In re A.D.
| Decision Date | 19 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22CA0402 |
| Citation | 2023 COA 6 |
| Parties | In the Interest of A.D., a Child, I.S. and V. T., Appellees, and L.D. Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
SUMMARY
A division of the court of appeals reviews the guardianship appointment for a minor under section 15-14-204(2)(c), C.R.S 2022. In so doing, the division adopts the analytical framework outlined in In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.J., 242 P.3d 1128 (Colo. 2010). Applying that framework to section 15-14-204(2)(c), the division concludes that the moving party must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is (1) "unable or unwilling" to exercise their parental rights, and (2) the guardianship is in the best interest of the minor notwithstanding the parent(s)' opposition to the guardianship. Moreover, in entering such an order, the court must articulate the "special factors" it relies upon to justify this interference with parental rights. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
Utilizing that framework here, the division concludes that the court did not err in appointing a guardian for the minor.
Larimer County District Court No. 21PR30624 Honorable Sarah B. Cure, Judge
Lindsey Steele-Idem, Guardian Ad Litem Liggett Johnson & Goodman, P.C., Gail B. Goodman, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellees
Wick & Trautwein, LLC, Julie M. Yates, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Appellant
¶ 1 L.D. appeals the district court's order granting guardianship of her son, A.D., to I.S. and V.T. (jointly, Petitioners) pursuant to section 15-14-204(2)(c), C.R.S. 2022. We affirm.
¶ 2 L.D. is the sole living parent of A.D., one of her three children. A.D. was sixteen at the time of the guardianship proceeding. Although L.D. and A.D. once shared a healthy relationship, it deteriorated dramatically during the summer and fall of 2021. This deterioration gave rise to Petitioners' request for - and the district court's grant of - an unlimited guardianship over A.D. We turn to that history now.
¶ 3 In June 2021, A.D.'s car was vandalized while parked in front of the family home. A.D. and his mother had a heated argument about why it happened and who was responsible for cleaning it. Upset by this conversation, A.D. went to stay at his girlfriend's house. Although he soon returned home, A.D. ran away from home five more times following disagreements with L.D.
¶ 4 In early July 2021, L.D. gave A.D. an ultimatum: he could (1) go to military school, (2) attend therapeutic boarding school, or (3) abide by her house rules. A.D. ran away again that night, but this time he spent over a month away from home, staying with his girlfriend, couch surfing at friends' homes, or sleeping in public parks.
¶ 5 On August 7, 2021, A.D. was taken to the emergency room after appearing to overdose while partying with friends at a park. The hospital made a mandatory report to the Department of Human Services (DHS). Once A.D. was stable, L.D. and V.T. (L.D.'s longtime colleague and family friend) met with a DHS representative to discuss next steps. L.D. agreed that, given the hostility between A.D. and herself, and between A.D. and his two siblings (who both lived with L.D.), it was in his best interest to stay with Petitioners.
¶ 6 On September 8, 2021, A.D. drove Petitioners' car to L.D.'s house for his first night back since early July. When he arrived, L.D. became extremely upset that he had driven there. In her mind, A.D.'s operation of a car - and Petitioners' facilitation of it - violated their agreement that he not drive until certain conditions were met. The next morning, without notice to Petitioners or her son, L.D. called the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and withdrew her permission for A.D.'s driver's license. The DMV revoked his license the next day.
¶ 7 A.D. became enraged when he learned that his mother had revoked her consent and subsequently sent a series of angry texts to her. L.D. then blocked A.D.'s number, thus preventing A.D.'s calls or texts from coming through to L.D.'s phone (though texts came through on her computer).
¶ 8 On September 24, 2021, DHS facilitated an "adults only" meeting with L.D., Petitioners, and DHS representatives. That meeting resulted in three shared priorities: (1) Petitioners were to provide regular updates about A.D. to L.D., who would, in turn, communicate with Petitioners before making decisions affecting A.D.; (2) A.D.'s license would be reauthorized within thirty days once to-be-defined conditions were met; and (3) A.D. would be allowed to be on the high school wrestling team, which all parties agreed was good for him.
¶ 9 Over the next month, Petitioners regularly emailed L.D. updates on A.D. L.D. provided few, if any, responses to these updates. Petitioners also sent L.D. a proposed plan for A.D. to get his license back, but L.D. did not respond.
¶ 10 On October 20, 2021, Petitioners filed their petition for appointment as A.D.'s guardians. L.D. objected to the petition, sought dismissal of the action, and requested attorney fees.
¶ 11 On November 8, 2021, Petitioners requested that the court appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent A.D.'s interests. Over L.D.'s objection, the court appointed a GAL pursuant to section 15-14-115, C.R.S. 2022, after concluding that, owing to their disagreement over the guardianship, the parties could not represent A.D.'s best interest in the guardianship proceedings. The GAL represented A.D.'s best interest throughout the litigation, and the court also instructed the GAL to provide a report about whether L.D. was "unable to exercise her parental rights."
¶ 12 On November 14, 2021, before Petitioners filed their reply, L.D. - without consulting Petitioners or A.D. - revoked her permission for A.D. to wrestle the day before the first day of practice. Why she took this sudden action is unclear: L.D. testified it was because A.D. was not maintaining passing grades, while another witness testified that she wanted "leverage" over him to participate in family therapy. Regardless, A.D. was devastated by the timing and nature of this action.
¶ 13 While these motions were pending, Petitioners continued to care for A.D. Petitioners asked L.D. for permission to talk to A.D.'s teachers, coaches, and doctors about how to better care for him. Yet from August to early December 2021, L.D. refused to grant Petitioners permission to engage with these individuals. She ignored or outright refused to allow such communications until December 8, 2021, when, after repeated requests from a DHS representative, she allowed Petitioners to attend - but not participate in - a meeting with A.D.'s teachers.
¶ 14 L.D. also resisted Petitioners' requests for financial support for A.D.'s care. To her credit, L.D. provided A.D. with $25 per week for groceries. These funds came from A.D.'s $1,800 monthly survivorship benefit, which was established following the death of A.D.'s father when A.D. was three. Petitioners knew the benefit existed and requested more financial support. L.D. did not respond to these requests.
¶ 15 Except for the text exchange between L.D. and A.D. following the revocation of L.D.'s consent for A.D.'s license, L.D. and A.D. never communicated directly. Instead, all such communications went through Petitioners or DHS.
¶ 16 Consistent with section 15-14-205(1), C.R.S. 2022, the district court conducted a hearing on Petitioners' guardianship motion. The hearing spanned two days, with both sides calling numerous witnesses.
¶ 17 In a written order, the court granted Petitioners an unlimited guardianship over A.D. In so doing, the court concluded that Petitioners had proved by clear and convincing evidence that L.D. was, consistent with section 15-14-204(2)(c), "unwilling or unable" to care for A.D. and that the guardianship was in A.D.'s best interest notwithstanding his mother's opposition to it.
¶ 18 We first address L.D.'s contention that it was improper for the court to proceed under section 15-14-204(2)(c) because, she claims, the order deprived her of parental rights in a manner akin to a dependency and neglect proceeding without affording her the attendant process. After determining that the court properly proceeded under section 15-14-204(2)(c), we examine the evidentiary burden and application of section 15-14-204(2)(c). With those legal principles in hand, we then turn to the district court's judgment and conclude that the court did not err in granting the guardianship.
¶ 19 Section 15-14-204(1) empowers district courts to appoint guardianships for minors upon request from "a person interested in the welfare of a minor."[1] A court can do so for several reasons. As pertinent here, it may appoint a qualified guardian if it finds the parents are "unwilling or unable to exercise their parental rights" and that the appointment is "in the minor's best interest." § 15-14-204(2)(c).
¶ 20 Unless otherwise limited by the court, a guardian possesses "the duties, responsibilities, and powers of a parent regarding the ward's support, care, education, health, and welfare." In re D.I.S., 249 P.3d 775, 780 (Colo. 2011); §§ 15-14-207, -208, C.R.S. 2022. Of course, granting such a guardianship may result in the coextensive loss of those duties, responsibilities, and powers for the parent(s).
¶ 21 Judicial actions taken under article 3 of the Colorado Children's Code can also affect parental rights. See §§ 19-3-100.5 to -705, C.R.S. 2022. For example, if the State alleges that a minor is dependent and neglected under section 19-3-102(1), C.R.S. 2022, then the court may hold an adjudicatory hearing at which the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child...
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