In re Condie

• Decision Date: 16 November 2020
• Docket Number: No. 80221-6-I,80221-6-I
• Citation: 475 P.3d 993
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: In the MATTER OF the MARRIAGE OF Stephen Paul CONDIE, Appellant, and Amy Renee Condie, n/k/a Amy Renee Bateman, Respondent.

475 P.3d 993

In the MATTER OF the MARRIAGE OF Stephen Paul CONDIE, Appellant,

and

Amy Renee Condie, n/k/a Amy Renee Bateman, Respondent.

No. 80221-6-I

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

FILED November 16, 2020

PUBLISHED OPINION

Verellen, J.

¶ 1 The child support statute broadly includes income and resources from any source when calculating child support. We conclude that income and net income for purposes of child support include contemporaneously ordered spousal maintenance. We disagree with In re Marriage of Wilson,¹ where the court held conflicts between the child support and maintenance statutes should be harmonized to allow the trial court to ignore contemporaneously ordered maintenance when computing income and net income. The trial court should have included the maintenance it contemporaneously ordered Stephen Condie to pay Amy Bateman when computing child support under the child support schedule.

¶ 2 Stephen Condie otherwise fails to establish any abuse of discretion regarding the parenting plan, division of property, and standard calculation of child support.

¶ 3 Therefore, we reverse the trial court's failure to include contemporaneously ordered maintenance when computing child support, affirm as to all other issues, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

¶ 4 Stephen Condie and Amy Bateman were married in 2009 and separated in 2018. Condie and Bateman have one daughter, E.C.

¶ 5 The dissolution trial occurred over four days in April 2019. In the final parenting plan, the court ordered that "neither parent shall take the child out of the country, except to Canada and Mexico, until she reaches the age of 13 years unless otherwise agreed by the parties in writing."² The court explained the limitation was based on E.C.’s "sensory impairment and limited food tolerance."³

¶ 6 In the dissolution decree, the court entered a 60/40 property distribution in favor of Bateman. The court ordered Condie to pay maintenance in the amount of $6,500 a month for a little over three years. The court also ordered Condie to pay child support in the amount of $1,404.15 a month. Condie moved for reconsideration on various issues. The court denied Condie's motion.

¶ 7 Condie appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. Contemporaneously Ordered Spousal Maintenance and Child Support Allocation.

¶ 8 Relying on Wilson, the trial court did not include the maintenance it contemporaneously ordered Condie to pay Bateman when determining income and net income to compute child support on the child support schedule.

¶ 9 The Wilson court interpreted the maintenance statute, RCW 26.09.090(1)(a), as requiring computation of child support before spousal maintenance.⁴ And the court determined a gap existed between the child support and maintenance statutes:

Although former RCW 26.19.071 ’s plain language requires a trial court to consider spousal maintenance "actually paid" and "actually received" in calculating a parent's income for purposes of determining child support obligations, the statute is silent as to whether a trial court must consider spousal maintenance that has been ordered but has not yet been paid or received.^{[5 ]}

Reasoning this silence required it to harmonize the maintenance and child support statutes, the Wilson court concluded the trial court had discretion to ignore contemporaneously awarded maintenance when computing child support:

Reading former RCW 26.19.071 in harmony with the spousal maintenance statute, RCW 26.09.090, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by calculating [the father's] child support obligation without first deducting his ordered spousal maintenance obligation.^{[6 ]}

The court also concluded there was an ambiguity in the child support statute:

The conflict between RCW 26.09.090(1)(a) ’s direction and RCW 26.19.001, the purpose of the child support statute, create an ambiguity that confronts the trial court in complying with worksheet directions when setting child support.^{[7 ]}

And the Wilson court resolved that ambiguity by again concluding the trial court had discretion to ignore contemporaneously awarded maintenance when computing child support:

In this instance, we resolve the ambiguity to hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not including the maintenance in the child support worksheets.^{[8 ]}

We disagree.

¶ 10 First, the core question is the meaning of "income" and "net income" for purposes of child support calculations. The child support statute does not define "income" or "net income."⁹ Because no statute defines "income" for purposes of child support calculations, we look to dictionary definitions:¹⁰ (1) "a gain or recurrent benefit that is usually measured in money" or (2) the "value of goods and services received."¹¹ These definitions accord with the expansive view of "income" used in RCW 26.19.071. RCW 26.19.071(1) broadly directs that "[a]ll income and resources of each parent's household shall be disclosed and considered by the court"¹² when determining a parent's income. RCW 26.19.071(3) then directs that "monthly gross income shall include income from any source, including: ... (q) [m]aintenance actually received."¹³ RCW 26.19.071(5) provides that "[t]he following expenses shall be disclosed and deducted from gross monthly income to calculate net monthly income: ... (f) [c]ourt-ordered maintenance to the extent actually paid."

¶ 11 When interpreting a statute, "[t]he court's fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the [l]egislature's intent, and if the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent."¹⁴ " ‘[T]he plain meaning is ... derived from what the [l]egislature has said in its enactments, but that meaning is discerned from all that the [l]egislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.’ "¹⁵

¶ 12 The child support statutes are expressly intended to divide the child support obligation between parents in proportion to their income.¹⁶ As noted, the child support statute directs the trial court to consider "[a]ll income and resources" of the parents when determining child support.¹⁷ And maintenance is a "recurrent benefit." Consistent with the broad directive of the statute and the dictionary definition of income, we conclude contemporaneously ordered maintenance is income to the recipient and an expense to the payor for purposes of the child support statute.

¶ 13 Contrary to Wilson, we do not read the child support statutes to promote a presumption that parents contemporaneously ordered to pay maintenance are likely to default. The statutory references to "maintenance paid" and "maintenance received" logically apply to maintenance obligations from a prior marriage or maintenance award where there is a history of payments actually made or missed. When the court makes a contemporaneous award of maintenance between the parents in a pending dissolution, there is no such payment history as to that contemporaneous award. Contemporaneously ordered maintenance must be considered when determining income and net income for purposes of the child support schedule.

¶ 14 Second, much of the parties’ argument on appeal, like the analysis in Wilson,¹⁸ focuses upon perceived conflicts in the mechanics and timing of determining maintenance and child support. The focus on mechanics is not compelling.

¶ 15 The Wilson court concluded there was a conflict between the maintenance and child support statutes requiring that the court first determine child support. The maintenance statute, RCW 26.09.090(1)(a), recites that the court is to consider "the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance ... including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party." But contemporary child support awards are for the benefit of the child.¹⁹ For purposes of the child support schedule, there is no portion of a child support award that includes a sum for the parent. There is no need to consider child support awards under the child support schedule as part of the calculus for determining the amount of a maintenance award.

¶ 16 Further, the maintenance statute and the child support worksheets do not present an insoluble accounting conundrum. Because contemporaneously awarded maintenance must be included in the calculation of child support under the child support schedule, the court must first determine any maintenance award and then incorporate that amount into the child support calculation. In practice, neither RCW 26.09.090(1)(a) nor RCW 26.19.071 preclude a trial court from simultaneously looking at various scenarios for maintenance and child support and running various worksheet alternatives before arriving at a final decision.²⁰ The trial judge is not beset with an endless loop of mechanical computations.

¶ 17 Third, the approach taken in Wilson invites an inefficient use of judicial resources. If a court ignores its contemporaneous maintenance order when calculating initial child support payments, a party could seek a modification after the first maintenance payment because the payment will have created a history of maintenance "actually paid" and "actually received." Income and net income will necessarily have changed in the amount of the maintenance paid and received and, arguably, such a change may qualify for a child support modification. Such an approach is not consistent with an efficient use of judicial resources.

¶ 18 Finally, Bateman argues we should apply the rules of statutory construction, including the legislature's acquiescence in Wilson’s holding, because the legislature has not amended RCW 26.19.071(3) or .071(5) since that case was decided. But we apply the rules of statutory construction only after determining there is an ambiguity in the statute,²¹ and we do not find ambiguity here.

¶ 19 We disagree with the decision in Wi...