In re Danasia MC.

• Decision Date: 24 April 2012
• Citation: 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 03196,94 A.D.3d 1122,943 N.Y.S.2d 549
• Parties: In the Matter of DANASIA MC. (Anonymous), appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 03196

94 A.D.3d 1122

943 N.Y.S.2d 549

In the Matter of DANASIA MC. (Anonymous), appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

April 24, 2012.

Geanine Towers, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant.

Michael A. Cardozo, CorporationCounsel, New York, N.Y. (Francis F. Caputo and Elizabeth I. Freedman of counsel; Daniel A. Pollak on the brief), for respondent.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, A.P.J., RUTH C. BALKIN, SANDRA L. SGROI, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from (1) a fact-finding order of the Family Court, Kings County(Elkins, J.), dated November 3, 2010, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, criminal possession of a disguised gun, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree with intent to use (two counts), and possession of pistol or revolver ammunition, and committed the crime of unlawful possession of weapons by a persons under sixteen (three counts), and (2) an order of disposition of the same court dated July 26, 2011, which, upon the fact-finding order and after a dispositional hearing, inter alia, adjudged her to be a juvenile delinquent, and placed her on probation for a period of 12 months.

ORDERED that the appeal from the fact-finding order dated November 3, 2010, is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as the fact-finding order was superseded by the order of disposition and is brought up for review on the appeal from the order of disposition; and it is further,

ORDERED that the order of disposition dated July 26, 2011, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The appellant's contention that the Family Court erred in failing to apply the circumstantial evidence standard in this case is unpreserved for appellate review ( cf.Matter of Charles S.,41 A.D.3d 484, 838 N.Y.S.2d 136;Matter of James G.,309 A.D.2d 935, 766 N.Y.S.2d 100;CPL 470.05 [2] ).In any event, the claim is without merit.“[I]n a bench trial, it is presumed that the Judge sitting as the trier of fact made his [or her] decision based upon ‘appropriate legal criteria’ ”( People v. Marvin,216 A.D.2d 930, 930, 629 N.Y.S.2d 566, quotingPeople v. Moreno,70 N.Y.2d 403, 406, 521 N.Y.S.2d 663, 516 N.E.2d 200).Moreover, it is not necessary to use the words “moral certainty” in evaluating a wholly circumstantial case ( seePeople v. Sanchez,61 N.Y.2d 1022, 1024, 475 N.Y.S.2d 376, 463 N.E.2d 1228), as long as the factfinder engages in the “more complex and problematical reasoning process necessarily undertaken in cases of purely circumstantial evidence”( People v. Barnes,50 N.Y.2d 375, 381, 429 N.Y.S.2d 178, 406 N.E.2d 1071;seePeople v. Kennedy,47 N.Y.2d 196, 201–203, 417 N.Y.S.2d 452, 391 N.E.2d 288;Matter of Kevin B.,128 A.D.2d 63, 69–70, 514 N.Y.S.2d 971, affd. sub nom.Matter of Timothy L.,71 N.Y.2d 835, 527 N.Y.S.2d 734, 522 N.E.2d 1032).We are satisfied that the Family Court engaged in the aforesaid “complex and problematical reasoning process.”

The appellant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved for appellate review ( cf.Matter of Charles S.,41 A.D.3d 484, 838 N.Y.S.2d 136;Matter of James G.,309 A.D.2d 935, 766 N.Y.S.2d 100;CPL 470.05[2] ).In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( seeMatter of David H.,69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621;Matter of Summer D.,67 A.D.3d 1008, 1008–1009, 890 N.Y.S.2d 562;Matter of Davonte B.,44 A.D.3d 763, 764, 844 N.Y.S.2d 68), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 265.01[1] ), criminal possession of a disguised gun (Penal Law § 265.02[6] ), criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree with intent to use (Penal Law § 265.01[2] ), and possession of a pistol or revolver ammunition, and committed the crime of unlawful possession of weapons by a persons under sixteen (Penal Law § 265.05).Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( seeMatter of Hasan C.,59 A.D.3d 617, 617–618, 873 N.Y.S.2d...