In re Detention of Rafford

• Decision Date: 14 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. 81416-8-I,81416-8-I
• Parties: In the Matter of the Detention of BRUCE S. RAFFORD, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

In the Matter of the Detention of BRUCE S. RAFFORD, Respondent.

No. 81416-8-I

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE

June 14, 2021

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SMITH, J. — Bruce Rafford is civilly committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP). Pursuant to RCW 71.09.092 and following the court's order permitting him to seek a less restrictive alternative (LRA), Rafford proposed his conditional release to Complete Care Company LLC. The trial court accepted his proposal and ordered the Department of Social and Health Services/Special Commitment Center (DSHS) to pay Complete Care over $30,000 per month for Rafford's care, housing, and supervision.

DSHS appeals, asserting that the trial court lacked authority to require it to pay all costs associated with Rafford's treatment and housing at Complete Care. Rafford asserts that, under RAP 2.2, DSHS cannot appeal because it was not a party to the proceeding below. As to the latter assertion, because DSHS has a pecuniary interest in the proceeding, DSHS may appeal under RAP 2.2(3) without seeking discretionary review. As to the former issue, because the court ordered DSHS to pay costs beyond those related to Rafford's treatment, the court erred. Therefore, we remand to the trial court to modify its order consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

Under the sexually violent predator act (SVPA), chapter 71.09 RCW, "when an offender's sentence is about to expire, the State may file a petition alleging that the offender is an SVP." In re Det. of Reyes, 184 Wn.2d 340, 343, 358 P.3d 394 (2015). An SVP is an individual "convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence . . . who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility." RCW 71.09.020(18). If a jury finds that an offender is an SVP, they "shall be committed to the custody of the [DSHS] . . . for control, care, and treatment until such time as" the person's condition has changed and they no longer meet the definition of an SVP or conditional release to an LRA "is in the best interest of the person and conditions can be imposed that would adequately protect the community." RCW 71.09.060(1).

At their annual show cause review hearing, an individual may seek conditional release to an LRA. RCW 71.09.090(1). An LRA is defined as "court-ordered treatment in a setting less restrictive than total confinement" which satisfies the statutory requirements. RCW 71.09.020(6). If the court finds probable cause exists to allow for conditional or unconditional release, the court must hold a full trial addressing the individual's release. RCW 71.09.090(2)(c). There, the SVP must propose a specific LRA that meets five statutory requirements under RCW 71.09.092. If the SVP is entitled to placement in an LRA, the court, based on recommendations by the Department of Corrections (DOC), orders conditions required to protect the community and orders DSHS topay the costs associated with the SVP's treatment at the LRA. RCW 71.09.096; RCW 71.09.110.

FACTS

On July 1, 2004, the Snohomish County Superior Court civilly committed Rafford as an SVP. Specifically, the court committed Rafford to the custody of DSHS for placement in the Special Commitment Center (SCC) on McNeil Island.

On November 19, 2013, the SCC authorized Rafford to petition for release to a Secure Community Transition Facility (SCTF). Five months later, the court conditionally released Rafford to Pierce County's SCTF.

In March 2017, the court found probable cause that Aacres Property Holdings LLC, an LRA residence, met the statutory requirements and that Rafford's release to Aacres was in his "best interest and conditions could be ordered to adequately protect the community." Accordingly, the trial court set a trial date for Rafford's conditional release.

After the trial, the court concluded that Rafford's conditional release to Aacres was in his best interest and included conditions necessary to protect the community. Therefore, the court ordered DSHS to release Rafford to Aacres and noted that DSHS and Aacres had a contract for their treatment and care of SVPs. The court's order on release included residential conditions, treatment conditions, supervision conditions, standard conditions, and special conditions.

In October 2019, Aacres went out of business. Two months later, Complete Care agreed to provide secure housing and treatment to Rafford. InMarch 2020, the DOC investigated Complete Care, making recommendations to the court regarding necessary conditions at the Complete Care facility.

At a hearing regarding Rafford's LRA placement with Complete Care, in April 2020, the State, Rafford, and the DSHS were represented. On DOC's recommendations, the court ordered conditions necessary to protect the community. The court found that Rafford's release to Complete Care complied with the statutory requirements and concluded that "[c]ontinued conditional release to a community [LRA] . . . is in Mr. Rafford's best interest and includes conditions that will adequately protect the community." The order required DSHS to pay funds to Complete Care for Rafford's placement, living expenses, and care at the Complete Care facility in Graham, Washington. Specifically, the court's order provided that "DSHS/SCC shall pay for the following costs:" (a) $2,000 "to reimburse [Complete Care] for start-up expenses previously purchased by the company, (i.e., bed, mattress, sheets, dresser, etc.)"; (b) $2,235 "a month in administrative costs" including "costs associated with transporting Mr. Rafford in the community, and administrative activities such as program planning, health care management, and staff training"; (c) $1,935 "a month for basic maintenance," including "rent, food, utilities and community inclusion"; and (d) $25,836 "a month for staff costs" for "one on one supervision by a staff member." The court ordered DSHS to pay a total of $30,006 per month to Complete Care. It concluded "that the payment to [Complete Care] are costs relating to Mr. Rafford's treatment."

The State did not contest that Rafford's placement at Complete Carecould be in his best interest or that the court's order contained adequate conditions to protect the community. However, DSHS contested the portion of the order requiring it to pay Complete Care for Rafford's placement, living expenses, and care at Complete Care's facility. The court ordered Rafford to be conditionally released to Complete Care's facility on May 13, 2020.

DSHS appeals.

ANALYSIS

DSHS's Ability To Appeal

Rafford asserts that, under RAP 2.2, the State may not appeal the order modifying the LRA. Because aggrieved parties may appeal if they have a pecuniary interest under RAP 3.1 and because the order constituted a written decision affecting a substantial right that in effect determines the action under RAP 2.2(a)(3), we disagree.

"The appealability of superior court decisions is governed by the Rules of Appellate Procedure." In re Det. of McHatton, ___ Wn.2d ___, 485 P.3d 322, 324 (2021). "We review interpretations of court rules de novo." McHatton, 485 P.3d at 324.

In general, "[t]hose who are not parties to an action may not appeal." Aguirre v. AT&T Wireless Servs., 109 Wn. App. 80, 85, 33 P.3d 1110 (2001); see also RAP 2.2(a)(8) (A party to a case may appeal "[a] decision ordering commitment, entered after . . . a sexual predator hearing."). However, "Washington courts have long recognized that, under some narrow circumstances, persons who were not formal parties to trial court proceedings,but who are aggrieved by orders entered in the course of those proceedings, may appeal as 'aggrieved parties.'" State v. G.A.H., 133 Wn. App. 567, 574, 137 P.3d 66 (2006). Specifically, under RAP 3.1, "an aggrieved party may seek review by the appellate court." And an aggrieved party is "one whose personal right or pecuniary interests have been affected." State v. Taylor, 150 Wn.2d 599, 603, 80 P.3d 605 (2003).

In G.A.H., G.A.H. was being held in juvenile detention on several charges, and DSHS was not a party to G.A.H.'s detention review hearing. 133 Wn. App. at 570-71. At the hearings, the court ordered G.A.H's release to DSHS "for assessment of services and a possible foster care placement." G.A.H., 133 Wn. App. at 570-71. Subsequently, the court ordered DSHS to place G.A.H. in foster care. G.A.H., 133 Wn. App. at 571. DSHS placed G.A.H. in foster care but appealed the juvenile court's orders, arguing that the court did not have authority to order DSHS to place G.A.H. in foster care. G.A.H., 133 Wn. App. at 571-72.

On appeal, we concluded that, although DSHS was not a party to the proceedings below, "DSHS may appeal this matter as an 'aggrieved party' under RAP 3.1" and the statute governing juvenile courts. G.A.H., 133 Wn. App. at 574. Specifically, we reasoned that because "DSHS was ordered to assume custodial and financial responsibility of G.A.H.'s welfare," DSHS was "an aggrieved party" that could appeal as a matter of right. G.A.H., 133 Wn. App. at 575. We also rejected the respondents' claim that DSHS had to seek discretionary review, because we concluded that the juvenile court order was afinal order "appealable as a matter of right" under RAP 2.2(a)(1). G.A.H., 133 Wn. App. at 576.

Like DSHS's position in G.A.H., here, the trial court ordered DSHS to assume financial responsibility for all of the expenses related to Rafford's placement at Complete Care. Accordingly, DSHS was an aggrieved party with a substantial pecuniary interest affected by the court's decision. Cf. In re Guardianship of Lasky, 54 Wn. App. 841, 844, 850, 776 P.2d 695 (1989) (concluding that an attorney did not have an interest in the court's order to remove him as an individual's guardian but that he did have a pecuniary interest in his fees and in the sanctions that the court imposed on him). And like in G.A.H., DSHS did not have to seek discretionary...