In re Crawford

• Decision Date: 04 June 1889
• Citation: 21 N.E. 692,113 N.Y. 560
• Parties: In re CRAWFORD et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

113 N.Y. 560

21 N.E. 692

In re CRAWFORD et al.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 4, 1889.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, Third department.

Peter Townsend died in September, 1885, leaving a will executed August 8, 1883. In March, 1884, he purchased certain coupon bonds of the Shenandoah Railroad Company, to which this litigation in part relates. Caroline P. T. Crawford and others, executors, filed their accounts before the surrogate of Orange county, for adjudication, on which a hearing was had, and an appeal taken to the general term. From a judgment modifying the surrogate's decree Mrs. Elizabeth Meagher and other legatees appeal.

W. D. Shipman and G. L. Rives, for appellants.

Platt & Bowers, for the executors, respondents.

PECKHAM, J.

We agree with the courts below in regard to the deposit of moneys in the bank, and subsequently in the trust company. There was an executed gift, completed by a full delivery of the subject thereof and a change of title therein. The surrogate has found that the donor made the first deposit to the credit of Mrs. Crawford in the bank in her presence, and for her personal and specific use. The subsequent deposits he also finds were made by the donor in the trust company to the credit of Mrs. Crawford, and they were entered in a pass-book supplied by the company, which book was delivered by the donor to her. There was evidence sufficient to authorize such findings. The donor thus parted completely with the title to the moneys which he deposited, and the same became subject to the exclusive and entire control of the donee, and were legally and in fact in her full possession. She herself drew the $30,000 which had been deposited to her credit in the bank, and they were deposited in the trust company, and formed part of the whole fund which was from time to time deposited by the donor in such company to her credit. There was nothing more that could have been done in order to clothe the donee with the absolute and full title and control of the moneys thus deposited, and nothing more was necessary to complete a valid and irrevocable gift. It is very probable that one of the motives which prompted the first deposit on the part of the donor was that the donee should have some money in the house in case he should be taken away. One of the witnesses testified that the donor so stated in his presence. But the evidence is, as we think, entirely insufficient to show that the gift of the $30,000 was only upon the condition that it should not take effect until his death. Nor can the subsequent deposits, in the light of evidence, be regarded as a gift only upon that condition. Within all the authorities, the facts make a valid and executed gift in proesenti of the moneys in question.

But we cannot assent to the decision of the courts below, which holds the bonds to have been effectually disposed of by the intending donor in his life-time by a valid gift, completed by delivery to Mrs. Crawford, or to any one for her as her agent. We do not think there was any such delivery. He may have intended the bonds as a gift, but his intention was never, as we think, effectually carried out. They were coupon bonds payable to bearer; and were bought by the direction of the donor by his broker, and delivered to the donor, and kept by him up to the time of his death. There was a book found among his effects after his death which purported to be an inventory of the securities of his estate, in which these bonds were entered. Some of the entries, if not all, were in his hand writing. The coupons for the semi-annual interest had been cut off by him, and collected for him as they became due subsequent to the purchase, excepting those which were due six months prior to his death; and those coupons had not been detached from the bonds. The proceeds of the coupons which had been collected had been passed to his credit by the bankers who collected them. It appeared in evidence that the donor had giver direction to his bankers to purchase the bonds, and he stated at the time that he wanted them purchased for Carrie, (the intended donee;) and, after they had been purchased, he directed his banker to have them registered in her name, and the banker thereupon took them to the office of the company, and the name of the intended donee was indorsed upon each bond, together with the date of such indorsement and the name of the transfer agent. The bonds were then brought back and delivered to the donor, who kept them thereafter as above stated. There is no evidence that the donee knew anything of he transaction, or that she was ever aware of anything concerning the intended gift. Upon these facts we do not see that there was ever any delivery of the bonds. Nothing appears in the case as to what was the effect of the so-called ‘registry.’ We are not prepared to hold that the simple indorsement on a bond, payable to bearer, of the name of another party than the true owner, made at his request and at the office of the company issuing the bond, and by an officer thereof, passes the title to the bond to the party whose name is thus indorsed. An owner of a bond may intend to give it to another, and for that purpose he may obtain such an indorsement, but that does not constitute a delivery of the gift to such person. The owner may subsequently change his mind, and we do not say that he could not effectuate such a change without the aid of an intended donee to whom he had never delivered the gift. The most that the evidence shows is an intention to make a gift of these bonds; but the material fact of a delivery is entirely unproved, and cannot be implied from the evidence. The case has nothing in common with that of Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134, and kindred cases. There was a declaration of trust in those cases, in such form that the donor stated that he was, and he thereby became, a trustee for the donee; and the deposit or gift was made in that character. Nothing of the kind exists here. Neither can it be...