In re Detention of Barnes

• Decision Date: 19 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-1216.,03-1216.
• Citation: 689 N.W.2d 455
• Parties: In re the DETENTION OF Allen Albert BARNES a/k/a Albert Barnes. State of Iowa, Appellee, v. Allen Albert Barnes, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

689 N.W.2d 455

In re the DETENTION OF Allen Albert BARNES a/k/a Albert Barnes.

State of Iowa, Appellee, v. Allen Albert Barnes, Appellant.

No. 03-1216.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

November 19, 2004.

Mark Smith, First Assistant State Public Defender, and Steven L. Addington, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Denise A. Timmins and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

CADY, Justice.

Appellant Allen Albert Barnes appeals from a district court judgment finding him to be a sexually violent predator subject to civil commitment under Iowa Code chapter 229A (2003). His primary claim on appeal is that civil commitment violates his due process rights under both the federal and state constitutions because he has not been diagnosed with a mental abnormality that is in general directly related to sexual offending. For the reasons that follow, we reject the claim and affirm the district court judgment.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Barnes has a long history of sexual misconduct. When he was thirteen, he sexually molested his nephew. In 1981, while on work release from a conviction for forgery, he committed voyeurism. In 1985, he was convicted of three counts of third-degree sexual abuse. He raped three different women at knifepoint. He was also convicted of one count of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse for attempting to rape a fourth woman. He was imprisoned until 1990. In 1996, he was again convicted of third-degree sexual abuse. He forced his way into a woman's house and raped her. He was imprisoned until 2001. While in prison, Barnes was terminated from the sex offender treatment program four times for sexual misconduct and for engaging in inappropriate behavior towards female staff.

On February 15, 2001, the State filed a petition to have Barnes civilly committed as a sexually violent predator under Iowa Code chapter 229A. On August 30, 2001, a jury found Barnes to be a sexually violent predator, and the district court ordered him confined in accordance with chapter 229A. Barnes appealed, alleging a jury instruction violated due process. We reversed the commitment and remanded the case for a new trial. In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98 (2003).

On remand, both parties agreed to a bench trial. At trial, the State called Dr. Caton Roberts, a professor of psychology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, as its expert witness. Dr. Roberts diagnosed Barnes with antisocial personality disorder and testified that he also met the criteria for being a psychopath. He opined Barnes had a mental abnormality that made it difficult for him to control his behavior and made him likely to engage in sexually violent offenses if not confined. Barnes called Dr. Lynn Maskel, a forensic psychiatrist, as his expert witness. Dr. Maskel opined that antisocial personality disorder does not "affect[ ] the emotional or volitional capacity in any kind of significant way" and "does not cause a serious difficulty in controlling behavior." She testified that antisocial personality disorder is common among criminals in general and that forensic psychiatrists do not consider it to predispose a person to commit sexually violent offenses.

The district court concluded Barnes was a sexually violent predator under chapter 229A. It committed him to the Department of Human Services in accordance with section 229A.9.

Barnes appeals and raises two issues. First, he contends a commitment based on a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder renders the statute overly broad and violates due process. Second, he asserts the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he had a mental abnormality that caused him serious difficulty controlling his behavior.

II. Standard of Review

When violation of a constitutional right is claimed, the standard of review is de novo. State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004) (citing State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 106 (Iowa 2001)). "The court makes an `independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record.'" Id. (quoting State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001)). "We give considerable deference to the trial court's findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses, but are not bound by them." Id. (citing Turner, 630 N.W.2d at 606; State v. Liggins, 524 N.W.2d 181, 186 (Iowa 1994)). We review a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for errors at law. Wolbers v. Finley Hosp., 673 N.W.2d 728, 734 (Iowa 2003) (citing Heinz v. Heinz, 653 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Iowa 2002)).

III. Overview

To establish Barnes was a sexually violent predator, the State was required to prove: (1) he was "convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense"; and (2) he "suffers from a mental abnormality which makes [him] likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility." Iowa Code § 229A.2(11). To prove Barnes had a "mental abnormality," the State was required to show: (1) he has "a congenital or acquired condition affecting [his] emotional or volitional capacity"; and (2) his condition "predispos[es] [him] to commit sexually violent offenses to a degree which would constitute a menace to the health and safety of others." Id. § 229A.2(5).

In In re Detention of Barnes, we held that, consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), and Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002), due process requires the State to show a person has "a serious difficulty in controlling behavior" to support civil commitment as a sexually violent predator. 658 N.W.2d at 101. This showing "must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case." Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. at 870, 151 L.Ed.2d at 862-63. Additionally, in Foucha v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held, "[d]ue process requires that the nature of commitment bear some reasonable relationship to the purpose for which the individual is committed." 504 U.S. 71, 79, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1785, 118 L.Ed.2d 437, 447 (1992) (citations omitted). Barnes seizes on this language to support his central claim on appeal that an antisocial personality disorder is not a mental abnormality that sufficiently relates to sexual offending to support a commitment.

IV. Barnes's Commitment as a Sexually Violent Predator

A. Mental Abnormality

Barnes disputes that he suffers from a "mental abnormality" as defined under the statute because his mental diagnosis is limited to antisocial personality disorder. He asserts this diagnosis is not correlated with sex-offending and that forty to sixty percent of the prison population has this diagnosis. See Paul Moran, The Epidemiology of Antisocial Personality Disorder, 34 Soc. Psychiatry & Psychiatric Epidemiology 231, 234 (1999) (recognizing that forty to sixty percent of the male prison population is diagnosable with antisocial personality disorder). He further contends, "a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder does not imply anything about a person's ability to control their behavior and does not indicate whether the person is more or less likely to commit a sex offense." Therefore, he concludes that a civil commitment based solely on this diagnosis violates due process. We consider this argument in the context of the statutory elements of a "mental abnormality."

1. Congenital or Acquired Condition Affecting Emotional or Volitional Capacity

There was expert testimony presented at trial that Barnes suffers from antisocial personality disorder. This testimony also revealed that such a disorder does not necessarily relate to sexual offending. However, the experts disagreed about the effect of the disorder, including the effect of the disorder on a person's emotional or volitional capacity. Dr. Roberts testified that antisocial personality disorder is a condition that is either congenital, acquired, or both. He further testified it affects Barnes's emotional and volitional capacity. Dr. Maskel, on the other hand, testified that antisocial personality disorder does not affect emotional or volitional capacity.

We first reject the notion that antisocial personality disorder cannot serve as the basis for civil commitment under chapter 229A. Our review of section 229A.2(11) reveals that the types of conditions that can serve to establish a "mental abnormality" are not limited to certain recognized diagnoses. Furthermore, due process does not require such limitation. What is important is that the statute requires the condition to be congenital or acquired and to affect the emotional or volitional capacity of the person subject to commitment. Significantly, the statute does not require that the condition affect the emotional or volitional capacity of every person who is afflicted with the disorder or condition; the requirement is that it has that effect on the particular individual subject to commitment. This limitation satisfies due process and requires the State to present evidence to support it.

The opinions expressed by Dr. Roberts, the State's expert, supported a finding that Barnes had a "condition affecting [his] emotional or volitional capacity." Although the evidence was conflicting, we frequently defer to the district court's judgment in such cases because it was in a better position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 685 (Iowa 2000). Additionally, Barnes testified that he did not set out to commit rape in one of the rape incidents in 1985. Instead, Barnes testified the rape "was just a spur of the moment thing." He also testified to the effect that at the time, he felt the victims wanted to engage in sexual intercourse with him because they had...