In re Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 1)

• Decision Date: 25 May 1938
• Docket Number: 2443
• Citation: 2 A.2d 783,332 Pa. 289
• Parties: Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 1)
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

2 A.2d 783

332 Pa. 289

Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 1)

No. 2443

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 25, 1938

Argued May 18, 1938. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

No 25, Miscellaneous Docket No. 7. Petition by Governor and Attorney General for writ of prohibition, in re investigation by the June, 1938, Dauphin County Grand Jury. Order entered granting leave to amend or supplement petition, and providing that, unless so amended, a writ of prohibition would be directed to issue.

PETITION OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION.

The District Attorney averred that he was the duly qualified District Attorney of Dauphin County; that, on a date two days prior to the filing of this petition, the then Attorney General of the Commonwealth had advised the court that he proposed to file a petition asking for the immediate convening of a grand jury to investigate charges of unlawful and improper conduct on the part of public officials and others affecting the interests of the Commonwealth and its citizens; that before said petition could be prepared, the Governor had removed the said Attorney General from office that he had been fully advised by the former Attorney General regarding the allegations set forth in the petition and the facts and circumstances in support thereof; that grave and serious charges had been made by the former Attorney General and others concerning the conduct of certain public officials and others in the performance of their official duties and their relations with the Commonwealth.

The charges were as follows: (a) that large sums of money were unlawfully paid to B, a high state official, C, who held a high state office, and D, chairman of the finance committee of a political state committee, in return for their influence in causing certain legislation to be enacted by the General Assembly; (b) that unlawful irregularities existed in the purchase of materials, equipment and supplies by the Commonwealth, and, more particularly, in the purchase of asphalt, trucks and rock for highway use; that the foregoing were unlawfully purchased at prices in excess of their fair market value so that certain sums of money could be and were paid to B and D and others by the vendors, with intent to cheat and defraud the Commonwealth; (c) that charges had been made by a state senator and others that highway equipment and workers were being unlawfully used for political purposes, with the intent to cheat and defraud the Commonwealth; (d) that the Mayor of Philadelphia and an United States senator from Pennsylvania had stated that there was an improper and unlawful relationship between D and the General State Authority in connection with contracts awarded to D by the authority amounting to a large sum and with the employment of inspectors, engineers and others and with the performance of the obligations of said contracts; (e) that a demand had been made by the Mayor of Philadelphia for an immediate investigation of the receipt by A, the Governor of the Commonwealth, of a large sum of money from D, during the years 1936 and 1937, to determine whether A unlawfully influenced or directed the award of contracts by the Authority to D; (f) charges of macing, coercion, and the unlawful collection of assessments from public employees involving the payment of large sums of money; (g) charges of macing and unlawful collection of large sums of money by B and D and others from legitimate business men and architects who had dealings with the Commonwealth; (h) that statements had been made by an United States senator from Pennsylvania substantially charging that an investigation of Capitol Hill would disclose facts which would overshadow and belittle a former graft scandal.

The District Attorney averred that a situation of grave and serious moment existed within the Commonwealth; that the interests of justice and of the people of Pennsylvania required a full, complete and searching investigation of the said charges; that the said charges involved high public officials and others in the administration of the affairs of the Commonwealth and in the discharge of their official duties; that the charges were of such a nature that the ordinary processes of law were inadequate to cope with or discover them; that the charges involved criminal acts which seriously affect or injure the public generally, the effect whereof, if permitted to continue, would endanger public safety, demoralize the personal security of members of the public and permit systematic depredations by public officials and others; and that in the interests of justice a grand jury should be immediately convened so that a full and complete investigation of the charges might be made.

Wm. A. Schnader, for petitioners.

Carl B. Shelley, District Attorney, P.P., with him Samuel Handler, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney.

Before KEPHART, C.J., SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW, LINN, STERN and BARNES, JJ.

OPINION

MR. KEPHART, CHIEF JUSTICE.

On April 29, 1938, the District Attorney of Dauphin County, on the eve of a primary election, presented to the Court of Quarter Sessions of that county, a petition requesting that a special grand jury be convened to investigate charges made during the campaign against certain public officials and private individuals. The petition presented to the Court of Quarter Sessions, which was the basis of its action, will be found in the Reporter's Notes. The District Attorney did not personally, or through his office, make any investigation of the campaign charges, nor does he aver in his petition that he knew any of the charges to have a basis in fact. Whereupon the Governor of the Commonwealth and the Attorney General presented a petition to this Court in which it was averred that the effect of ordering the grand jury to investigate these combined charges would be to seriously interfere with and hamper the executive branch in its conduct of government, and that the charges were so vague and indefinite that an investigation predicated on them would enable the Grand Jury to pass upon not merely criminal violations, but the efficiency and regularity of the management of the entire executive department. It was also asserted that the Attorney General was the only official who could investigate these charges and that, under the Constitution and the law, a grand jury is not competent to investigate criminal charges aimed at the executive authority. Accordingly, a writ of prohibition was asked. On this petition we issued a rule to show cause and stayed proceedings until the further order of the Court.

The questions involved may be briefly stated to be: May the grand jury investigate the conduct of the executive branch of the State government? Are uninvestigated campaign charges (that is, uninvestigated by the District Attorney) a sufficient basis for convening a grand jury? May a grand jury be convened on a petition which does not charge the commission of any specific offenses, and does not allege the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Dauphin County courts? Has the Attorney General exclusive authority to investigate the conduct of the executive branch of the government? Is the petition for a writ of prohibition premature because made prior to the charge of the court to the grand jury defining the scope of its investigation?

The Governor and the Attorney General are explicit in stating that they do not wish to save from prosecution any person who has been guilty of crime. They also assert that all charges will be speedily and fully investigated by them, and it was stated at the argument that the Attorney General has already taken up the investigation of the charges made and "to that end he has the full and unrestricted approval and consent of your petitioner, the Governor of the Commonwealth."

We recognize the strength of the language used in the Constitution, Article IV, Section 2, providing that the supreme executive power shall be vested in the Governor. We also recognize the effect of Hartranft's Appeal, 85 Pa 433, that the official conduct of the executive branch of the government is not to be subjected to investigation by the judiciary. The mere fact a crime is charged in connection with, or as a result of, acts performed by the executive branch of government in its official capacity, is not sufficient to warrant the judiciary in undertaking to inquire broadly into the functioning of that branch. And, we may add, it is basic and fundamental in our system of government that the powers of the three coordinated branches of government are and should be separate and kept clear, the one from the other. The judicial branch cannot assume overlordship of the executive or legislative, or vice versa. In Commonwealth v. Widovich, 295 Pa. 311, at 322, it was stated: "The judiciary is a constituent or coordinate part of government; it is not subordinate to other powers, nor does it depend for existence on the legislative will. Its powers come directly from the people, without intervening agency. From the very nature of its time-honored powers, it should be kept a separate, distinct and independent entity in government to perform those duties which have been immemorially under the common law imposed on it. The domain of the judiciary is in the field of the administration of justice under the law; it interprets, construes and applies the law. Its powers were possibly the first to be exercised by civilization. Within the compass of its duties it may ascertain and punish crimes against the State, and may, at times, in designated instances, operate as a check on other departments of government; but its strength and security come from a complete and absolute separation from political, administrative or...