In re Creuzot

• Decision Date: 08 November 2021
• Docket Number: No. 05-21-00741-CV,05-21-00741-CV
• Citation: 637 S.W.3d 186
• Parties: IN RE John CREUZOT, Relator
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

637 S.W.3d 186

IN RE John CREUZOT, Relator

No. 05-21-00741-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Opinion Filed November 8, 2021

Russell J. Anderson Jr., Dallas, for Relator.

Frank M. Adler, for Real party in interest Dallas County Juvenile Probation Department.

Paul James Johnson, Denton, for Real party in interest D.C., a juvenile.

Before Justices Osborne, Pedersen, III, and Goldstein

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Goldstein

In this original proceeding, relator John Creuzot, as the District Attorney of Dallas County ("the State"), asks us to compel the 305th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas ("juvenile court"), to vacate its August 20, 2021 injunctive order as void and dismiss the probation department's application for temporary relief for want of jurisdiction. Because we agree with the State that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to issue the challenged injunctive order, we conditionally grant the writ of mandamus.

I. BACKGROUND

The State filed an indictment charging the adult defendant with murder. The criminal proceeding is pending in the 283rd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas ("criminal court"), under cause number F19-75881-T. In that proceeding, the State issued a subpoena to compel the appearance and testimony of the defendant's former juvenile probation officer during the criminal trial.

After failing to successfully quash the subpoena in criminal court, the juvenile probation department filed an application for a temporary restraining order and request for temporary orders in the juvenile court, which had prior jurisdiction over the defendant's juvenile delinquency proceeding. The probation department asked the juvenile court to temporarily restrain the State from disclosing any confidential juvenile information without the juvenile court's permission. The probation department further asked for temporary orders to ensure the protection and confidentiality of the defendant's juvenile record and the juvenile probation department's record, including but not limited to: (1) orders directing the State to comply with Texas Family Code Chapter 58 and not to disclose any confidential juvenile record and (2) orders directing the State to properly request a confidential juvenile record through the juvenile court. The juvenile court issued an order temporarily restraining the State from "disclosing, subjecting others to disclose, and/or utilizing confidential juvenile information in any manner contrary to Chapter 58 of the Texas Family Code," and the matter was set for a hearing.

At the hearing, the probation department complained that the State could not have known the identity or name of the defendant's juvenile probation officer unless the State had improperly accessed the confidential juvenile records. On August 20, 2021, the juvenile court granted the probation department's application and issued an "Order on Injunctive Relief." Among other things, the juvenile court found that the identity of the defendant's juvenile probation officer could not have been known to the State unless the State had inspected a protected and confidential record, and, even if the State did have the authority to inspect the juvenile records, the State did not have the authority to disclose or utilize the probation officer's name or identity, including issuing a subpoena in the probation officer's name. The court further found that the State did not seek the juvenile court's approval prior to utilizing or disclosing confidential, protected information regarding the juvenile record. Accordingly, the injunctive order restricts the State from: (1) disclosing or utilizing any information obtained from a confidential juvenile record; (2) "subjecting any individual, agency or organization to disclose, in any forum" information obtained from a confidential juvenile record; and (3) using any obtainable information from a confidential juvenile record. This mandamus proceeding followed.

In its petition for writ of mandamus, the State asks this Court to direct the juvenile court to vacate its injunction and dismiss the probation department's application for want of jurisdiction. The State has also filed an appeal from the injunction addressing both jurisdictional and substantive issues. This panel requested a response and later issued a stay of the injunctive order and underlying proceeding pending further order of this Court. Although the response to the petition was due on October 4, 2021, the real party in interest has filed no response to date.

II. ANALYSIS

Generally, to be entitled to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, a relator must show both that the trial court has clearly abused its discretion and that she has no adequate appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co. , 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). Where the trial court's order is void, however, it is unnecessary for the relator to show the lack of other adequate remedies for a writ of mandamus to issue. Dikeman v. Snell , 490 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. 1973). An order is void when it is clear that the court had no jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter, no jurisdiction to render judgment, or no capacity to act as a court. State ex rel. Latty v. Owens , 907 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex. 1995) ; see Alderson v. Alderson , 352 S.W.3d 875, 879 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (discussing the same elements of a judgment as void). Subject matter jurisdiction is never presumed and can also be raised at any time. Alfonso v. Skadden , 251 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tex. 2008).

We conclude that the challenged order is void because the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to issue it.¹ "The juvenile court is not a court of general jurisdiction." In re N.J.A. , 997 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1999). The Family Code supplies the juvenile court's authority to act. Id. The juvenile court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over all proceedings involving a defendant who is a "child" when the alleged offense occurred. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.04(a). The Family Code defines "child" as one who is:

(A) ten years of age or older and under 17 years of age;

or

(B) seventeen years of age or older and under 18 years of age who is alleged or found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision as a result of acts committed before becoming 17 years of age.

Id. § 51.02(2). The juvenile court's jurisdiction is limited once the child turns eighteen years old. See In re N.J.A. , 997 S.W.2d at 555–56.

Generally, to invoke the jurisdiction of a court, a party must file a petition whose subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the court. See Morgan v. Chandler , 906 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, writ denied) (Reynolds, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Cleveland v. Ward , 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063, 1069 (1926) ). A plaintiff's petition "must state facts which affirmatively show the jurisdiction of the court in which the action is brought." Richardson v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co. , 419 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Tex. 1967) ; Brown v. Peters , 127 Tex. 300, 94 S.W.2d 129, 130 (1936). If, even by amendment, no claim or cause of action can be stated consistent with the facts alleged, the petition fails to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction, and the court only has jurisdiction to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction. See Bybee v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. , 160 Tex. 429, 331 S.W.2d 910, 917 (1960) (explaining that, although the imperfect statement of a claim will not automatically defeat jurisdiction, the court lacks jurisdiction where, even by amendment, no cause of action can be stated consistent with the facts alleged). "An injunction is an equitable remedy, not a cause of action." Brittingham v. Ayala , 995 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (citations omitted).

Here, even putting to one side the limited nature of the juvenile court's jurisdiction, the probation department did not file a petition alleging a claim or cause of action in the juvenile court proceeding. All that was filed was the probation department's application for a temporary restraining order and request for temporary orders, which alleged no claim or cause of action.

We also find that a cause of action could not be stated consistent with the facts alleged in the...