In re Corbin

• Decision Date: 24 May 1937
• Docket Number: 34364
• Citation: 187 La. 968,175 So. 636
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: In re CORBIN

175 So. 636

187 La. 968

In re CORBIN

No. 34364

Supreme Court of Louisiana

May 24, 1937

Rehearing Denied June 21, 1937

Appeal from Third Judicial District Court, Parish of Lincoln; E. L Walker, Judge.

Suit by Pearl Corbin to interdict Frank Corbin. From a judgment rejecting his demand, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed, rendered, and remanded.

Elder &amp Elder, of Ruston, for appellant Pearl Corbin.

Charles E. Barham and Truett L. Scarborough, both of Ruston, for appellee.

PONDER Justice. LAND, J., dissents.

OPINION

PONDER, Justice.

In this suit the plaintiff seeks to interdict his grandfather, Frank Corbin. Plaintiff alleges in his petition that he is a resident of Arkansas and the only living relative of Frank Corbin; that Frank Corbin is a resident of Lincoln parish, La.; that Frank Corbin owns real and personal property within the jurisdiction of the court; that Frank Corbin is subject to a habitual state of insanity and imbecility and is not capable of taking care of his property; that Frank Corbin should by judgment be declared incapable of taking care of his property or his person and should be interdicted; and that a curator and under-curator should be appointed to take care of his person and manage his estate.

The defendant admits in his answer that he is a resident of Lincoln parish, but denies all the other allegations of plaintiff's petition. Answering further, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff left the state twenty years ago and has ever since resided in the state of Arkansas; that during the twenty years, the plaintiff has never written to the defendant nor visited him nor shown any interest, love, or affection whatever toward the defendant. There are other allegations in the answer that are not pertinent to the decision herein.

At the trial of the case, nineteen witnesses testified for the plaintiff, all whom were lay witnesses except two physicians, and eighteen witnesses testified in behalf of the defendant, all of whom were lay witnesses except three physicians.

Upon submission of the case, the lower court rendered judgment rejecting the demands of the plaintiff, from which judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Upon examination of the record, we find that the conclusion of the facts found by the lower court as to the mental condition of the defendant is correct. The lower court in its opinion stated that it was its conclusion from a study of all the testimony and from seeing the defendant in court, both on and off the witness stand, that the defendant is mentally incapable of taking care of his property, but that he is mentally capable of taking care of his person. The court stated in its opinion that it did not see how any one could be serious and reach a different conclusion; that there was complete agreement among the witnesses that the defendant is capable of taking care of his person; that, notwithstanding his age and physical infirmities, he goes where he pleases about the place, dresses and undresses himself, serves his own food and attends to the numerous chores around the home; that the defendant is quiet, peaceable, and biddable; that he owns no property except a few head of live stock; and that no necessity exists for the interdiction. The conclusion reached by the lower court was (1) that the defendant was incapable of administering his affairs; (2) that the defendant was capable of caring for his person; and (3) that no necessity existed for the interdiction, and that these three prerequisites must exist in order to render a judgment of interdiction -- namely, (1) the defendant must be mentally incapable of administering his estate, (2) unable to take care of his person, and (3) an actual necessity for his interdiction must exist. The court held that the first prerequisite was established, but the last two prerequisites were not established and dismissed plaintiff's suit.

The testimony shows that the defendant's infirmity began in September, 1934, and was occasioned by a paralytic stroke; that on October 17, 1936, he deeded his real estate, consisting of 180 acres of land, to Dave Reed and Cleveland Robinson, husbands of his two illegitimate daughters. The consideration of this sale was the payment of a mortgage on the property in favor of the Federal Land Bank in the sum of $ 900. In the deed the defendant reserved one-fourth of the mineral rights which he later sold to the same parties for $ 500 and other valuable consideration. It is admitted that the $ 500 was not paid. There is testimony in the record which shows that, in lieu of the payment, the purchasers took care of the defendant and his wife. The evidence shows that the purchasers of the property are still taking care of the defendant.

There is some testimony to the effect that another party is agitating the plaintiff in the suit, which we will not recite herein as it could be of no value in determining the state of incapacity of the defendant. This court in the case of ...