In re Crawford
Decision Date | 06 July 1999 |
Docket Number | No. COA98-1274.,COA98-1274. |
Citation | 517 S.E.2d 161,134 NC App. 137 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | In the Matter of the Change of Name of Chadwick Holland CRAWFORD to Chadwick Holland Crawford Trull, by Mary Holland Trull, Petitioner. |
Johnson, Mercer, Hearn & Vinegar, PLLC, by Jennifer M. Green, Raleigh, for petitioner-appellant.
Jordan Price Wall Gray Jones & Carlton, by R. Frank Gray and Hope Derby Carmichael, Raleigh, for respondent-appellee.
Petitioner Mary Holland Trull and respondent Patrick Sullivan Crawford are the natural parents of Chadwick Holland Crawford, born 7 October 1996. Petitioner and respondent have never been married, and neither is presently married to another. On 10 October 1996, both petitioner and respondent executed an Affidavit of Paternity acknowledging respondent as Chadwick's father, and on 23 October 1996, respondent submitted to a paternity test which confirmed a 99.92% probability that respondent is Chadwick's biological father. Both petitioner and respondent are listed on Chadwick's birth certificate as the child's parents, and by their mutual agreement, the child's name was stated on the birth certificate as "Chadwick Holland Crawford."
On 18 September 1997 petitioner filed a Petition for Name Change seeking to change Chadwick's name from "Chadwick Holland Crawford" to "Chadwick Holland Crawford Trull." Petitioner alleged, as grounds for the name change, that she had suffered embarrassment by reason of having a surname different from that of her child, and that her child's different surname was a source of confusion to others. Respondent filed a Motion to Intervene and a Response to the Petition for Name Change, objecting to the child's name being changed. Although respondent acknowledged paternity shortly after the child's birth, the record does not indicate that the child has been legitimated.
The matter came to hearing before the Clerk of Superior Court for Wake County. The clerk found facts consistent with the foregoing summary, concluded "[t]here is no legal or statutory authority permitting the name change as requested in the absence of consent by [respondent], the father of the minor child," and denied the petition. Petitioner appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the order of the clerk. Petitioner appeals.
Petitioner first argues that both the clerk of superior court and the superior court erred in concluding that respondent's consent was necessary to change Chadwick's surname. Specifically, petitioner contends that because Chadwick was born out of wedlock and has not been legitimated, G.S. § 130A-101 operates to vest petitioner with superior rights in naming the child; that despite respondent's acknowledgment of paternity, petitioner could have refused to allow Chadwick to bear respondent's surname; and that it "is illogical that her action in initially acquiescing in the use of [r]espondent's surname is sufficient to confer an absolute right upon him to thereafter withhold consent to her actions."
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 130A-101(f)(4) (emphasis added). Here, there is no dispute that petitioner and respondent executed an Affidavit of Paternity acknowledging respondent as Chadwick's natural father; that respondent's name is entered on the birth certificate as the father; and that respondent and petitioner agreed that the child would bear the name "Chadwick Holland Crawford." Thus, under the statute, the child was properly given respondent's surname.
Petitioner, however, apparently contends that because Chadwick has not been legitimated, she can unilaterally withdraw her consent as to the child's surname and change it to her own. G.S. § 130A-101(f)(4) plainly contains no such authority and we cannot, under the guise of statutory interpretation, write such a provision into it. See Walker v. North Carolina Coastal Resources Comm'n, 124 N.C.App. 1, 11, 476 S.E.2d 138, 144 (1996),
disc. review denied, 346 N.C. 185, 486 S.E.2d 220 (1997) (quoting Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990)) ("`[w]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning'").
Petitioner also argues that in determining that respondent's consent is necessary to change Chadwick's surname, the lower courts erroneously afforded more weight to G.S. § 101-2, the name change statute, than to G.S. § 130A-101. Although neither the clerk's order nor the superior court's order affirming it cites G.S. § 101-2, the statute is pertinent to the issue of respondent's consent. As relevant to the issue before us, G.S. § 101-2 provides:
Applications to change the name of minor children may be filed by their parent or parents or guardian or next friend of such minor children, and such applications may be joined in the application for a change of name filed by their parent or parents: Provided nothing herein shall be construed to permit one parent to make such application on behalf of a minor child without the consent of the other parent of such minor child if both parents be living....
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 101-2 (emphasis added). Citing In re Dunston, 18 N.C.App. 647, 197 S.E.2d 560 (1973), petitioner contends the word "parent" as contained in the statute does not include respondent, and his consent to change Chadwick's surname is not required.
Dunston at 649, 197 S.E.2d at 562 (emphasis added). Dunston is distinguishable from the present case in that respondent does, in fact, have rights in the child's name by virtue of the parties' agreement pursuant to G.S. § 130A-101(f)(4). The natural father in Dunston was unknown, clearly played no role in the child's life, and the child's birth certificate listed no one as the father. The issue of the necessity of the natural father's consent was not at issue, and the italicized portion of the Court's opinion quoted above is dicta, inapplicable to the present facts.
Moreover, the Dunston court elaborated on the meaning of "parent" within the statute, stating, Dunston at 649, 197 S.E.2d at 562. Respondent, as Chadwick's legally recognized natural father, in both an Affidavit of Paternity and the birth certificate, clearly fits within an ordinary definition of "father" and "natural parent." See Smith v. Bumgarner, 115 N.C.App. 149, 151, 443 S.E.2d 744, 745 (1994)
(citation omitted) ("A statute's words should be given their natural and ordinary meaning."). Thus, under the present...
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In re Jo.A.P., No. COA08-816 (N.C. App. 11/18/2008)
...were not argued to the trial court. A party will not be allowed to raise an issue for the first time on appeal. In re Crawford, 134 N.C. App. 137, 142, 517 S.E.2d 161, 164 (1999). These arguments are dismissed. Mother assigns error to findings of fact 32, 51-52, 56-57, 63, 65-66, 68, and 70......
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Daniels v. Hetrick
...Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 10(b)(1) are not properly preserved for appeal. In re Change of Name of Crawford to Crawford Trull, 134 N.C.App. 137, 142, 517 S.E.2d 161, 164 (1999). We find appellant's first assignment of error to be without In her second assignment of error pla......
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In Matter of the K.O.S., No. COA04-773 (NC 2/1/2005)
...file 01 CVD 2256 of the Clerk of Court of Wake County. 4. The Court of Appeals, in a recent case, In the Matter of the Change of Name of Crawford, 134 N.C. App. 137, 517 S.E.2d 161, (NC, 1999) [sic], has held that the mother could not unilaterally change the name of an infant illegitimate s......