In re Coppadge

Decision Date23 January 2013
Docket NumberC.J. No. 12,2011.
Citation74 A.3d 593
PartiesIn re the Honorable Arlene Minus COPPADGE, a Judicial Officer.
CourtSupreme Court of Delaware

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Victor F. Battaglia, Sr., Esquire, of Biggs & Battaglia, Wilmington, Delaware, for Judicial Officer.

C. Malcolm Cochran, IV, Esquire, of Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, appointed as Presenting Counsel.

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, RIDGELY, Justices, STRINE, Chancellor, VAUGHN, President Judge, and SMALLS, Chief Judge, constituting the available members of the Court on the Judiciary.1

PER CURIAM:

In this disciplinary proceeding that brings a judicial officer before the Court on the Judiciary, we conclude that the judicial officer committed persistent misconduct in violation of Rule 2.5(C) of the Delaware Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct. For that misconduct, we conclude that the judicial officer must be sanctioned.

The Constitution and Applicable Code Provision

The Delaware Constitution confers authority on the Court on the Judiciary to discipline a judge for:

wilful misconduct in office, wilful and persistent failure to perform his or her duties, the commission after appointment of an offense involving moral turpitude, or other persistent misconduct in violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics as adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court from time to time. 2

Rule 2.5(C) of the Delaware Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct provides that [a] judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court.” 3

Procedural Background

The judicial officer in this disciplinary proceeding is Family Court Judge Arlene Minus Coppadge. Judge Coppadge was appointed to her position in 2003.

This proceeding was initiated when Family Court Chief Judge Chandlee Johnson Kuhn sent a notice and amended notice informing the Court on the Judiciary that Judge Coppadge had failed to properly report matters held under advisement. Pursuant to Administrative Directive 175, Chief Judge Kuhn's notice and amended notice (as later supplemented) were treated as a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary.4

The Court designated a Panel of the Preliminary Investigatory Committee to investigate the matters identified in the notice and to submit a report determining whether or not there was probable cause to believe that Judge Coppadge may be subject to sanction.5 On January 13, 2012, the Panel filed a report finding that probable cause existed to believe that Judge Coppadge had violated Rule 2.5(C) of the Delaware Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct, and that she may be subject to sanction.6

As mandated by Rule 9 of the Rules of the Court on the Judiciary, the Court appointed a Board of Examining Officer.7 The Board issued a show cause order to Judge Coppadge and appointed a Presenting Counsel to “conduct an investigation and present evidence on the formal charges.” 8 After an evidentiary hearing before the Board,9 Judge Coppadge and Presenting Counsel submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.10

The Board's final report dated November 28, 2012 found that Judge Coppadge had engaged in a persistent pattern of delay in the disposition of cases and had failed to comply with the reporting mandates of Administrative Directive 175. The Board recommended the Judge Coppadge be publicly censured. Neither Judge Coppadge nor Presenting Counsel filed exceptions to the Board's report and recommendation.11

The Board's Report

The Board's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended discipline are set forth here: 12

FINDINGS OF FACT

This matter originated with the filing of an initial complaint by Family Court Chief Judge Chandlee Johnson Kuhn on July 11, 2011 but was followed by an Amended Notice (jointly signed by Judge Coppadge) on July 21, 2011 (the “Amended Notice”). This Amended Notice addressed two instances of delay in the disposition of cases pending before Judge Coppadge and the subsequent failure to include those cases on the so-called “90 day report” required by Directive 175 issued by the Chief Justice effective July 1, 2010.

Directive 175 requires the presiding Judge of each of the Delaware courts to submit monthly reports to the Chief Justice regarding matters held under advisement beyond specified time limits. With respect to the Family Court, the Directive requires the Chief Judge to “furnish to the Chief Justice on the tenth day of each month, a detailed report of each matter held under advisement for more than 90 days as of the last business day of the previous month by each Judge [of the court].” Directive No. 175 § B.

Directive 175 also imposes on the individual judge a specific reporting requirement. Section E of Directive 175 (Section E) requires [e]ach ... Judge” to provide to her presiding judge the information necessary for the submission of “an accurate and timely report” to the Chief Justice. Failure of a judge to do so for “two consecutive months” results in mandatory referral to the Court on the Judiciary:

E. Each ... Judge shall furnish the information necessary to the presiding judge of the court involved so an accurate and timely report can be prepared. Failure to do so for two consecutive months shall cause the presiding judge to file a notice with the Clerk of the Court on the Judiciary. The notice shall be processed as a complaint under Court on the Judiciary Rule 5.

Directive 175 § E (emphasis supplied).

Chief Judge Kuhn's initial notice of a violation of Directive 175 was prompted by a contact from a litigant in a case entitled [ Smith v. Kane ] who complained about the failure of Judge Coppadge to render a decision in a matter heard approximately ninth months previously. Upon further inquiry by Chief Judge Kuhn, it was determined that the delay in the [ Smith ] matter should have been reported in Judge Coppadge's 90–day report for each month from December 2010 to May 2011. Judge Coppadge issued a belated decision in the [ Smith ] matter on June 27, 2011.

The second case reflected in the Amended Notice [ Bailey v. Taylor ] was discovered through a review by Chief Judge Kuhn's office. This case had remained open since November 5, 2010 and failed to appear for approximately four months beyond the required reporting date. After the Amended Notice was referred to a [Panel of the] Preliminary Investigatory Committee ... six additional cases were unearthed as a result of a further review by Judge Coppadge of her docket. These six cases were forwarded to [the Panel] on August 18, 2011 as a supplement to the Amended Notice.

The additional six cases, with pertinent hearing and required reporting dates are as follows:

[ Fulton v. Robinson ]

(Hearing: January 13, 2011. Decision: June 29, 2011. Omitted from April and May 2011 90–day reports.)

[ Gibson–Stevens v. Owens–Roberts ]

(Hearing: August 16, 2010. Decision: June 29, 2011. Omitted from November, December 2010 and January–May 2011 90–day reports.)

[ Martin v. Martin (Sawyer) ]

(Hearing: September 7, 2010. Decision: July 6, 2011. Omitted from December 2010 and January–June 2011 90–day reports.)

[ Green v. Stanford ]

(Hearing: December 8, 2010. Decision: June 29, 2011. Omitted from March, April and May 2011 90–day reports.)

[ Reed v. Williams ]

(Hearing: August 17, 2010. Decision: July 7, 2011. Omitted from November, December 2010 and January–June 2011 90–day reports.)

[ Clark v. Palmer ]

(Hearing: May 19, 2010. Decision: October 29, 2010. Omitted from August and September [2010] 90–day reports.)

Although not directly an instance of reportable misconduct in this proceeding, Judge Coppadge was involved in a matter which came to the attention of the Delaware Supreme Court in early 2010. In Clark v. Clark, the Supreme Court noted that an issue in the underlying matter on appeal from the Family Court had not been decided “for over two and one-half years.” 2010 WL 876935, at *1 (Del. March 9, 2010) (Order). The Court described the delay as “extraordinary” and [f]ortunately ... unusual.” The Court directed that upon remand, the matter be assigned to a different judge of the Family Court, for a determination of whether the delay had resulted in financial harm to the litigants. It was eventually determined that no such financial harm existed. Judge Coppadge was the original trial judge in this matter. The delay in the Clark matter was the subject of a discussion between Chief Judge Kuhn and Judge Coppadge and the need for Judge Coppadge to “stay on top” of her cases.

At the hearing before the Board, Judge Coppadge did not dispute that delays had occurred in the cases above discussed nor did she include these matters in her 90–day reports. While accepting ultimate responsibility and expressing remorse for the resulting delay, she attributed failure to comply with the Directive to her assistant who was charged with tracking Judge Coppadge's cases and reporting delinquent dispositions. Judge Coppadge claimed that the “system” broke down when her assistant began to take night classes at Delaware Technical and Community College in January 2010 and discontinued her tracking and reporting duties. The delay in the Clark matter, however, had already occurred before Judge Coppadge's assistant began her night classes.

At the hearing before the Board, the Presenter arranged for the testimony of an expert witness on the questions of whether the delays in the eight cases under review was unreasonable and whether harm to the litigants resulted from such delays. Gerald I.H. Street, Esquire has practiced exclusively in Family Court in all three counties for more than twenty-five years handling a broad range of family law cases. After review of the eight matters at issue in this proceeding, Mr. Street opined that there were unreasonable delays in six of the cases. He was of the further view that in two of the six delayed matters a litigant suffered direct injury. In one case ( Stevens v. Owens–Roberts ), a ten month post-hearing delay denied a father...

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