In re D.S.M.

• Decision Date: 23 May 2023
• Docket Number: 612 WDA 2022,J-S09015-23
• Parties: IN THE INTEREST OF: D.S.M., A MINOR Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

1

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.S.M., A MINOR Appellant

No. 612 WDA 2022

No. J-S09015-23

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

May 23, 2023

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Dispositional Review Order Entered May 20, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-25-JV0000069-2021, CP-25-JV0000178-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM

BENDER, P.J.E.

D.S.M ("Appellant"), a minor, appeals from the dispositional review order dated April 20, 2022, and entered on the docket in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County on May 20, 2022, which modified his placement after he was adjudicated delinquent for multiple offenses. After careful review, we affirm.

The juvenile court provided the following procedural history and factual background in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:

[Appellant] was adjudicated delinquent on August 17, 2021 after previously admitting to several allegations, including criminal mischief, possession of a firearm by a minor, discharge of a firearm into an occupied structure, reckless endangerment, theft by unlawful taking, and receiving stolen property.^[1] The [c]ourt ordered that he be placed at Cornell Abraxas Academy [("Abraxas")] in Morgantown, Pennsylvania. His first four months at Abraxas were relatively positive, but unfortunately[,] by December [of that year], [Appellant's] behavior declined. All told, 12 physical interventions occurred at Abraxas between December 14, 2021, and March 10, 2022. Despite [Appellant's] escalating misconduct, Abraxas recommended at a review hearing[,] held in February of 2022[,] that he remain at the facility, believing it could still treat [Appellant's] behavioral issues. After a few weeks, however, the facility was no longer so optimistic. On March 17, 2022, Abraxas requested his removal, citing instances of aggression, such as attempting an assault on a peer, threatening to "jump" a staff member, and the breaking of a security camera and a large wooden table.

At a disposition hearing held on April 20, 2022, the Commonwealth recommended placement at another secure facility. While counsel for [Appellant] agreed that "Abraxas just didn't work" and "a change of scenery would work best for him[,]" he proposed "[g]etting him back home as a good alternate possibility." [Appellant's] mother proposed that he be released on probation to participate in a summer work experience program, and to engage in counseling with Dr. Parris Baker. Ultimately, the [c]ourt agreed with the Commonwealth's recommendation, continuing the finding of delinquency and ordering him "relocated to a state secure juvenile facility with the first available bed." The [c]ourt found this "to be the least restrictive means to address community protection, victim restoration, mental health and competency development."

Juvenile Court Opinion ("JCO"), 7/27/22, at 1-2 (citations to record and brackets in original omitted).

The juvenile court entered its April 20, 2022 dispositional review order at both juvenile docket numbers (JV 69-2021 and JV 178-2021) on May 20, 2022. Appellant filed a single, timely notice of appeal on May 20, 2022, listing both docket numbers from which he appeals, followed by a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant now presents the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the [juvenile] court erred when it determined that Appellant needed further "treatment, rehabilitation and/or supervision" in a more restrictive facility instead of in a less restrictive setting such as a community type of setting (i.e., formal probation with outpatient and/or wrap around services) and/or an independent living type of placement due to Appellant's age and/or other factors considered by the [juvenile c]ourt[?]

B. Whether the [juvenile] court erred when it determined that Appellant's best placement option was Commit to State Placement ([Youth Development Center ("YDC")]) (first bed available), which is further from [Appellant's] home county than other placements that could accomplish the same "treatment, supervision and rehabilitation" goals that focus on education and/or personal safety instead of a less restrictive setting such as a community type of setting (i.e., formal probation with outpatient and/or wrap around services) and/or an independent living type of placement due to Appellant['s] age and/or other factors considered by the [juvenile c]ourt[?]

Appellant's Brief at 5.

Before delving into the merits of Appellant's claims, there are several preliminary matters that demand our attention. First, we must determine whether quashal of this appeal is required, due to Appellant's failure to follow the proper practice under Rule 341(a) of filing separate appeals from an order that resolves issues arising on more than one docket. See Pa.R.A.P. 341, Official Note ("Where … one or more orders resolves issues arising on more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of appeal must be filed."); Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977 (Pa. 2018) (requiring quashal of an appeal where the appellant fails to file separate notices of appeal when appealing from a single order that resolves issues arising on more than one trial docket), overruled in part, Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462 (Pa. 2022) (reaffirming Walker, but determining that Pa.R.A.P. 902 permits the appellate court, in its discretion, to allow correction of the error where appropriate).

Exceptions to Walker's bright-line quashal rule have been established, such as where a breakdown of court operations has occurred. In Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157 (Pa. Super. 2019), the PCRA court advised the appellant that he could appeal from its order dismissing his PCRA petition pending at two separate docket numbers by filing within thirty days "a written notice of appeal[.]" Id. at 160 (emphasis in original). The lower court also utilized the singular in advising him where to file "[s]aid notice of appeal[.]" Id. (emphasis in original). "Hence, while Walker required that [the a]ppellant file separate notices of appeal at each docket number, the PCRA court informed [him] that he could pursue appellate review by filing a single notice of appeal." Id. We concluded that such misstatements regarding the manner in which an appeal could be effectuated amounted to "a breakdown in court operations" such that we could overlook the defective nature of the timely notice of appeal. Id. We, therefore, declined to quash pursuant to Walker and addressed the substance of the appeal. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 A.3d 350, 352-54 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (reaffirming Stansbury and concluding that a breakdown in the court system occurred where the lower court advised Larkin that he had "thirty (30) days … to file an appeal" from an order appearing on two dockets) (emphasis is original).

Similarly, in Interest of K.M.W., 238 A.3d 465 (Pa. Super. 2020), the mother filed a timely single notice of appeal from a decree that involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her minor child on the adoption docket and changed the child's permanency goal to adoption on the dependency docket. Id. at 468. The mother listed both lower court docket numbers on her single notice of appeal. Id. at 468-69. Notably, the trial court indicated to the mother that she could seek relief by filing a singular appeal from multiple lower court docket numbers. See id. at 470 ("This order shall become absolute as of course if no appeal is taken, within thirty (30) days, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341.") (emphasis added). We concluded that the trial court's misstatement constituted a breakdown in court operations and, accordingly, declined to quash the appeal. Id.

In the matter sub judice, Appellant was notified of his right to file "a direct appeal[,]" as well as the time constraints for filing such an "appeal" in a written post-dispositional rights colloquy signed by Appellant and his counsel on the date of the dispositional review hearing. See Pa.R.J.C.P. 610(D).^[2]Throughout the two-paged colloquy, all references to Appellant's right to an appeal were consistently made in the singular. There is no indication in the record that the juvenile court ever instructed Appellant to file two separate notices of appeal from its dispositional order which appears on both docket nos. JV 69-2021 and JV 178-2021. We believe the juvenile court's failure to inform Appellant that separate notices of appeal were required to comply with Rule 341(a) and Walker constituted a breakdown in court operations. Accordingly, we decline to quash this appeal. See Int. of K.M.W., supra, Larkin, supra, and Stansbury, supra.^[3] Next, we must determine whether the order from which Appellant appealed is appealable, because appealability implicates our jurisdiction. Interest of J.M., 219 A.3d 645, 650 (Pa. Super. 2019). See also Kulp v. Hrivnak, 765 A.2d 796, 798 (Pa. Super. 2000) ("[S]ince we lack jurisdiction over an unappealable order[,] it is incumbent on us to determine, sua sponte when necessary, whether the appeal is taken from an appealable order."). It is clear that an initial order of disposition is a final order from which a juvenile may appeal as of right. See In re M.D., 839 A.2d 1116, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2003). We have also established that this right to appeal does not extend to review orders that simply maintain the status quo. Id. at 1121 ("We hold … that a committed juvenile does not have the right to appeal from a review order that continues his commitment in the same manner and place and that maintains the status quo."). However, we have permitted appeals from review orders in cases where the order modifies...