Moody, Jr., convicted under federal and state law for the 1989 murder of Eleventh Circuit Judge Robert S. Vance, has petitioned for a writ of mandamus ordering the recusal of District Judge L. Scott Coogler, who was randomly assigned to hear his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, see28 U.S.C. § 2254, and directing the transfer of this matter to a district judge outside the bounds of the Eleventh Circuit. After filing his mandamus petition, Mr. Moody has separately moved for the recusal of all judges on this court, requesting that we likewise transfer his mandamus petition to a different circuit.

At bottom, Mr. Moody argues that Judge Vance's murder, which occurred more than two decades ago, necessitates the recusal of all circuit judges on, and all district and magistrate judges within, the Eleventh Circuit. According to Mr. Moody, allowing any such judges to rule on his habeas corpus petition would create an appearance of partiality within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), and also violate § 455(b)(4) by allowing them to sit on a case in which they have an “interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome.” Having analyzed the unique facts and circumstances of this matter, and with the benefit of oral argument, we deny Mr. Moody's petition and motion.

I

In 1972, a federal jury in Georgia convicted Mr. Moody of possessing an unregistered destructive device. See United States v. Moody, 474 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir.1973) (Moody I ) (table decision affirming conviction). After his attempts to set aside the conviction proved unsuccessful, see, e.g., Moody v. United States, 874 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir.1989) (Moody II ) (affirming denial of coram nobis relief), Mr. Moody mailed a tear-gas package bomb to the NAACP Regional Office in Atlanta. That bomb exploded on August 21, 1989, “engulf[ing] NAACP employees in clouds of choking gas.” United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1425, 1428 (11th Cir.1992) (Moody V ). Mr. Moody also sent out a “Declaration of War” to the Eleventh Circuit and to television stations around the country, accusing the Circuit of deliberate misconduct and rank bias. Id.

As detailed in Moody V, 977 F.2d at 1428–29, Mr. Moody then built four powerful package bombs. He mailed the first of these bombs to Judge Vance in Alabama, with the return address of another Eleventh Circuit judge. Judge Vance was killed on December 16, 1989, when he opened the package containing the bomb, and his wife was seriously injured by the blast. The second of the bombs killed civil rights attorney Robert Robinson in Savannah, Georgia, two days later. A security officer intercepted the third bomb at the Eleventh Circuit headquarters in Atlanta, and the fourth bomb was received but not opened by employees of the Jacksonville NAACP office because they had heard about the other bombings.

In 1990, the government obtained an indictment against Mr. Moody, charging him with numerous federal offenses related to the murders of Judge Vance and Mr. Robinson. All judges then sitting on the Eleventh Circuit entered an order recusing themselves from all cases “relating to the investigation of the murder of [Judge] Vance” in which Mr. Moody was a party. See United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420, 1423 (11th Cir.1992) (Moody IV ).¹

All district judges in the Northern District of Georgia also recused themselves, and as a result Chief Justice Rehnquist designated Judge Edward Devitt from the District of Minnesota to preside over Mr. Moody's case. Judge Devitt granted Mr. Moody's motion for a change of venue, and moved the trial to St. Paul. See United States v. Moody, 762 F.Supp. 1485 (N.D.Ga.1991) (Moody III ). After a jury convicted Mr. Moody of 71 counts, Judge Devitt sentenced him to seven life terms and 400 years, to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to a 15–year sentence imposed in the Middle District of Georgia on separate perjury and obstruction charges related to Mr. Moody's attempts to overturn his 1972 conviction. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit—with a panel comprised of three judges from the Fourth Circuit—affirmed Mr. Moody's convictions and sentences in Moody V.²

The State of Alabama then charged Mr. Moody with the capital murder of Judge Vance. A jury found Mr. Moody guilty, and the state trial court, following the jury's 11–1 recommendation, sentenced him to death. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and the Alabama Supreme Court denied review. See Moody v. State, 888 So.2d 532 (Ala.Crim.App.2003), writ denied,888 So.2d 605 (Ala.2004) (Moody VI ). When his attempt to obtain post-conviction relief in the Alabama courts failed, see Moody v. State, 95 So.3d 827 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (Moody VII ), Mr. Moody filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Northern District of Alabama. The petition was randomly assigned to Judge Coogler, who denied Mr. Moody's motion for recusal.

II

In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides that “[a]ny ... judge ... of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” In keeping with the aim of “ ‘promot[ing] confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible,’ ” United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir.2003) (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988)), recusal under § 455(a) turns on “whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant doubt about the judge's impartiality.” United States v. Scrushy, 721 F.3d 1288, 1303 (11th Cir.2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under § 455(b)(4), recusal is required whenever a judge has “any ... interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.” The phrase “any ... interest that could substantially be affected” is not statutorily defined, and “it is not easy to conclude what [it] means.” In re Virginia Electric & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 367 (4th Cir.1976). We have held, however, in a case alleging improper transactions in a customer's airline frequent flyer program, that § 455(b)(4) did not require recusal of Eleventh Circuit judges who happened to belong to the same program. See Delta Air Lines v. Sasser, 127 F.3d 1296, 1297 (11th Cir.1997) (explaining in part that the litigation would not “jeopardize the viability” of the frequentflyer program as a whole). Cf. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 867, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (district judge violated § 455(b)(4) by failing to recuse after learning that he was a member of the board of trustees of a university with an interest in the outcome of the proceedings before him).

“[A]ny doubts must be resolved in favor of recusal.” Patti, 337 F.3d at 1321. Nevertheless, “there is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse when there is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is.” United States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir.1992) (internal punctuation and citation omitted). Indeed, “a judge, having been assigned to a case, should not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.” United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556, 1558 (11th Cir.1986).

III

We first address Mr. Moody's motion for recusal of the members of this panel. Mr. Moody argues that recusal of all Eleventh Circuit judges is required because his crimes in 1989 targeted not only Judge Vance, but also the Eleventh Circuit as an institution (as well as all of its then-constituent judges). Mr. Moody notes that the judges of the Eleventh Circuit received threatening letters contemporaneously with Judge Vance's murder, that a bomb was delivered to the Eleventh Circuit's headquarters in Atlanta, that Judge Vance maintained close relationships with a number of circuit colleagues, and that two current Eleventh Circuit judges participated in his prosecution. Such facts, Mr. Moody maintains, would lead a “objective, disinterested, lay observer” to harbor a “significant doubt” about the Eleventh Circuit's ability to decide this matter fairly and therefore necessitate recusal under § 455(a). See Scrushy, 721 F.3d at 1303 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A

Recusal decisions under “ § 455(a) are extremely fact driven and ‘must be judged on their unique facts and circumstances more than by comparison to situations considered in prior jurisprudence.’ ” Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 157 (5th Cir.1995)). Given the peculiar scenario here, the facts that Mr. Moody relies on do not warrant recusal under § 455(a). First, none of the three judges on this panel sat on the Eleventh Circuit (or were members of the federal judiciary) at the time of Judge Vance's death or of the contemporaneous bomb threat to the Eleventh Circuit's headquarters.³ Second, although Judges Wilson and Jordan served as law clerks to Fifth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit judges respectively, they did so before Judge Vance's murder (Judge Wilson in 1980 and Judge Jordan in 1987–88). Third, no judge on this panel enjoyed a close personal or professional relationship with Judge Vance or with any member of his immediate family. Fourth, even though two current Eleventh Circuit judges took...