In re Contas: Lion Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 09 September 1930
• Docket Number: 1635,1636
• Parties: IN RE CONTAS: LION COAL CO. v. CONTAS; IN RE SIKORA: LION COAL CO. v. SIKORA [*]
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

291 P. 314

42 Wyo. 94

IN RE CONTAS: LION COAL CO. v. CONTAS;

IN RE SIKORA: LION COAL CO. v. SIKORA ^[*]

Nos. 1635, 1636

Supreme Court of Wyoming

September 9, 1930

APPEAL from District Court, Sweetwater County; VOLNEY J. TIDBALL Judge.

Separate proceedings were brought under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Louis Contas, and by John Sikora, claimants, which were opposed by the Lion Coal Company, employer. From orders awarding compensation, the employer appealed in each case and the appeals were dismissed. (42 Wyoming, p. 59-60, 289 P 368). Heard on petitions and motions for reinstatement of each of the cases.

Petitions and motions denied.

For the appellant there was a brief by T. S. Taliaferro, Jr., and Arthur-Lee Taliaferro in support of the petitions and motions for reinstatement, the points and authorities being practically the same in each case.

The completed appeal record in the Sikora case, was filed with the clerk of the District Court within seventeen days of the entry of the final award; the completed record in the Contas case was filed in the office of the clerk of the District Court within twenty-seven days of the entry of the final award. Both were filed in ample time to reach the Supreme Court within the thirty days named in Section 4328 C. S. Both records were withheld by the clerk of the District Court to enable the trial court to decide whether new trials should be granted. The petitions and motions for reinstatement were considered as applications for rehearing under Supreme Court Rule 23. The practice requires motions for reinstatement of appeals to be supported by affidavits or other proof of good cause for vacating the order of dismissal. 4 C. J. 611, Sec. 2444. Sec. 4328 C. S. as amended by Ch. 124, Laws 1925, related to proceedings in error and not to direct appeals: under the direct appeals statute, an appellant does not control the forwarding of the record to the Supreme Court nor the time the trial judge may use in reviewing specifications of error and an appellant should not suffer for omissions of a clerk. Insurance Co. v. Phinney, 178 U.S. 327, 44 L.Ed. 1093; Building Assn. v. Mills, (Nebr.) 62 N.W. 478; King v. Penn., (Ohio) 1 N.E. 85; Richardson v. Green, 130 U.S. 104; Budd v. Roy, 26 Wyo. 210, 181 P. 140; Samuelson v. Tribune Publishing Co., (Wyo.) 287 P. 84. Appellant was not guilty of laches. It was not the intention of the direct appeal statute to set a trap for litigants. Hansen v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 29 Wyo. 434. Omission of the clerk to transmit papers is not a ground for dismissal of proceedings in error. Reynolds v. Morton, 22 Wyo. 481; Miller v. New York Oil Co., 32 Wyo. 483. Delivery of an appeal record to the clerk of the Supreme Court is not the manner in which jurisdiction is obtained. The case of Reintsma v. Oil Co., 263 P. 619, was an error proceeding and the decision is not in point here. Samuelson v. Tribune Co., supra, did not involve a jurisdictional question. We believe that this court has inherent power to review the decisions of all judicial tribunals and that other departments of the state government cannot interfere with such power. Const. Art. V, Sec. 2. Compensation awards are judgments. Laws 1925, page 130. Sec. 4328 C. S. relating, as it does, to proceedings in error, cannot be applied to direct appeals, for the reason that the various steps required to be taken in direct appeals (Sec. 6401-6415 C. S.) within periods fixed by the statute are wholly inconsistent with the time prescribed for proceedings in error by Sec. 4328 C. S. The polity of one method computes "time" from an entirely different starting point, from the starting point in which "time" commences to run in the other method. A confusion of ideas and of practice, will inevitably result from the confusion of the two systems. And yet this court has reviewed a large number of compensation cases brought up by direct appeal. Counsel for appellant in these cases lodged both appeal records with the clerk of the District Court within twenty-seven days after the entry of the awards, and had they been promptly forwarded to the Supreme Court by said clerk, they would have been received within the thirty day period. This appellant should not therefore be deprived of its right of appeal in these cases by reason of omissions of the clerk of the court below. Moreover, as we read the decision in Allen v. Lewis, 26 Wyo. 85, 177 P. 433, the provisions of 6410 C. S. provide time for the trial court to review the record, and determine whether a new trial should be granted, are mandatory. We are unable to see how this doctrine can be reconciled with the holdings of this court in dismissing these appeals for non-compliance with the provisions of Sec. 4328 C. S., a section of the law relating to proceedings in error, and not to direct appeals.

RINER, Justice. BLUME, C. J., and KIMBALL, J., concur.

OPINION

RINER, Justice.

Appellant has presented its "petitions and motions" supported by briefs to reinstate these causes, which were dismissed (289 P. 368) Lion Coal Co. v. Contas, because this court held, following its previous decisions, that it had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in a Workmen's Compensation case where the record was not filed here as required by the imperative language of Section 4328, W. C. S. 1920, as amended by Laws 1925, Ch. 124, Sec. 2. We regard these petitions and motions as coming within the provisions of our rule twenty-three.

It is insisted by appellant that "when a complete record, without laches on the part of the appellant, is filed with the clerk of the District Court then and there jurisdiction is acquired by the Supreme Court to hear and determine the question presented by the record." This obviously cannot be so, for the law governing direct appeals to this court specifically provides (Wyo. C. S. 1920, Sec. 6411) that "The Supreme Court shall not acquire jurisdiction over the cause until the record on appeal is filed with the clerk of said court." Recognizing the force of this statutory provision, in Thomas v. Bivin, 32 Wyo. 478, 235 P. 321, 322, it was said, citing the section last mentioned:

"This court obtains jurisdiction of the cause only when the record on appeal is filed with its clerk."

The purpose of the law-making body of this state to require prompt disposition of claims arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act is at once apparent upon inspection of its sections dealing with procedure. In the District Court, whenever an injury is reported to the judge as by law required, by Section 4327, W. C. S. 1920, it is declared "it shall thereupon be the duty of said judge to investigate the nature of said injury and claim for compensation at the earliest possible date." (Italics are ours.) When there is a dispute as to the right of the injured employee or his dependent family to receive compensation or as to the amount thereof, then the said section further directs "it shall be the duty of said judge to set the case down for a hearing at the earliest possible date." (Italics are ours.) In case a jury is demanded, names may be drawn from the five-mile jury box unless a regular jury is in attendance. While a review in this court is allowed (Sec. 4328 supra) of the order made in the District Court upon the hearing, it is permitted only under the positive terms of the proviso quoted in the original memorandum filed in this case. The purpose of the legislature is further demonstrated by the clause of the law immediately following that provision whereby the time regularly allowed for briefs in this court is reduced and the case "shall be advanced on the calendar and disposed of as promptly as possible." The fact that the care and subsistence of workers in extra-hazardous occupations and their families are involved is doubtless the mainspring of the purpose of the law in thus speeding up procedure in matters of this kind, and affords, we think, an underlying incentive wholly humanitarian and justifiable.

It is to be observed that the requirement of the proviso aforesaid that "the petition in error, bill of exceptions and record on appeal must be filed in the Supreme Court within thirty days from the date of decision or order on motion for new trial by a court or judge unless the time be extended by order of court or judge" materially alters the time for bringing proceedings in error in such cases, which would ordinarily be the period of one year, as fixed by Section 6384, W. C. S. 1920, as well as definitely controls the time for lodging the record on direct appeal in this court. Were we to adopt the view urged by appellant, that the quoted proviso is directory merely, we would be not only disregarding the clearly expressed purpose of the legislature, but we would also be rendering ineffective the latest expression of the will of the people of this state concerning this special course of procedure.

If it be suggested that inasmuch as Section 4328, supra, of the Workmen's Compensation Act became a law in 1915, while the provisions for a direct appeal to this court came into existence thereafter in 1917 (Comp. St. 1920, Secs. 6401-6415), it follows that those provisions cannot be affected by the limitations fixed upon appellate procedure in the earlier statute, to this suggestion there are several answers.

It is beyond reasonable controversy, as has been already indicated that it was the policy and purpose of the legislature by the enactment of Section 4328 aforesaid, to speed up appellate procedure, and by the general terms of that section to fix a limited time for lodging any record in this court upon which could be sought the review of a decision or order in a Workmen's Compensation case. This limitation may appropriately be said to apply to the lodging of a...