In re Crawford

• Decision Date: 16 November 2020
• Docket Number: S18Z1636
• Citation: 851 S.E.2d 572,310 Ga. 403
• Parties: INQUIRY CONCERNING Judge Robert M. CRAWFORD.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

310 Ga. 403

851 S.E.2d 572

INQUIRY CONCERNING Judge Robert M. CRAWFORD.

S18Z1636

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: November 16, 2020

Charles P. Boring, for Judicial Qualifications Commission.

The Barnes Law Group, Roy E. Barnes, John R. Bartholomew, IV, Virgil L. Brown, for Judge Crawford.

The Weathington Firm, James G. Banks, Amicus Curiae.

Per Curiam.

This judicial discipline matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of the Hearing Panel of the Judicial Qualifications Commission ("JQC") and a timely notice of exceptions filed by Robert M. "Mack" Crawford. The Hearing Panel recommended that Crawford, who later resigned as a Superior Court Judge of the Griffin Judicial Circuit, be "removed from office" for violating Rule 1.1 of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct ("CJC"), which says that "Judges shall respect and comply with the law. "¹ The Hearing Panel did not recommend that Crawford be permanently barred from seeking or holding judicial office.² The JQC Director did not file a notice of exceptions, thereby accepting the Hearing Panel's recommendation. See JQC Rule 24 (F). Under rules promulgated by this Court, we must now file a written decision either dismissing this matter or imposing a sanction. See JQC Rule 25 (D) (1). For the reasons stated below, we dismiss.

1. At the direction of the JQC's Investigative Panel, the Director filed a formal complaint against Crawford. The complaint alleged that Crawford violated CJC Rule 1.1 in two ways: (1) by "impermissibly converting money from the registry of the Superior Court of Pike County ... when he ordered the Pike County Clerk via handwritten note to disburse $15,675.62 in funds from the court registry to him via check" and "then cashed and used a portion of the check for his personal benefit and deposited the remainder of this money in his personal checking account," although he later returned the funds; and (2) by "failing to follow the proper procedure for the disbursement of funds, even if the money had been his, as required by law," noting the certification requirement for withdrawal of funds from a court registry contained in Uniform Superior Court Rule 23. In 2002, when Crawford was in private practice, he had deposited the funds into the registry from his client trust account in connection with a lawsuit. The JQC complaint acknowledged that Crawford claimed that at least some of the money was owed to him as attorney fees and expenses. The complaint sought Crawford's removal from office but not a ban on seeking or holding judicial office in the future.³

At a formal hearing before the JQC Hearing Panel, the Pike County Clerk, who had held that position for 30 years, testified – and the Hearing Panel later found – that Crawford did not order the Clerk to disburse the funds to him, nor did the Clerk feel compelled to do so; she simply trusted Crawford because he was a close, longtime friend. The Hearing Panel issued its Report and Recommendation, concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence that Crawford violated CJC Rule 1.1 by taking money that was "not demonstrably his own" and by failing to comply with the certification requirement.

To assist in our review of this judicial discipline matter, on August 10, 2020, we directed Crawford and the Director to file briefs on three issues: (1) whether there is clear and convincing evidence that Crawford violated CJC Rule 1.1 ; (2) whether the JQC was validly constituted at all relevant times; and (3) whether this Court should ban Crawford from seeking or holding judicial office in the future in light of the evidence. In connection with the third issue, we noted that the Director did not seek such a sanction in the formal complaint, the issue was not raised before the Hearing Panel, and the Hearing Panel did not recommend a lifetime ban.

2. Crawford contends that the JQC failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he violated CJC Rule 1.1 in a manner sufficient to support his removal from office and that the Hearing Panel erred in concluding otherwise based on the evidence before it. See JQC Rule 7 ("Charges of misconduct ... shall be established by the standard of clear and convincing evidence...."). It is undisputed that Crawford violated CJC Rule 1.1 by obtaining funds from the court registry without complying with the certification requirement of Uniform Superior Court Rule 23. However, while such a violation is serious, we express doubt that the complaint would have sought or the Hearing Panel would have recommended Crawford's removal from office for violating CJC Rule 1.1 based solely on a single violation of the certification requirement of Uniform Superior Court Rule 23. As a result, and particularly in light of the sanction sought here, we move to the clearly more serious of the Hearing Panel's CJC Rule 1.1 findings.

It also seems clear that, while the evidence before the Hearing Panel likely was sufficient to support a finding that Crawford violated CJC Rule 1.1 by impermissibly converting the funds he obtained from the court registry under a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, and perhaps even under the higher clear and convincing evidence standard, that is a close question; we note that the evidence on that issue certainly was not overwhelming. See In the Matter of: Inquiry Concerning Judge Peters , 289 Ga. 633, 635, 715 S.E.2d 56 (2011) (explaining that in judicial discipline matters, "this Court employs the clear and convincing proof standard to decide whether allegations against a judge are established by the evidence of record" (citation and punctuation omitted)). Critical to our analysis of the evidence, though, is the fact that Crawford has since resigned, thereby voluntarily removing himself from office, which was the very sanction sought in the formal complaint and recommended by the Hearing Panel. Under these circumstances, we conclude that it is unnecessary for us to decide definitively whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Crawford violated CJC Rule 1.1 by impermissibly converting the funds from the court registry so as to warrant his removal from office.⁴

3. Crawford also contends that the Hearing Panel was not properly constituted when it considered this matter because the names of its members were not submitted to the Senate by January 15, 2018. See OCGA § 15-1-21 (g) (1) ("The names of the appointees ... shall be submitted by the appointing authorities to the Senate no later than the third Monday in January.... [I]f an individual's name is not submitted by such deadline, he or she shall not be eligible for confirmation."). However, Crawford presented no testimony or other evidence before the Hearing Panel to support this contention, and the Director likewise did not present any testimony or other evidence on this question. Accordingly, there is no record evidence upon which we could decide this issue in Crawford's favor. He is therefore deemed to have abandoned this issue. See Daker v. State , 300 Ga. 74, 77 n.6, 792 S.E.2d 382 (2016) (holding that enumeration of error not supported by citations to record was abandoned).

4. That leaves for consideration only the question of whether this Court should ban Crawford from seeking or holding judicial office in the future. As Crawford acknowledges, the JQC has continuing jurisdiction over former judges regarding timely allegations of misconduct that occurred during their service as a judge. See CJC, Application D; JQC Rule 2 (B) (2). Crawford also acknowledges that this Court is not constrained by the Hearing Panel's recommendation as to the appropriate sanction and that we generally have the authority to impose any permissible sanction – including a harsher sanction – despite what the JQC recommends. See In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 01-44 , 275 Ga. 404, 404-406, 566 S.E.2d 310 (2002). As noted above, JQC Rule 6 (B) (1) identifies removal from office "with ... a prohibition on seeking or holding judicial office in the future" as a permissible sanction, and in the past we have imposed a permanent ban on seeking or holding judicial office, see, e.g., In the Matter of: Inquiry Concerning Judge Peters , 289 Ga. at 636, 715 S.E.2d 56 ; In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 92-80 , 262 Ga. 804, 804, 426 S.E.2d 552 (1993). We conclude, however, that such a sanction would not be appropriate here.

First, as noted in Division 2, above, the evidence that Crawford impermissibly converted the funds from the court registry is not overwhelming. Second, the alleged misconduct did not directly involve Crawford's exercise of his judicial duties; to the contrary, the Hearing Panel specifically found that the Director failed to prove that Crawford had "len[t] the prestige of [his] office to advance [his] private interests" in connection with the disbursement of the funds as required to support the additional charge of violating CJC Rule 1.3. Third, Crawford voluntarily removed himself from office by resigning, which was the very sanction sought in the formal complaint and recommended by the Hearing Panel. Finally, Crawford's plea agreement prohibits him from seeking or holding judicial office while he is on probation, and there is no indication in the record or in Crawford's filings in this Court that he plans to seek a judgeship at any point in the future.

For these reasons, a permanent ban on seeking or holding judicial office would not be an appropriate sanction here. Accordingly, we hereby dismiss this matter.

Dismissed.

All the Justices concur, except Nahmias, P.J., and McMillian, J., disqualified. Warren, J., not participating.

Blackwell, Justice, concurring.

Even if this Court had the power to forever disqualify Judge Robert M. Crawford from holding judicial office, I would not exercise it in this case, especially considering that the Director of the Judicial Qualifications Commission did not seek a lifetime...