In re Crosswell's Petition

• Decision Date: 23 January 1907
• Citation: 28 R.I. 137,66 A. 55
• Parties: In re CROSSWELL'S PETITION.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

66 A. 55

28 R.I. 137

In re CROSSWELL'S PETITION.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 23, 1907.

Petition by Simon G. Crosswell for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain his discharge from the Butler Hospital for the Insane. Petition dismissed.

Argued before DOUGLAS, C. J., and DUBOIS, BLODGETT, JOHNSON, and PARKHURST, JJ.

Amasa M. Eaton and Simon G. Croswell, for petitioner. Gardner, Pirce & Thornley, for Butler Hospital.

DOUGLAS, C. J. This proceeding is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and for discharge from custody of a patient confined against his will in the Butler Hospital.

Citation was issued to show cause why the writ should not issue, and a hearing was had before the court at which the petitioner was present with experienced counsel appointed by the court, and at which he and his witnesses were heard. Subsequently briefs were filed by him, and by his counsel, and by counsel representing the respondent. All parties have been given full opportunity to present their evidence and arguments. We find as matter of fact, upon the concurrent testimony of all the expert witnesses, that the petitioner is insane; and upon uncontradicted evidence, that his malady is in its nature progressive, and that it is liable at any time, without warning, to induce in him acts of violence to himself or others. In these circumstances it is clear that for his own good, as well as for the protection of the community, be requires restraint and medical care such as the Butler Hospital affords and for the purpose of furnishing which it is incorporated and authorized by law to receive patients.

The petitioner is a citizen of Massachusetts, and was brought from that state, and, by order of two of its trustees, admitted to the Butler Hospital upon the following certificate and application presented to the superintendent:

"Certificate and Application.

"We hereby certify that Simon G. Crosswell, of Cambridge, Mass., is insane.

"E. Stanley Abbott, M. D.,

"Guy G. Fernald, M. D.,

"Physicians. "Date, 29 April, 1905.

"I request that the above-named insane person may be admitted as a patient into the Butler Hospital.

"Mary C. Crosswell, Guardian."

The signers of the certificate were known to the superintendent, as he testifies, to be practicing physicians in good standing. It appeared, also, by their own depositions, taken on behalf of the petitioner, that they are salaried officials of the McLean Hospital, living in one of the hospital buildings and exclusively occupied in attendance upon the patients of that institution and medical practice therein. The signer of the application is sister and the nearest relative of the petitioner, and on May 13, 1903, both of his parents having died, she was appointed guardian of the petitioner, as an insane person, by the probate court of Middlesex county, Mass., where he is domiciled.

The commitment and reception of the petitioner at the hospital were under the provisions of Gen. Laws 1890, c. 82, §§ 11, 12, as follows:

"Sec. 11. Insane persons may be removed to and placed in said Butler Hospital, or in any other curative hospital for the insane of good repute in this state, managed under the supervision of a board of officers appointed under the authority of this state, by their parents, or parent, or guardians, if any they have, and if not, by their relatives and friends; but the superintendent of said hospital shall not receive any person into his custody in such case without a certificate from two practicing physicians of good standing, known to him as such, that such person is insane, and the state shall not be liable for the support of any such person.

"Sec. 12. Any person committed to the charge of any of said institutions for the insane as aforesaid, in either of the modes hereinbefore prescribed, may be lawfully received and detained in said institution by the superintendent thereof, and by his keepers and servants, until discharged in one of the modes herein provided; and neither the superintendent of such institution, his keepers or servants, nor the trustees or agents of the same, shall be liable, civilly or criminally, for receiving or detaining any person so committed or detained."

The statute does not require that the certificate mentioned in section 11 should be sworn to or that it should be signed by physicians practicing in this state, or that they should not be officers of an institution for the care of the insane, or that the removal shall be from another hospital. These objections, urged against the validity of the certificate in the present case, have no basis in the statute. The certificate fulfilled the requirements of the law. The power given to parents or guardians, so far as it relates to minors or wards, is only a recognition of the power which nature gives to the one class and the courts have bestowed upon the other. A parent, without this statute, may abridge the liberty of his child, may confine him in a school, or workshop, or hospital, may determine his place of abode or occupation, according to the parent's judgment, consulting the interests of the child, not its desire; and a guardian, wherever his authority is recognized, has similar rights over his ward. While it is true that an appointment by the court of any state has legal and imperative effect only within the jurisdiction of the state, it is also true that the relation of guardian and ward, when legally established by a court of competent authority having jurisdiction of the person of the ward, will generally be recognized by courts in other jurisdictions, into which the ward may be brought, who have occasion to examine Questions relating to the custody of the ward's person. In such cases the court will make such order as is apparently for the benefit of the ward, and will remand him to the custody of the foreign guardian unless it sees that such control is improper. 1 Wharton, Con. Laws (3d Ed.) 263, 263a. State ex rel. Raymond v. Lawrence, 86 Minn. 310, 90 N. W. 769, 58 L. R. A. 931; Nugent v. Vetzera, L. R. 2 Eq. 704; Townsend v. Kendall, 4 Minn. 412 (Gil. 315) 77 Am. Dec. 534; Ex parte Dawson, 5 Bradf. (N. Y.) 130; Warren v. Hofer, 13 Ind. 167; Re Parker, 39 La. Ann. 333, 1 South. 891; Vick v. Volz, 47 La. Ann. 42, 16 South. 568; Taylor v. Nichols, 86 Tenn. 32, 5 S. W. 436.

Our statutes expressly confer upon nonresident guardians certain powers with regard to property of their wards which may be in this state. Gen. Laws 1896, c. 196. §§ 41, 42, re-enacted in Court & Practice Act 1905, §§ 1075, 1076, construed in Mitchell v. People's Savings Bank, 20 R. I. 502, 40 Atl. 502. We think the statute now under consideration should be held to include in the word "guardian" those of foreign as well as domestic appointment. Many of the patients in the Butler Hospital are not citizens of Rhode Island, and we cannot narrow the construction of so comprehensive a statute, and construe it so as to require in many cases the appointment of a local guardian before a person needing the care of this institution could be committed to it. But the person who signed the application in this case is the sister of the petitioner, and in either case the requirement of the law was satisfied.

The important question raised by counsel for the petitioner is whether the statute itself is in violation of the clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States which reads: "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." This question came before the court in Doyle, Petitioner, 16 R. I. 537, 18 Atl. 159, 5 L. R. A. 359, 27 Am. St. Rep. 759, upon a commitment under Pub. St. 1882, c. 74, §§ 11, 12, which are substantially the same as the sections of the general laws, now under discussion. The petition in that case was brought by the guardian of a patient in the Butler Hospital who had been committed thereto by his wife before the guardian was appointed, and the provisions of these sections were held to be unconstitutional. July 23, 1889, 24...