In re Crawford

Citation560 S.W.3d 357
Decision Date12 June 2018
Docket NumberNo. 06-18-00025-CV,06-18-00025-CV
Parties IN RE: Sally CRAWFORD
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

Stacy Thompson, Meloney Perry, Shannon Spizman, Perry Law PC, 10440 N Central Expy, Ste 600, Dallas, TX 75231, for Appellant.

Rick Standifer, Rick Standifer, PC, 3713 Lamar Ave, Paris. TX 75460, for Appellee.

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Moseley

On April 5, 2018, Relator Sally Crawford filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel the presiding judge of the 62nd Judicial District Court of Hopkins County to dismiss, for want of prosecution, a suit for damages against her arising out of a motor vehicle collision. For the reasons below, we conditionally grant Crawford’s petition for writ of mandamus.

I. Background
A. Case Originally Filed in the County Court at Law of Hopkins County

This case has had a long and tortured past, beginning with an automobile collision alleged to have occurred on July 21, 2003, between vehicles driven by Teresa Rae Turner and Crawford. A lawsuit over the collision was filed July 14, 2005, in the County Court at Law of Hopkins County by Turner against Crawford wherein Turner alleged that Crawford’s negligent driving had been the cause of the collision. In that lawsuit, Turner maintained that as a result of Crawford’s negligence, she suffered, among other things, physical injuries and mental anguish. Turner requested disclosure of material information and also asked for a jury trial. On September 14, 2005, Crawford filed a general denial, along with a claim for "contributory/comparative negligence/responsible third party." Crawford also requested disclosure of material information and asked for a jury trial. On November 11, 2005, Turner filed her responses to Crawford’s requests for disclosure.

On February 14, 2006, Turner filed a notice to multiple medical providers of her intention to take depositions by written questions. On February 1, 2012, and February 28, 2006, Turner gave her oral, video-recorded deposition. In March 2006, Turner’s lawsuit against Crawford was set on the county court at law’s dismissal docket. At that time, Turner’s case had been pending for approximately 253 days.

On July 12, 2006, Teresa D. Kowalczyk, M.D., gave her oral, audio/video-recorded deposition.

On March 1, 2007, the parties filed an "unopposed motion for entry of agreed order setting schedule" in the County Court at Law of Hopkins County. In the motion, the parties stated,

As this case involves complex injuries, which the Plaintiff sustained during the automobile accident. [sic] Plaintiff is still obtaining medical treatment. Plaintiff and Defendant anticipate that it will take several months to treat the patient and coordinate the retrieval of medical records and associated bills. As such, Plaintiff anticipates that this matter should be ready for trial by November 19, 2007, the date set by the Court. Further, the date set by the Court for trial is a jury date. Accordingly, Plaintiff[ ] move[s] that the Court enter a level 3 discovery control plan and reset this matter for jury trial on November 19, 2007....

Four days later, the trial court entered an agreed scheduling order, which included a trial setting of November 19, 2007. On September 10, 2007, Turner provided Crawford with her first set of requests for production, first set of requests for admissions, first set of interrogatories, and a request for withholding statement. On October 10, 2007, Crawford provided Turner with her answers and responses to Turner’s discovery requests. On October 11, 2007, Timothy J. Cardile, D.C., and Annette Horne, D.O., gave their oral, audio/video-recorded depositions. On November 6, 2007, the parties filed an agreed motion for continuance asking for a new trial date of February 5, 2008, explaining, "The parties need time to continue to conduct settlement discussions and possible mediation, as ordered by this court’s scheduling order." On November 16, 2007, the trial court granted the parties' request.

The record reflects that mediation had been set for July 9, 2008, but Turner informed Crawford by letter dated July 7, 2008, that she desired to cancel the mediation. On January 12, 2009, Turner’s counsel sent a letter to Turner. That letter contained the following:

This is my second attempt to contact you[.] It is imperative that you contact my office.
....
At this time, there are circumstances that make it difficult for me to represent you to the best of my abilities. For one, I have tried to settle this case numerous times, however all offers that were made by opposing counsel you regarded as an insult. I understand and I can agree, however, with the suit being filed two (2) years after the original incident, and no substantial medical evidence I can use under the rules to prove that the accident was a direct cause of your injuries, settlement was your best option for any recovery.
....
That being said, this case has run far beyond a normal time frame for an auto accident case, and has taken hours of work, time, and expenses. It seems that the case has dragged on with no foreseeable end due to trying to find what the primary cause of your physical ailments are. In addtion [sic], you have informed me that you do not wish to take this matter to trial. Without those two components I do not have the ability to win under [sic] in your eyes. The Court will not allow this matter to continue as it has and I am surprised it has gone this long without a complaint from the other side or the Court. So much time has passed that the right to additional discovery is over unless the Court sees that it is necessary to allow additional discovery.
....
I request your permission to withdraw from this case or leave of the court after a hearing.

In April 2009, Turner’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw, stating that good cause existed for withdrawal due to a conflict with Turner. Crawford indicated that she had no objection to the motion, which was granted April 9, 2009. On July 16, 2009, Crawford filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no evidence (1) that she was either negligent or that she was the proximate cause of the collision, (2) that Turner suffered any physical injury as a result of the accident, or (3) that Crawford’s negligence was the proximate cause of monetary damages to Turner.

On September 11, 2009, Turner filed a motion for continuance, along with a sworn affidavit from her new attorney, stating that he had only recently been contacted by Turner and that the time to file a response to Crawford’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment had passed. He stated, "My brief review of this extensive case file indicates there may be some additional discovery to complete, so I would need additional time to secure depositions and discovery in order to adequately represent Mrs. Turner." In addition, Turner filed a sworn affidavit stating,

I received first notice of a hearing on Defendant’s No Evidence Summary Judgment Motion on August 18, 2009. It was not until Thursday, August 20, 2009 while trying to contact my attorney, Ray Nichols, that I discovered that he no longer represents me in this matter. I have since learned that Mr. Nichols was allowed to withdraw on April 9, 2009. Previous to August 20, 2009 I have received no notice by mail or telephone that Mr. Nichols had withdrawn in this matter.

On December 7, 2011 (over two years later), the County Court at Law of Hopkins County sent Turner a letter stating that it had denied Crawford’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment and that it was ordering the parties to participate in mediation prior to the trial date of March 19, 2012.

On February 20, 2012, Turner provided Crawford with billing-records affidavits from thirty-two healthcare providers. On March 5, 2012, Turner provided her with medical-records affidavits from twenty health care providers. On April 10, 2012, the audio/video-recorded deposition of Daniel B. Strader, D.D.S., took place. In July 2012, the County Court at Law of Hopkins County entered an order granting Turner’s motion for continuance, finding that "due to questions arising as to amount in controversy" and issues relating to the court’s jurisdiction, the case should be continued to August 23, 2012. On August 16, 2012, the court sent the parties a letter explaining that the case had been reset for September 24, 2012.

Three years later, on September 21, 2015, the court entered an order stating, "On 9/24/2012, the court considered the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by [Crawford],"1 along with "the evidence of claimed monetary damages alleged by [Turner]." It then ordered "that this lawsuit be dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction."2

On October 16, 2015, Turner filed a motion for new trial asking the court to vacate its order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction and stating, "Plaintiff’s counsel has not found any Motion to Dismiss in Plaintiff’s files or in the Court’s files. Counsel does recall discussing with Defense Counsel and this Honorable Court the possibility that the damages exceed $100,000." On October 22, 2015, the trial court entered an order explaining that "by agreement of the parties," the court had conducted a telephone hearing on October 20, 2015, and that it was denying Turner’s motion for new trial.

B. Case Filed in District Court

According to Crawford, on November 19, 2015, Turner re-filed her lawsuit in the 62nd Judicial District Court of Hopkins County, alleging damages as a result of the July 21, 2003, vehicular collision.3 About ten months later, Crawford filed a motion for summary judgment and a no-evidence motion for summary judgment arguing, among other things, that Turner’s lawsuit was barred by the two-year statute of limitations, the doctrine of laches, and the doctrines of judicial estoppel and res judicata. On October 20, 2017, the trial court granted Crawford’s unopposed motion to...

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5 cases
  • In re Levetz
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • October 24, 2019
    ...ordinary trial process which will not be corrected by mandamus, but by the legal remedy of the ordinary appellate process.'" In re Crawford, 560 S.W.3d 357, 363 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, orig. proceeding) (quoting Hooks v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 808 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proce......
  • In re Porter
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • August 6, 2021
    ...(orig. proceeding)). "The relator is obligated to provide this Court with a record sufficient to establish his right to mandamus relief." Id. (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3; Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); In re Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 187 S.W.3d 197, 198-......
  • Sewell v. Brock
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • September 2, 2020
    ...of prosecution either under its inherent power or pursuant to Rule 165a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. (quoting In re Crawford, 560 S.W.3d 357, 364 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, orig. proceeding) (citing Conner, 458 S.W.3d at 534)). "Under Rule 165a(2) of the Texas Rules of Civil ......
  • Price v. E. Tex. H.S.I., Inc.
    • United States
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    • September 11, 2019
    ...the dismissal has the burden to produce evidence at the hearing showing good cause for his delay in prosecuting the case. In re Crawford, 560 S.W.3d 357, 364 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, orig. proceeding). Whether the plaintiff actually intended to abandon the lawsuit is not the inquiry. Bevi......
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