In re Commitment of Stokes, No. 2004AP1555 (Wis. App. 2/21/2007), 2004AP1555.
| Decision Date | 21 February 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 2004AP1555.,2004AP1555. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In re The Commitment of James E. Stokes: State of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Respondent, v. James E. Stokes, Respondent-Appellant. |
APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: MARY M. KUHNMUENCH, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded.
Before Fine, Curley and Kessler, JJ.
James E. Stokes appeals the commitment order entered against him after he was found to be a sexually violent person. He also appeals the order denying his postcommitment motion.1 Stokes contends that: (1) his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated; (2) there was insufficient evidence to commit him under WIS. STAT. ch. 980 (1997-98)2 ; and (3) he was deprived of his constitutional right to represent himself. In the alternative, Stokes contends that if his arguments are waived due to his trial counsel's failure to file a postcommitment motion, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file such a motion. We conclude that Stokes was denied his constitutional right to self-representation because the trial court improperly removed him as his own attorney. Although our conclusion with respect to self-representation obviates the need to address Stokes's other arguments, see Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938) (), we feel compelled to address Stokes's argument that his right to a speedy trial was violated. We reluctantly conclude that although his right to a speedy trial was not violated, we are very troubled that nearly six years elapsed from the filing of the petition to the beginning of Stokes's trial. We instruct judges assigned to cases that involve petitions for the commitment of an individual as a sexually violent person to find a way to bring these matters to trial in a more timely fashion. Because Stokes's right to proceed pro se was improvidently revoked, we reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court for a new trial.
¶ 2 On March 6, 1985, Stokes was convicted of two counts of second-degree sexual assault and one count of attempted aggravated battery, and imprisoned with an expected release date of May 5, 1998.3 See State v. Stokes, No. L-0656 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Dane County Mar. 8, 1998). On April 28, 1998,4 the State filed a petition, pursuant to WIS. STAT. ch. 980, to have Stokes committed as a sexually violent person, alleging that Stokes suffered from mental disorders that predisposed him to engage in acts of sexual violence and that it was substantially probable that he would engage in such acts in the future. On April 30, 1998, the trial court found that there was probable cause to detain Stokes. At a scheduling conference on May 6, 1998, a jury trial was scheduled for November 2, 1998, but the trial was postponed numerous times at the request of the State, the defense and the court. On January 3, 2002, almost four years after the petition was filed, Stokes waived his right to a jury trial.5 On September 15, 2003, Stokes's trial counsel withdrew due to deteriorated communications between him and Stokes and Stokes was assigned new counsel.
¶ 3 A bench trial finally began on February 17, 2004, approximately five years and ten months after the petition was filed. Stokes's attorney moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that Stokes's right to a speedy trial had been violated. The trial court denied the motion on grounds that the adjournments were the result of requests by both sides, and were for just cause or strategic reasons.
¶ 4 Dr. Patricia Coffey, who testified for the State, indicated that she had reviewed Stokes's file, scored Stokes using various diagnostic risk assessment instruments, including the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), and concluded that he could be diagnosed with "personality disorder, not otherwise specified, with antisocial features" and "paraphilia not otherwise specified," which predispose him to engage in acts of sexual violence. During his counsel's cross-examination of Dr. Coffey, Stokes indicated that he wished to proceed pro se because his counsel was not asking Dr. Coffey questions about the DSM. The court granted Stokes's request to represent himself and his former counsel agreed to stay on as standby counsel.
¶ 5 Stokes cross-examined Dr. Coffey, but asked that she be recalled because he did not have all the notes he needed. The next day the trial continued but was adjourned until March 26, due to Dr. Coffey's unavailability and the court's crowded docket. On March 26, 2004, the defense called Dr. Diane Lytton, whom Stokes questioned about the reliability of the various instruments used by Dr. Coffey to reach her assessments, including the DSM.
¶ 6 On April 30, 2004, the trial was to continue, but was adjourned until June 1, 2004, due to the State's failure to produce Stokes. That afternoon Stokes appeared via telephone. The trial court sought to complete the trial telephonically that day, but Stokes refused because he wanted to question Dr. Coffey in person. On June 1, 2004, Stokes finally was able to cross-examine Dr. Coffey. During Stokes's cross-examination, the trial court determined that Stokes could not continue to represent himself, stating that he repeatedly interrupted the court and testified instead of asking questions. The court reinstated Stokes's defense counsel and, after arguments by the State and the defense, found Stokes to be a sexually violent person. That day, six years and one month after the petition was filed, and three and one-half months after the court trial began, the trial court issued an order committing Stokes to institutional care in a secure mental health facility. Stokes was forty-eight years old when the petition was filed and fifty-four years old when the trial was completed. Stokes's counsel did not file a postcommitment motion.
¶ 7 On June 8, 2004, Stokes filed a pro se notice of appeal, but on January 4, 2005, now represented by counsel, filed a motion with this court requesting a remand to the trial court and fifteen days to file a postcommitment motion. This court granted the motion. On January 20, 2005, Stokes filed a timely postcommitment motion to vacate the commitment and dismiss the petition, arguing that: (1) he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file postcommitment motions; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support commitment. On March 9, 2005, the trial court denied the motion, concluding with respect to Stokes's claim that his right to a speedy trial had been violated that the delay was not unreasonable because Stokes was to blame for most of the delays and that the remainder was neither side's fault and the result of the ordinary demands of the judicial system.
¶ 8 Stokes filed another motion with this court requesting that this court remand the case to the trial court and grant him fifteen additional days to file another postcommitment motion. This court granted the motion. On July 26, 2005, Stokes filed a supplemental postcommitment motion seeking a new trial, contending that the trial court deprived him of his right to self-representation when it refused to allow him to continue to act as his own attorney, and in the alternative, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue.
¶ 9 On October 27, 2005, the trial court issued a written order denying Stokes's motion. The court first stated that "[t]he record reveals that during the course of the respondent's cross-examination of Dr. Patricia Coffey ... the respondent was unable to question the witness without testifying himself, without being argumentative, without being extremely repetitive, and without constantly interrupting the court," and that "[t]he record demonstrates that [the court] gave the respondent every opportunity to proceed with cross examination of the doctor within the bounds of appropriate cross-examination procedure." The court explained that Stokes erred in suggesting that once he had been allowed to proceed pro se a high standard exists for rescinding his pro se status. According to the trial court, it was not prevented from reassessing Stokes's competency to represent himself once the proceedings were in progress, and cited Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980), overruled on other grounds by State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), for the proposition that "the court has a continuing duty to evaluate a defendant's ability to represent himself throughout the proceedings." On this basis the court concluded that it had not erred in revoking Stokes's right to self-representation. This appeal follows.
A. Right to Self-Representation
¶ 10 We begin by addressing Stokes's contention that he was deprived of his right to self-representation.
¶ 11 Both the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution guarantee a defendant the right to conduct his own defense. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 7. When a defendant seeks to proceed pro se, the trial court must: (1) conduct a colloquy to insure that the defendant has knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the right to counsel, and (2) determine whether the defendant is competent to proceed pro se. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 203.
¶ 12 Here, Stokes requested permission to proceed pro se on February 17, 2004, because he felt his attorney's cross-examination of Dr. Coffey was inadequate. The trial court conducted the requisite colloquy and concluded that Stokes was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waiving his right to counsel, and found Stokes competent to proceed pro se. It is undisputed that Stokes satisfied both Klessig requirements. See id., 211 Wis. 2d at 204, 206, 212. The issue, however, is whether the trial court properly revoked Stokes's right to self-representation.
¶ 13...
To continue reading
Request your trial