In re D.W.P.
| Decision Date | 28 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 140A19,140A19 |
| Citation | 373 N.C. 327,838 S.E.2d 396 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF: D.W.P., B.A.L.P. |
Mercedes Chut, Greensboro, for petitioner-appellee Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services
Coats & Bennett, PLLC, by Gavin Parsons, for appellee Guardian ad Litem
Michael Spivey for respondent-appellant mother
Respondent, the mother of D.W.P. (David)1 and B.A.L.P. (Briana), appeals from the trial court's 23 January 2019 order terminating her parental rights. The issue before the Court is whether the trial court made and relied upon findings of fact that were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in assessing respondent-mother's reasonable progress to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of her children. After careful consideration of the relevant legal authorities and in light of the record evidence, we affirm the trial court's decision.
On 1 March 2015, the Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services (GCDHHS) received a Child Protective Services (CPS) report that eleven-month old David was being treated at MedCenter Emergency Department in High Point for a broken femur
. The doctor examining David had also performed a body scan and the results showed older clavicle, tibia, fibula, and rib fractures that were still in the process of healing. During the GCDHHS investigation, respondent-mother stated that she never noticed any signs that David had been harmed and attributed his fractured femur to the family's seventy-pound dog and suggested that the children's biological father had inflicted the older injures.
On 20 March 2015, based on David's young age and the multiple fractures for which respondent-mother and her fiancé, Mr. Goff, provided no plausible explanation, GCDHHS filed a petition and nonsecure custody motion relating to of David and Briana. On the same date, Judge Betty J. Brown entered an order granting nonsecure custody of both children to GCDHHS. After a hearing held on 26 January 2016, the court adjudicated David an abused and neglected juvenile and adjudicated Briana, although she had no injuries, a neglected juvenile. Legal and physical custody of both children was granted to GCDHHS and a permanency planning hearing was set for 23 March 2016. Respondent-mother appealed the trial court's order.
The COA affirmed David's adjudication as abused and neglected, but reversed Briana's adjudication as being a neglected juvenile. See In re D.P. and B.P. , 250 N.C. App. 507, 793 S.E.2d 287 (2016) (unpublished). The court remanded the case to the trial court to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine if Briana was, in fact, a neglected juvenile. Id. Respondent-mother later stipulated at the adjudication hearing on 27 October 2017 that Briana was neglected.
As a result of David's injuries, respondent-mother was charged with felony child abuse inflicting serious injury. On 9 November 2017, she entered an Alford plea to misdemeanor child abuse and was placed on probation for twelve months. During the allocution, respondent-mother told the court David's injuries may have occurred because he "slept funny." The trial court made a finding from this testimony that respondent-mother provided yet another explanation for the injuries that was inconsistent with previously submitted evidence involving David's injuries. Following respondent-mother's plea, there was a permanency hearing on 30 November 2017.
Following the hearing, the court entered an order ceasing reunification efforts and directing GCDHHS to file a petition for termination of parental rights. GCDHHS did so on 20 March 2018. After an 8 January 2019 termination hearing, the trial court entered its order terminating respondent-mother's parental rights on 23 January 2019. The court acknowledged that respondent-mother had completed many of the requirements set out in the permanency plan, but concluded that she had willfully failed to make reasonable progress to remedy the conditions that led to removal of her children, that her neglect continued, and that she was likely to neglect the children in the future.
Among other things, the court specifically focused on respondent-mother's refusal to honestly report how David's injuries occurred. Because respondent-mother and Mr. Goff were David's only caretakers at the time of the incident, the court identified only three possible causes of the injuries: (1) respondent-mother caused the injures, (2) respondent and Mr. Goff caused the injuries together, or (3) respondent-mother failed to protect David from Mr. Goff causing the injuries. Without knowing the cause of the injuries, the court believed GCDHHS was unable to provide a plan to ensure that injuries would not occur in the future.
Respondent-mother appealed the trial court's order terminating her parental rights, arguing that the trial court made and relied upon findings of fact that were unsupported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence in assessing her reasonable progress to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of her children.
Termination of parental rights proceedings consist of two stages: adjudication and disposition. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2017); In re Montgomery , 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner must prove by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" that one or more grounds for termination exist under section 7B-1111(a) of our General Statutes. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e), (f) (2017). Thus, we review a district court's adjudication "to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law." In re Montgomery , 311 N.C. at 111, 316 S.E.2d at 253 (citing In re Moore , 306 N.C. 394, 404, 293 S.E.2d 127, 133 (1982) ). Unchallenged findings of fact made at the adjudicatory stage, however, are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman , 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991) (citing Schloss v. Jamison , 258 N.C. 271, 275, 128 S.E.2d 590, 593 (1962) ). If the petitioner proves at least one ground for termination during the adjudicatory stage, "the court proceeds to the dispositional stage, at which the court must consider whether it is in the best interests of the juvenile to terminate parental rights." In re D.L.W. , 368 N.C. 835, 842, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) ((citing In re Young , 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614–15 (1997) ; N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110 )).
On appeal, respondent-mother challenges several of the trial court's findings of fact as unsupported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence as well as its conclusions of law regarding her progress in remedying the conditions that led to the removal of her children and the likelihood of future neglect.
Findings of fact supported by competent evidence are binding on appeal, despite evidence in the record that may support a contrary finding. See In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 112-13, 316 S.E.2d at 254. Further, it is the duty of the trial judge to " ‘pass[ ] upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.’ " In re D.L.W. , 368 N.C. 835, 843, 788 S.E.2d 162, 168 (2016) (quoting Knutton v. Cofield , 273 N.C. 355, 359, 160 S.E.2d 29, 33 (1968) ). The trial judge's decisions as to the weight and credibility of the evidence, and the inferences drawn from the evidence are not subject to appellate review. Id.
"In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ... the court shall find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions of law thereon ...." N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1). Thus, the trial court must, through "processes of logical reasoning," based on the evidentiary facts before it, "find the ultimate facts essential to support the conclusions of law." See In re Harton , 156 N.C. App. 655, 660, 577 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2003). The resulting findings of fact must be "sufficiently specific" to allow an appellate court to "review the decision and test the correctness of the judgment." Quick v. Quick , 305 N.C. 446, 451, 290 S.E.2d 653, 657 (1982).
The trial court made several findings of fact about respondent-mother's failure to reveal the source of David's injuries, including:
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court's findings were not supported by evidence because the court could not and did not find that she...
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