In re Condemnation Proceedings by Board of Education of City of Minneapolis

• Decision Date: 09 February 1923
• Docket Number: 23,183
• Citation: 192 N.W. 102,154 Minn. 486
• Parties: IN RE CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS BY BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS; THE BOARD OF EDUCATION v. HEYWOOD MANUFACTURING COMPANY
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

192 N.W. 102

154 Minn. 486

IN RE CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS BY BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS; THE BOARD OF EDUCATION v. HEYWOOD MANUFACTURING COMPANY

No. 23,183

Supreme Court of Minnesota

February 9, 1923

The Board of Education of the city of Minneapolis petitioned the district court for Hennepin county for an order determining that the proposed taking of certain lands by the board was necessary and for the appointment of commissioners to appraise the value thereof. From the report and award of the commissioners, the Board of Education appealed to the district court for Hennepin county, where the appeal was heard by Molyneaux, J., and a jury which assessed $28,500 damages for the taking of the property. From an order denying its motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial Heywood Manufacturing Company appealed. Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

Owner not allowed compensation for proposed use of land when part only is condemned.

1. All the uses to which land may be properly adapted should be taken into account in determining the compensation the owner should receive when a portion of his land is taken as a result of condemnation proceedings, but not the peculiar situation, circumstances or plans of the owner or the business in which he happens to be engaged.

Objections to reading testimony taken by deposition.

2. The cross-examination of a witness whose testimony was taken by deposition may be read at the trial by the party by whom the witness was called. When so read, his opponent is not precluded from objecting by the fact that the interrogatories to which he objects were propounded by himself.

Practice of real estate board in valuation of land not admissible.

3. The existence of a rule or practice followed by a real estate board in valuing property, is not admissible in evidence as bearing on the value of the property.

When proof of prices paid for neighboring property is admissible.

4. To establish its value, proof of the prices paid on recent sales of other nearby property should not be admitted as substantive independent proof of the value of the property in question, unless perhaps in exceptional cases where no other evidence of value can be had.

Verdict as to value sustained.

5. Evidence considered and held sufficient to support the verdict of the jury awarding compensation in a condemnation proceeding.

Koon Whelan & Hempstead, for appellant.

Neil M. Cronin and R. S. Wiggin, for respondent.

OPINION

LEES, C.J.

This is a condemnation proceeding by the board of education of the city of Minneapolis to acquire title to property owned by appellant. The commissioners awarded appellant $40,000, and the board of education appealed to the district court. The jury reduced the award to $28,675. A motion for a new trial was denied and this appeal followed.

Appellant is a manufacturer of paper boxes and other paper products and is also engaged in a general printing business. It conducts its business in three different plants in the city of Minneapolis. In the year 1909 it purchased a portion of block 16 in Bradford & Lewis' Addition to Minneapolis. The property is intersected by a 20-foot alley, by which it is divided into two parts of equal area, one fronting on Third Street North and the other on Fourth Street North. Railway tracks extend through the alley. They were laid after appellant purchased the property. The board of education seeks to acquire that portion of the property which lies between Third street and the alley. As we understand the record, the property is vacant and unoccupied.

John A. Heinrich, one of appellant's officers, was a witness in its behalf. He was asked a series of questions relative to appellant's plans for the future use of the property. Objections to all such questions were sustained and these rulings are challenged by the assignments of error.

It is well settled that in ascertaining the value of property to be acquired by condemnation proceedings, it is proper to inquire what the property is worth in the market, not merely with reference to the owner's present use of it, but with reference to all uses to which it is plainly adapted, having regard to the existing business or wants of the community or such as might reasonably be expected in the immediate future. I Dunnell, Minn. Dig. § 3050. The purpose of the questions to which objections were sustained was to elicit testimony showing that in developing its business appellant had planned to make a particular use of the property and would be unable to carry out its plans if a portion of the property was taken. It is generally held that the measure of compensation is not the value of the property to any particular person, but its market value at the time of the taking, and that it is not competent to show that the owner intended to put the property to a particular use, or what plans for its improvement he had in mind. A terse statement of the rule is that nothing can be allowed for damages to an intended use. 2 Lewis, Em. Dom. § 709.

The rule is well stated in Maynard v. City of Northampton, 157 Mass. 218, 31 N.E. 1062, as follows:

"In determining the damages * * * the jury should consider not only the value of the property taken, but also the effect of the taking upon that which is left; and in estimating the value of that which is taken they may consider all the uses to which it might properly have been applied if it had not been taken. * * * Damages are not to be awarded in reference to the peculiar situation or circumstances or plans of the owner, or to the business in which he happens to be engaged; but any and all of the uses to which the land considered as property may profitably be applied, whether contemplated by the owner or not, may well be taken into the account by the jury."

It was followed in Sanitary District v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co. 267 Ill. 252, 108 N.E. 312; Goodwine v. Evans, 134 Ind. 262, 33 N.E. 1031; Ogden v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co. 229 Pa. 378, 78 A. 929; Wadsworth Land Co. v. Piedmont Traction Co. 162 N.C. 503, 78 S.E. 299; Seattle Ry. Co. v. Land, 81 Wash. 206, 142 P. 680; Five Tracts of Land in Cumberland Tp. v. United States, 101 F. 661, 41 C.C.A. 580.

In Farmer v. Stillwater Water Co. 99 Minn. 119, 122, 108 N.W. 824, this was said:

"We may also add that it was error to permit plaintiff to prove that he had planned or arranged to utilize his property for the purpose of supplying the citizens of Stillwater with water. The availability of the property for that purpose was proper to be shown, but plaintiff's plans in that direction should have been excluded."

That was an action for damages for the unlawful diversion of the sources of a spring of water located upon plaintiff's premises, but we see no reason why the statement is not equally applicable to a condemnation proceeding.

The rule above stated is not followed in Wisconsin. Jeffery v. Osborne, 145 Wis. 351, 129 N.W. 931. Citing Minneapolis, St. P.R. & D. Elec. T. Co. v. Friendshuh, 108 Minn 492, 122 N.W. 451, counsel for appellant assert that it has not been followed in this state. Such is not our understanding of the case cited. There, the owner of a farm was about to erect a barn on the only available site he had...