In re Detention of Powell

• Decision Date: 28 November 2005
• Docket Number: No. 97452.,97452.
• Citation: 217 Ill.2d 123,839 N.E.2d 1008
• Parties: In re DETENTION OF Harold POWELL (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Harold Powell, Appellee).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1008

839 N.E.2d 1008

217 Ill.2d 123

In re DETENTION OF Harold POWELL (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Harold Powell, Appellee).

No. 97452.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September 22, 2005.

Rehearing Denied November 28, 2005.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin and Jay Paul Hoffman, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Daniel P. Duffy, of Duffy & Mundo, P.C., Chicago, E. Hardy Lewis, of Blanchard, Jenkins, Miller, Lewis & Styers, P.A., Raleigh, North Carolina, for appellee.

Justice McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

In 1987, respondent Harold Powell was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 12-14) and aggravated kidnapping (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 10-2), and was sentenced to life in prison. The sentence was vacated on appeal, and respondent was resentenced to concurrent terms of 30 years for aggravated criminal sexual assault and 15 years for aggravated kidnapping. On September 25, 2000, the State filed a petition in the circuit court of Cook County asking that respondent be committed pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (the Act or Commitment Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2000)). Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely, alleging that the petition was filed more than 90 days before his entry into mandatory supervised release, in violation of section 15(b-5)(1) of the Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/15(b-5)(1) (West 2000)). The circuit court denied respondent's motion to dismiss.

Respondent moved for leave to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill.2d R. 308). The circuit court granted respondent's motion and certified the following question for appeal: "[W]hether the State's original Petition was untimely filed where it was not filed within 30 [sic] days of the respondent's release onto mandatory supervised release, or within 90 [sic] days after said release, as required by 725 ILCS 207/15(b-5)(1)."¹ The appellate court answered the certified question in the affirmative, concluding that the State's petition was untimely filed. 344 Ill.App.3d 97, 279 Ill.Dec. 134, 799 N.E.2d 937. The State appeals from the judgment of the appellate court (177 Ill.2d R. 315). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

In 1987, respondent was convicted of three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, pars.12-14(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(4)) and two counts of aggravated kidnapping (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, pars.10-2(a)(3), (a)(5)), and was sentenced to life in prison. The convictions stemmed from an incident that occurred on October 28, 1985. In 1991, respondent's life sentence was vacated on appeal, and he was resentenced to consecutive terms of 30 years in prison for aggravated criminal sexual assault and 15 years for aggravated kidnapping. In 1993, following an appellate court order, respondent's sentences were changed from consecutive to concurrent.

Respondent was scheduled to be released into mandatory supervised release (MSR) from the Illinois Department of Corrections' Big Muddy River Correctional Center on September 30, 2000. On September 25, 2000, the State, in conjunction with the Cook County State's Attorney, filed a petition in the circuit court of Cook County pursuant to section 15 of the Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/15 (West 2000)). This petition alleged that respondent was a "sexually violent person" within the meaning of section 5(f) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2000)) and, therefore, subject to commitment to the custody of the Department of Human Services "until such time [as] he is no longer a sexually violent person." In support of this petition, the State alleged that in 1987 respondent was convicted in Illinois of aggravated criminal sexual assault, a "sexually violent offense." The petition also alleged that respondent was twice convicted of rape in Tennessee, once in 1963 and again in 1974. The petition further alleged that respondent suffered from several mental disorders, including "Paraplegia, Not Otherwise Specified, With Non-consenting Persons." According to the petition, respondent "is dangerous to others because his mental disorders create a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence."

After reviewing the petition, the circuit court determined that there was cause to believe that respondent was eligible for commitment under section 35(f) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/35(f) (West 2000)). The court issued an order directing the Department of Corrections to detain respondent and transfer him to a detention facility in the Department of Human Services. The court's order also set the matter for a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that respondent was a sexually violent person. 725 ILCS 207/30(b) (West 2000). On September 26, 2000, respondent was served with a copy of the State's petition and a copy of the circuit court's detention order.

On September 28, 2000, respondent, who was still being held at the Department of Corrections' Big Muddy River Correctional Center, was given a copy of the conditions under which his MSR was to be served. As noted, respondent was scheduled to be released into MSR on September 30. Under section 3-3-7(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code of Corrections) (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(c) (West 2000)), respondent was to sign the statement of MSR conditions "before release." However, he refused to sign. According to respondent's testimony, he declined to sign the MSR agreement because he wanted to serve his MSR in Tennessee rather than Illinois. Respondent testified that his mother lived in Tennessee and he wanted to move in with her when he was released.

As a result of respondent's refusal to sign the MSR document, respondent was charged with an MSR violation. The violation report recommended that respondent "remain in an Illinois Correctional facility for the duration of his MSR period." The Prisoner Review Board scheduled several hearings on the alleged violation, but was unable to secure respondent's signature. According to an affidavit of Charles Soper, a corrections counselor at the Big Muddy River Correctional Center, Soper met with respondent 10 to 12 times between September 29, 2000, and March 12, 2001, in an effort to obtain respondent's signature. Soper testified in his affidavit that, on each of these occasions, respondent refused to sign the MSR agreement. Soper added that, during at least one of these meetings, respondent told Soper that he refused to sign the MSR agreement because he wanted to avoid being committed under the Act. During this period from September 2000 to March 2001, respondent remained in custody at the Department of Corrections' Big Muddy River Correctional Center.

In October 2000, following the probable cause hearing previously ordered by the circuit court pursuant to the Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/30(b) (West 2000)), the court entered an order finding that there was probable cause to believe that respondent was a sexually violent person subject to commitment under section 30(c) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/30(c) (West 2000)). The court ordered respondent detained pending further order of the court, and directed the Department of Human Services to evaluate respondent.

On March 14, 2001, respondent signed the statement of conditions under which his MSR was to be served. The next day he was transferred from the Big Muddy River Correctional Center to a Department of Human Services treatment and detention facility, where he was held pursuant to the circuit court's October 2000 detention order. According to respondent, he agreed to sign on March 14 because, five days previously, his blood pressure medication had been discontinued by the medical staff at the Big Muddy River Correctional Center.

On April 18, 2001, respondent filed a motion in the circuit court to dismiss the State's commitment petition. Respondent argued that the State's petition was not filed within the 120-day window required by section 15(b-5)(1) of the Commitment Act. Under this provision, a sexually violent person petition must be filed "[n]o more than 90 days before discharge or entry into mandatory supervised release from a Department of Corrections correctional facility * * * and no more than 30 days after the person's entry into parole or mandatory supervised release." 725 ILCS 207/15(b-5)(1) (West 2000). According to respondent, he did not enter MSR until March 14, 2001, the date he signed the MSR agreement. Respondent therefore contended that, in order for the State's petition to be timely, it must have been filed either within 90 days before March 14, 2001, or within 30 days after that date. However, respondent noted that the State's petition was filed on September 25, 2000, which was "171 days before March 14, 2001." In respondent's view, the State's petition was untimely filed. Respondent asked the circuit court to dismiss the petition with prejudice and to order respondent's immediate release from custody.

The State argued that respondent's MSR period began on the scheduled date, September 30, 2000, rather than on March 14, 2001, the date that respondent signed the document specifying the conditions of his MSR. The State contended that the signing of the MSR agreement had no impact on when an inmate enters into MSR. According to the State, an inmate's MSR entry date is established "by operation of law" when the Department of Corrections, at the time of sentencing, determines an inmate's scheduled date of entry into MSR. The State therefore argued that its commitment petition, which was filed on September 25, 2000, was timely filed within 90 days before respondent's September 30 entry into MSR, as required by section 15(b-5)(1) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/15(b-5)(1) (West 2000)).

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