In re Coggshall

• Decision Date: 08 June 1903
• Citation: 100 Mo. App. 585,75 S.W. 183
• Parties: In re COGGSHALL.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

75 S.W. 183

100 Mo. App. 585

In re COGGSHALL.

Court of Appeals at Kansas City, Missouri.

June 8, 1903.

CONTEMPT OF COURT—VIOLATION OF INJUNCTIONS—ACTUAL NOTICE.

1. One violating an injunction, with knowledge of it, may be punished for contempt, though not a party to the injunction suit, or served with process in it; actual notice being sufficient service within Rev. St. 1899, § 3643, making it contempt if any person violate an injunction after it is served on him.

Application by Guy R. Coggshall for discharge under writ of habeas corpus. Petition denied.

Noyes, Heath & Walls, for petitioner. F. E. Burroughs and R. E. Morrison, opposed.

SMITH, P. J.

Application for a discharge from imprisonment under the writ of habeas corpus. The case may be stated in about this way, to wit: That one Leo Rice filed a petition in the circuit court against A. W. Grigsby et ux., the object of which was to enjoin and restrain them, the defendants, their servants or employés, or any one for them, or in their name and behalf, from interfering with plaintiff, his employés, or assigns, in any way whatever, in taking care of certain stock, consisting of horses and cows, from feeding and from taking feed upon the premises wherewith to feed them, from attempting to redispose of their interest in the lease or leased premises, and from doing anything to injure the dairy business, etc. Upon this petition a temporary restraining order was made by the judge of one of the divisions of said court in substantial conformity to the prayer thereof. The defendants were served with the injunction process. It appears that Coggshall, the petitioner herein, and the defendant had rented of one Burge a certain inclosed pasture, which they used in common for the pasturage of their milch cows. It further appears, that they each resided in different houses situate in the pasture, and conducted thereat separate dairy establishments. It still further appears that the defendants had mortgaged their property to said Leo Rice, the plaintiff, and had made default in the payment of the mortgage debt, in consequence of which the plaintiff took possession of the property with the former's consent; but that, notwithstanding this, the defendants afterwards undertook to exercise dominion over the same, and to ignore and disregard the plaintiff's rights therein; and to restrain such behavior the restraining order already referred to was awarded against them. The petitioner was not a party to said injunction proceeding, nor was he in any sense an agent or employé of the defendants: A few hours after the restraining order had been served on the defendants, they met the petitioner, and informed him of the issue of the injunction, and immediately after this the petitioner turned the cows claimed by the plaintiff out into the highway. This fact being brought to the attention of the court over which the judge issuing the injunction presided, a notice was issued by it to the petitioner to at a certain time and place, and then and there, show cause, if any he had, why he should not be punished for contempt in violating the said injunction process. The petitioner appeared, and at the hearing the facts established were about as we have stated. It was then further disclosed that the petitioner had some understanding with Burge to the effect that, if the defendants discontinued the common use of the pasture with petitioner, he should have the exclusive use of it. The petitioner, it seems, testified that, as the defendants were no...