In re Dhermy, COA03-71.

Decision Date02 December 2003
Docket NumberNo. COA03-71.,COA03-71.
Citation588 S.E.2d 555,161 NC App. 424
PartiesIn the Matter of Jessica DHERMY, Minor Child.
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals

Charlotte A. Wade, Asheville, for petitioner-appellee Buncombe County Department of Social Services.

Attorney Advocate Judith Rudolph, Guardian Ad Litem.

Janet K. Ledbetter, Hillsborough, for respondent-appellant Susan Dhermy.

HUNTER, Judge.

Susan Dhermy ("respondent") appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, "J.D." (d.o.b. 25 February 1991). For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

On 25 September 2000, the Buncombe County Department of Social Services ("BCDSS") filed a juvenile petition alleging that J.D. was an abused and neglected juvenile. The events that occurred prior to the filing of the petition were as follows.

On 28 August 1996, BCDSS received a child protective services report ("CPS report") stating that respondent had taken J.D. (then four years old) to an emergency room claiming that the child's fourteen-year-old half-brother, Michael Dhermy ("Michael"), had raped her. Although a medical examination did not indicate the presence of any abnormality of her hymen, J.D. began seeing a therapist in connection with the alleged sexual abuse.

On 17 January 1997, BCDSS received a report from J.D.'s therapist that J.D. stated during a therapy session that Michael played with her vaginal area. Thereafter, respondent acknowledged that her son was a sexual offender and needed to be placed outside the home to protect J.D. However, shortly after out-of-home placement was located for Michael, respondent's husband and J.D.'s step-father, John Dhermy ("Dhermy"), returned Michael to the family home when respondent was hospitalized for psychological problems.

The juvenile court proceeded with an action against Michael for the sexual assault of J.D. The court was ultimately unable to adjudicate Michael as a sexual offender because J.D. and respondent recanted their previous statements, and Dhermy and Michael denied that J.D. had been sexually abused. Without any clear evidence, Michael was only ordered to (1) complete a sex offender specific evaluation, and (2) be placed outside the Dhermy home. Thus, the Dhermys placed another trailer next to their trailer for Michael to live in that was equipped with sensory devices to prevent him from leaving undetected. However, Michael regained access to his parents' home after his supervision by the juvenile court ended.

A third CPS report was received by BCDSS on 9 September 1997 concerning a violent fight between Dhermy and Michael. At that time, the social worker investigating the incident observed that Michael and J.D. were both living in the family home. Respondent threatened to kill anyone who tried to take Michael away.

On 9 October 1998, another CPS report was received by BCDSS in which J.D. disclosed to her therapist that both Michael and Dhermy had sexually abused her. The child made no further disclosures, and the matter was not substantiated.

Next, respondent reported to BCDSS on 11 April 2000 that her step-daughter and the step-daughter's husband, Tammera and Justin Abbott respectively ("Tammera" and "Justin"), smoked marijuana in the presence of their two-year-old son, Brandon. Respondent further reported that Tammera and Justin, who were living with respondent at that time, were involved in drug dealing and were being targeted for revenge because they had ripped off a drug dealer. When questioned, Justin admitted using marijuana. Tammera denied all drug usage, but later gave birth to another son on 28 July 2000 who tested positive for marijuana.

The final event that led BCDSS to file a juvenile petition with respect to J.D. occurred on 24 September 2000 when Brandon was seriously burned while in the care of respondent. Respondent's initial story was that her step-grandchild had doused himself with lighter fluid and struck a match. However, after being advised that the evidence did not support her story, respondent accused J.D. of the incident. Although Brandon never specifically stated who burned him, he did state a number of times that "grandma matched me." Thus, the preliminary results of the investigation implicated respondent as the main suspect.

Following the filing of the juvenile petition, BCSS obtained an order for non-secure custody of J.D. on 28 September 2000. J.D. underwent a medical evaluation on 26 October 2000 which indicated abnormalities of her hymen that were not present in J.D.'s 1996 medical evaluation. The evaluating physician opined that the abnormalities suggested sexual abuse.

By order filed 11 January 2001, J.D. was adjudicated a physically and sexually abused child and a neglected juvenile in that respondent and Dhermy had "created or allowed to be created a substantial risk of serious physical injury to the child by other than accidental means...." The court ordered custody of J.D. to remain with BCDSS and that a psychological evaluation of both parents and J.D. be performed.

On 4 April 2001, a permanency planning and review hearing was held. At the hearing, the court found that (1) respondent had been suffering from significant mental health issues at least since August of 1999, (2) J.D. had to be moved from her previous foster home after BCDSS received information that respondent had threatened to take the child and run to Canada, and (3) J.D. continued to be at risk if returned to her parents' care because they continued to deny responsibility for her neglect and abuse. The court concluded that BCDSS be relieved of reunification efforts and that the permanent plan be changed to adoption.

On 27 August 2001, BCDSS filed a petition to terminate respondent's parental rights on the grounds of neglect and juvenile dependency. Prior to the hearing, respondent told BCDSS social workers that "she had separated from John Dhermy and that she believed that he had been sexually abusing [J.D.], and had thought so for a number of years. The respondent mother gave no explanation why she had failed to protect [J.D.,]" but claimed that she would not be reconciling with Dhermy.

The termination of parental rights hearing was held on 25-28 March 2002. At the start of the hearing, BCDSS voluntarily dismissed the termination of parental rights action against Dhermy, as Dhermy had "no parental rights to terminate, as he [wa]s neither the biological father nor the legal father[]" of J.D. During the hearing, evidence was offered regarding the likelihood that respondent was responsible for setting Brandon on fire, respondent's prior and continuing mental health problems, and the Dhermy family's extensive and troublesome history, most of which evidenced that J.D. had been sexually abused and neglected. As to J.D. being sexually abused, respondent testified that she did not believe Michael "was dangerous or a threat to [J.D.], and that [respondent's] problems were limited to bad choices she made." She further testified as to her belief that Dhermy had sexually abused J.D. However, despite respondent's earlier claim that the two were separated and would not be reconciling, the court took notice that Dhermy and respondent attended court together every day during the hearing and that her apartment was in close proximity to where Dhermy was living. Based on all the evidence, the court concluded there was

clear, cogent and convincing evidence that grounds exist to terminate the parental rights of the respondent mother pursuant to N.C.G.S. 7B 1111(a)(1) in that she had neglected the minor child when the child came into the custody of the Department, she has continued to neglect the child during the entire time the child has been in the custody of [BCDSS], and there is a probability of the repetition of neglect if the minor child was returned to her care as the respondent mother has failed to correct the conditions which led to the abuse and neglect.

Therefore, the trial court determined it would be in J.D.'s best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights. Respondent appeals.

I.

By her first assignment of error, respondent argues the trial court committed reversible error by not appointing a guardian ad litem to represent her as statutorily required when juvenile dependency is alleged as a ground for termination. We disagree.

Subsection 7B-1111(a)(6) of our General Statutes provides, inter alia, that the court may terminate parental rights upon a finding that "the parent is incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the juvenile, such that the juvenile is a dependent juvenile within the meaning of G.S. 7B-101, and that there is a reasonable probability that such incapability will continue for the foreseeable future." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6) (2001). In cases "[w]here it is alleged that a parent's rights should be terminated pursuant to G.S. 7B-1111(6)[,]" our statutes require that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent the parent. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1101(1) (2001). Failure to meet this requirement results in remand of the case to the trial court for appointment of a guardian ad litem, as well as a rehearing. In re Richard v. Michna, 110 N.C.App. 817, 431 S.E.2d 485 (1993).

Here, BCDSS alleged Subsection 7B 1111(a)(6) as one of two grounds by which to terminate respondent's parental rights. In BCDSS' brief to this Court, it acknowledges that a guardian ad litem was not appointed for respondent as required by statute. However, BCDSS asserts Richard is distinguishable from the present case because, unlike the facts in Richard, BCDSS only argued and the trial court ultimately terminated respondent's parental rights pursuant to Subsection 7B 1111(a)(1) which requires no appointment of a guardian ad litem. This Court has held that "[a] valid finding on one statutorily enumerated ground is sufficient to support an order terminating parental rights." In re Stewart Children, 82 N.C.App. 651, 655, 347 S.E.2d 495, 498 (1986). Thus,...

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  • In re DSC
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • January 18, 2005
    ...to appoint a GAL despite BCDSS's alleged grounds for termination pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6). In re Dhermy, 161 N.C.App. 424, 429-30, 588 S.E.2d 555, 558-59 (2003). The basis for Dhermy was that the parent was not prejudiced by the error "since [N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6)......
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