In re Disbarment of Greathouse
| Decision Date | 05 May 1933 |
| Docket Number | 29,155 |
| Citation | 248 N.W. 735,189 Minn. 51 |
| Parties | IN RE DISBARMENT OF JOHN D. GREATHOUSE |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Proceeding for the disbarment of John D. Greathouse. The matter was referred to the Honorable Julius J. Olson, one of the judges of the fourteenth judicial district, to hear the evidence and make findings thereon. Attorney censured for unethical practices, with jurisdiction reserved to this court to subject him to discipline if practices are not discontinued.
Attorney and client -- unethical conduct of attorney.
An attorney employed other attorneys to solicit personal injury actions for him, and through such employes and his own active solicitation and efforts he carried on a systematic organization for so procuring such business. Held that he is guilty of unethical and unprofessional conduct subjecting himself to discipline from this court.
Oscar G. Haugland, Charles E. Houston, and McNeil V. Seymour, for state board of law examiners.
F. M. Miner, Thomas W. McMeekin, Samuel P. Halpern, and William A. Tautges, for respondent.
The state board of law examiners filed an accusation against John D. Greathouse asking for his disbarment or discipline because of his alleged unethical solicitation of business. The Honorable Julius J. Olson, one of the judges of the fourteenth judicial district, was appointed to take the evidence and make findings of fact, which are adopted by us.
John D. Greathouse was admitted to practice law in this state in 1919 and has since been engaged in his professional work, with his office in the city of Minneapolis. He has specialized in the procuring and prosecution of damage suits on account of personal injuries and property damages suffered, most of which causes of action arose out of automobile accidents. In 1927, 1928, and 1929 respondent employed laymen who solicited his employment in personal injury litigation. This apparently ceased upon the enactment of L. 1929, p. 360, c. 289, Mason Minn. St. 1931 Supp. §§ 5687-5 to 5687-9, which makes it unlawful for an attorney to employ any person who is not an attorney to solicit claims for personal injury or death.
Since January 1, 1930, respondent has employed four or five different attorneys who devoted a considerable portion of their time to the solicitation of business for him. Some worked on a salary and some on contingent fees. He furnished them the use of his library, office equipment, stenographic and telephone service, and office supplies. Each of these attorneys practiced his profession in his own name and for his own benefit, excepting only that each agreed with respondent that he would handle no damage cases in his own name or for his own benefit, but that all cases arising out of tort, especially automobile cases, should be solicited and procured for respondent, who would pay to the employed attorney procuring the particular case one-third of such fee as the respondent would otherwise realize. Such employed attorneys agreed diligently to seek and procure professional employment for respondent in damage cases, and were to solicit such employment for respondent from persons having such claims. Respondent himself actively solicited his own employment in like cases. Respondent negotiated many settlements. The principal activity of the organization was to get business, and there was an organized system to that end.
Respondent maintained a rather aggressive organization for procuring such business. Arrangements existed in his office whereby "tips" or "leads" would come to the office from public garages, newspaper reporters, and sometimes from former clients, of the happening of accidents. Upon the receipt of such information respondent would go himself or detail one of the employed attorneys to the hospital or other place to find the injured person or persons.
Early morning newspapers were read to learn of automobile accidents. Sometimes the machine or organization operating through newspaper employes disclosed the desired information before the newspaper was off the press, and the solicitor was on his way in advance of others engaged in similar solicitation for someone else; or possibly in advance of the adjuster for some insurance company. In several such instances the newspaper reporters were rewarded by the payment of $10 to $15. Respondent and those employed by him always carried with them ready for use printed forms of contract for employment. Sometimes they carried, and used in argument in selling respondent's services, photostatic copies of checks issued in settlement or payment in former cases. They also carried and used newspaper clippings reporting recoveries of large sums of money in other cases handled by respondent.
Respondent and his associates, in their transactions with injured persons, to a very great extent dealt with people who had very little knowledge as to the ethics of the legal profession. Contracts were sometimes made with relatives of the injured persons and were at times made when an injured person was unconscious.
The employment contract provided for a contingent compensation of 25 to 40 per cent. The customary compensation was one-third of the amount recovered, first deducting necessary expenses. During the last three and one-half years respondent's professional business along the lines indicated has been very extensive. He tried few cases himself, and usually arranged with other attorneys to try cases for him, paying them from his fee. He employed able attorneys.
Counsel treated his clients with fidelity, and as a rule they were satisfied with the service he rendered them. It is not claimed in this case that he is guilty of any dishonesty. The sole question presented by the record for our determination is whether or not such an organized system of solicitation for professional employment in the manner and form stated calls for discipline because of being unethical or unprofessional conduct.
An attorney is not an officer of the state in a constitutional or statutory sense of that term, but he is an officer of the court, exercising a privilege during good behavior. This privilege is granted by the court in the exercise of judicial power, not as a mere ministerial power. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366; Hanson v. Grattan, 84 Kan. 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 240; 6 C.J. p. 571, § 16.
In Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378, 18 L.Ed. 366, it is stated that attorneys "are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character." It is also there stated that upon admission the lawyers "become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct."
In Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364, 374, 19 L.Ed. 214, the court said:
"We do not doubt the power of the court to punish attorneys as officers of the same, for misbehavior in the practice of the profession."
In Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523, 540, 19 L.Ed. 285, the court said:
Hence their conduct should command public confidence.
The power to admit applicants to practice law is judicial and not legislative, and is of course vested in the courts only. Originally the courts alone determined the qualifications of candidates for admission; but, to avoid friction between the departments of government, the courts of this and other states have generously acquiesced in all reasonable provisions relating to qualifications enacted by the legislatures. Hanson v. Grattan, 84 Kan. 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 240; State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 221 N.W. 603.
The judicial power of this court has its origin in the constitution; but when the court came into existence it came with inherent powers. Such power is the right to protect itself, to enable it to administer justice whether any previous form of remedy has been granted or not. This same power authorizes the making of rules of practice.
The privilege given to an attorney, authorizing him to practice his profession, is always subject to revocation for cause. It is well settled that a court which is authorized to admit attorneys has inherent jurisdiction to suspend or disbar them. This inherent power of the court cannot be defeated by the legislative or executive department. The removal or disbarment of an attorney is a judicial act. Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523, 535, 19 L.Ed. 285; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366. In Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 15 L.Ed. 565, the court recognized common law grounds for disbarment.
Primarily the right to discipline an attorney is directly aimed at the want of fidelity to client, but the principle involved is more farreaching.
In recent years much has been said about lawyers' solicitation of business. In a report of Dean Fraser of the law school of the University of Minnesota for the biennium 1930-1932 it was stated:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial