In re D.K.

• Decision Date: 10 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–1403.,14–1403.
• Citation: 868 N.W.2d 202 (Table)
• Parties: In re the Matter of D.K., Alleged to be a Person with a Substance Related Disorder, D.K., Respondent/Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

868 N.W.2d 202 (Table)

In re the Matter of D.K., Alleged to be a Person with a Substance Related Disorder D.K., Respondent/Appellant.

No. 14–1403.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

June 10, 2015.

Christopher Warnock, Iowa City, and Christine Boyer, Iowa City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Gretchen Witte Kraemer, Assistant Attorney General, Janet Lyness, County Attorney, and Kristin Parks, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.

Considered by VAITHESWARAN, P.J., and TABOR and MULLINS, JJ.

Opinion

VAITHESWARAN, P.J.

D.K. was involuntarily committed to a facility based on a substance abuse related disorder. See 2013 Iowa Acts ch. 130, § 37 (codified at Iowa Code § 125.75 (2015)); Iowa Code §§ 125.81, .82 (2013). He filed a motion to terminate the commitment and, alternatively, a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Meanwhile, D.K. was discharged from the facility, and the district court ordered termination of the proceedings. Based on his discharge, the district court concluded habeas corpus was “not an appropriate form of relief.” The court reasoned, “No one here in Iowa is holding [D.K.] or restraining his liberty. Once this Court ordered termination of all proceedings pursuant to which the commitment/treatment order was issued, there exists no one upon whom to serve a writ of habeas corpus.” The court denied the petition.

On appeal, D.K. raises a due process challenge to his commitment. The State counters with several arguments supporting dismissal of the appeal, including an argument based on the mootness doctrine. Our appellate courts have declined to dismiss this type of action on mootness grounds. See In re B.B., 826 N.W.2d 425, 431–32 (Iowa 2013) (presuming “person adjudicated seriously mentally impaired and involuntarily committed suffers adverse collateral consequences” and declining to apply mootness doctrine under these circumstances); In re J.G., No. 12–1220, 2013 WL 2107462, at *2 (Iowa Ct.App. May 15, 2013). As for the State's remaining procedural arguments, we find it more expedient to bypass them and proceed to the merits.

D.K. contends Iowa Code chapter 125, governing substance-related disorders

, “was not properly applied in the instant case.” He asserts “due process requires [a finding of] dangerousness for involuntary commitment” and “the statute is illegal because it does not require [a finding of] dangerousness.”

D.K. is partially correct. Involuntary civil commitment “constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” In re E.J.H., 493 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1992) (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) ). A finding of “mental illness” alone cannot justify confinement against a person's will. Id. (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) ). There also must be a finding of dangerousness. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (“We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness' or ‘mental abnormality.’ These added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.”) (cited in In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 284 (Iowa 2000) ). Accordingly, we agree proof of “dangerousness” is required to satisfy due process. We disagree with D.K. that chapter 125 no longer contains this requirement.

The legislature amended chapter 125 in 2011. See 2011 Iowa Acts ch. 121, §§ 26, 28. Before these amendments, the legislature defined “chronic substance abuser” as one who “[h]abitually lacks self control as to the use of chemical substances to the extent that the person is likely to seriously endanger the person's health, or to physically injure the person's self or others, if allowed to remain at liberty without treatment” and “[l]acks sufficient judgment to make responsible decisions with respect to the person's hospitalization or treatment.” Iowa Code § 125.2(5) (2011). This definition included a dangerousness component.

The 2011 amendment substituted “substance related disorder

” for “chronic substance abuser” and defined “substance related disorder ” as “a diagnosable substance abuse disorder of sufficient duration to meet diagnostic criteria specified within the most current diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders published by the American psychiatric association that results in a functional impairment.” Iowa Code § 125.2(14) (2013). This definition does not explicitly include a dangerous component.

However, by the time of D.K.'s commitment, the legislature corrected this omission by adding a dangerousness component, albeit...