In re D.A.T.
| Decision Date | 13 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | DA 21-0057 |
| Citation | 2022 MT 174 |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF: D.A.T., A Youth. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Pete Wood, Attorney at Law, Boise, Idaho
For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie F Schulz, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Joshua A. Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Matthew S. Robertson Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
DIRK SANDEFUR JUSTICE.
¶1 D.A.T. (Youth) appeals from the December 1, 2020, judgment of the Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County accepting and imposing a proposed youth court consent decree disposition, placing him on supervised conditional probation for two years or until sooner released, and accordingly suspending the underlying youth court delinquency proceeding pursuant to § 41-5-1501(1), MCA. We address the following restated issue:
Whether the Youth Court erroneously concluded that the consent decree guilt admission required by § 41-5-1501(2), MCA, constitutes or requires a change of answer under § 41-5-1502(8), MCA, thus effecting a delinquency adjudication?
We answer affirmatively, reverse the affected December 1, 2020, youth court judgment, and remand for entry of an amended dispositional order clarifying the effect of the Youth's consent decree admission in accordance with § 41-5-1501(1), MCA.
¶2 On April 23, 2020, the State filed in the youth court of the Montana Eighth Judicial District Court a formal delinquent youth petition under §§ 41-5-1401 and -1402, MCA, alleging that, on or about January 1, 2015, the then nine-year-old Youth subjected a six-year-old female to sexual intercourse without consent (SIWC) in violation of §§ 45-5-501(1)(b)(iv) and -503(1), MCA. Following a formal "not true" answer to the alleged offense under § 41-5-1502(1), MCA, the Youth entered into a proposed preadjudication "consent decree" pursuant to § 41-5-1501(1), MCA. Subject to approval and adoption of the youth court, the proposed consent decree provided for placement of the Youth on supervised probation on specified conditions for a period of two years or until sooner released. In accordance with § 41-5-1501(1), MCA, the proposed consent decree further expressly provided, inter alia, that:
(Emphasis added.) The dispositive provision of the proposed Decree thus ordered that:
[T]he proceedings upon this petition against this youth [are] suspended and that the conditions and directions of this Consent Decree [are] hereby given full force and effect. If the Youth violates any of the conditions or directions of this Consent Decree, the [State] may, in [its] discretion, reinstate the petition suspended by this Decree and proceed against the youth as if this Consent Decree had never been entered.
(Emphasis added.) The proposed consent decree was separately signed by the Youth, his parents and counsel, a youth court probation officer, and a deputy county attorney.
¶3 On September 15, 2020, at the ensuing hearing on motion for court approval of the proposed consent decree, the Youth Court ascertained that the Youth "fully intend[ed] to admit" the charged offense "in order to take advantage of [the proposed] consent decree." However, a dispute arose between defense counsel and the State as to the legal effect of the contemplated admission. Defense counsel asserted that the admission of "guilt" required for a consent decree by § 41-5-1501(2), MCA, did not constitute or require a formal change of answer or plea to the offense charged in the underlying delinquency petition as referenced in § 41-5-1502(8), MCA, and thus did not constitute or effect an admitted delinquency adjudication for purposes of a subsequent probation revocation and disposition anew under §§ 41-5-1431(1), (3), and -1513, MCA, in the event of a subsequent consent decree violation. Analogizing the admission of "guilt" required for a consent decree by § 41-5-1501(2), MCA, and the resulting probationary consent decree disposition under § 41-5-1501(1), MCA, to a "plea of guilty," resulting deferred imposition of sentence, probation revocation on violation of a condition of deferral, and sentencing anew on probation revocation in an adult criminal case,[1] the State vehemently disagreed and contrarily asserted that the required consent decree admission of guilt also constituted or effected a formal change of answer and admitted adjudication of the subject delinquency-petition-charged offense under § 41-5-1502(8), MCA (formal delinquent youth adjudication on "valid admission" to offense charged in underlying delinquency petition). The State thus asserted that a subsequent consent decree violation would subject the Youth to a probation revocation petition under § 41-5-1431(1), MCA, and, upon revocation on an adjudicated consent decree violation, delinquent youth disposition anew under § 41-5-1513, MCA, including potential commitment to the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC) for placement in a youth correctional facility without need for further adjudication of the underlying offense charged in the original delinquency petition, to wit:
[I]f the Public Defender's Office is going to take the tact that they do not have to admit guilt and that they can just provide a factual basis to find [the youth] guilty and admit to that factual basis and then suspend these proceedings, the [State] will no longer sign or agree to any consent decree, and we will just take all of these matters to trial . . . [because it does not want to] have to come back a year or two years down the road and then try the case because [the youth] did not actually admit guilt....[I]f that's where we're going with this, then we will just withdraw from the agreement and we will ask the Court to set this matter for trial.
¶4 Following a continuance for supplemental briefing, the matter came on for hearing on November 10, 2020, at which the Youth Court agreed with the State. The Court thus essentially ruled that the Youth had only two options-obtain the benefit of the proposed consent decree by "chang[ing] his plea" on the charged offense "to true" under §§ 41-5-1501(2) and -1502(8), MCA, or stand on his original "not true" answer to the petition charge under § 41-5-1502(1), MCA, and go to an adjudicatory bench or jury trial under § 41-5-1502(2)-(7), MCA. Faced with that apparent, uncontemplated Hobson's choice, defense counsel advised that the Youth would have to change his original answer on the charged offense to "true" in order to avoid losing the benefit of the negotiated probationary consent decree disposition. On November 17, 2020, the Court issued a conforming written order summarily denying the Youth's motion for clarification regarding the effect of his contemplated consent decree admission of guilt under § 41-5-1501(2), MCA.
¶5 At the subsequent December 2020 "change of answer" hearing, defense counsel renewed the Youth's objection to the earlier denial of his motion to enter into a consent decree without a change of answer and admitted delinquency adjudication under § 41-5-1502(8), MCA, as distinct from the admission of guilt required for a consent decree by § 41-5-1501(2), MCA. When the Youth Court did not relent, the Youth admitted to the underlying factual allegations and changed his answer to the charged offense (SIWC) to "true" in accordance with the proposed consent decree. Based on those admissions, the Youth Court accepted and adopted the proposed consent decree and accordingly placed the Youth on supervised probation for a period of two years or until sooner released. The Youth Court later issued a subsequent written order noting that the Youth changed his answer and pled "true" to the charged offense, upon which the court "adopt[ed] and approve[d] the consent decree" and thus "suspended" the proceedings "subject to the terms of the [c]onsent [d]ecree[] pursuant to § 41-5-1501(1)(a), MCA."
¶6 The Youth timely appeals the denial of his motion for approval and imposition of the proposed consent decree without a change of answer and admitted adjudication of delinquency under § 41-5-1502(8), MCA, as distinct from the admission of guilt required for a consent decree by § 41-5-1501(2), MCA. He thus prays for remand with instruction for entry of an amended youth court judgment reflecting that his December 2020 admission(s) and change of answer were merely the admission of guilt required for consent decree approval under § 41-5-1501(2), MCA, and not a formal change of answer, trial waiver, and admitted delinquency adjudication under § 41-5-1502(8), MCA.
¶7 We review youth court interpretations and applications of provisions of the Montana Youth Court Act de novo for correctness. In re C.L., 2021 MT 294, ¶ 13, 406 Mont. 258, 498 P.3d 758 (internal citation omitted). In construing statutory provisions, our role is limited to "simply . . . ascertaining] and declaring]...
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