In re Downing

• Decision Date: 06 April 2021
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 118,589
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
• Parties: In the MATTER OF the ESTATE OF Vandell DOWNING, Deceased

489 P.3d 9

In the MATTER OF the ESTATE OF Vandell DOWNING, Deceased

CASE NO. 118,589

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

FILED APRIL 6, 2021

Jeffrey I. Crain and Leann G. Farha, Crain & Associates, P.L.L.C., Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellant

Sarita Downing, Pro Se. Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellee

GURICH, J.

Facts & Procedural History

¶1 Vandell Downing (Decedent) and Maxine Bailey (Bailey) met in 1982, and shortly thereafter began living together. Decedent and Bailey lived together for thirty-six (36) years and had six (6) children during this time period. The two shared household responsibilities, payment of bills, and child-rearing duties. At some point during their relationship, Decedent gave Bailey a ring as a symbol of their marital status. The parties resided together as a couple in Midwest City, Oklahoma, until Decedent's death on April 4, 2018.

¶2 On April 13, 2018, Bailey, claiming she was Decedent's common-law wife, filed a petition seeking appointment as administrator of the estate.¹ Bailey alleged that Decedent may have prepared a final will, but her searches revealed no testamentary instrument. The court scheduled a hearing for May 8, 2018, and directed notice be served on all surviving heirs.

¶3 On April 18, 2018, three of Decedent's adult children, Sarita Downing, Vandella Downing, and Keith Williams (collectively "Movants") filed an application requesting an ex parte emergency temporary restraining order against Bailey and Pollard Funeral Home to prevent disposal of Decedent's body.² The lengthy filing alleged that Bailey was not Decedent's common-law spouse, and that it was Bailey's intention to cremate Decedent contrary to his expressed wishes. In their prayer for relief, Movants requested the court legally determine inter alia : (1) Bailey was not Decedent's common-law wife; (2) as surviving adult children, Movants were entitled to statutory control over Decedent's body; and (3) Bailey be restrained from disposing of Decedent's remains. On April 20, 2018, the trial court issued an ex parte emergency order which prohibited Bailey and Pollard Funeral Home from carrying out cremation of Decedent's remains. A hearing on the merits of Movants' application was scheduled by the trial judge and notice of the ex parte emergency order was served on the respective parties. In response, Bailey filed an objection and motion to dismiss the application for a restraining order. On April 25, 2018, counsel for each party appeared, and the temporary restraining order was kept intact pending further review at an upcoming hearing on Bailey's request to be appointed administrator of the estate.

¶4 On May 8, 2018, the parties appeared before the court for a hearing scheduled on both Bailey's petition seeking appointment as administrator and review of the temporary restraining order. Prior to the hearing, Movants filed a motion to dismiss and objection to Bailey's petition for appointment, arguing Bailey was not Decedent's common-law wife. Notwithstanding, testimony was taken and Bailey was appointed as personal representative in accordance with 58 O.S. 2011 § 122(1).³

¶5 Both parties appeared for the hearing on May 9, 2019. Although there were several matters to be presented, the focal point of the hearing and salient issue for the court's inquiry, was whether Bailey was the common-law wife of Decedent. During the hearing, Bailey testified that the couple began acknowledging their marital status following Decedent's gift of a ring. Furthermore, Bailey presented evidence supporting the couple's joint payment of household bills, declarations of their marriage to third-parties, and routine celebration of their wedding anniversary. Bailey was covered under Decedent's government-issued health insurance. Family obituaries reflected Decedent and Bailey were husband and wife. In opposition, Movants admitted into evidence an instrument dated nearly thirty (30) years prior to Decedent's death, signed by both Decedent and Bailey, stating the couple no longer claimed rights under common-law marriage.⁴ In response, Bailey testified that the Decedent created the document following a hostile dispute, the document was not an accurate legal representation of their marital status, and the couple thereafter continued to act as husband and wife.

¶6 On the issue of which party should control Decedent's remains, Movants presented testimony that detailed the Decedent's purchase of a burial plot and his alleged desire to be buried. Testimonial evidence consisted solely of general statements describing Decedent's opposition to cremation, his purchase of a headstone and burial plot more than fifty (50) years before his death, and alleged statements by the Decedent showing his desire to be buried. Furthermore, Movants claimed that a deed and contract supporting Decedent's purchase of a burial plot was available, but such documentation was never offered as evidence.⁵ During the evidentiary hearing, counsel for Movants attempted to admit an exhibit relating to an inventory of Decedent's safe-deposit box, conducted at Tinker Federal Credit Union on July 13, 2018. However, the trial court sustained a hearsay objection to admission of the exhibit.⁶ Despite having copies of the actual physical documents contained in the safe-deposit box, Movants never sought to admit those records into evidence. Similarly, Movants argued Decedent had purchased burial insurance, but they never presented a copy of such a policy. In fact, no documentary evidence establishing Decedent's desire to be buried was admitted into evidence. Finally, Movants placed great emphasis on the fact that Decedent was Jewish and that Bailey had converted to Judaism, as evidence of his intent to be buried rather than cremated.⁷

¶7 The trial judge issued a detailed letter-ruling that outlined his findings of fact and conclusions of law on December 20, 2019.⁸ Simultaneously, the judge entered a formal journal entry memorializing the dispositive issues. Therein, the lower court found that "[Downing] and the Decedent were parties to a common law marriage, and that by the authority just mentioned, the Petitioner is the Decedent's surviving widow."⁹ Further, the ruling concluded that in accordance with 21 O.S. 2011 § 1158(1), "Decedent executed a written document which indicated his desire [to be buried], the contract whereby he purchased his burial plot."¹⁰ Thus, notwithstanding the finding that Bailey was Decedent's surviving widow, the district court found that the testimony regarding Decedent's contract to purchase a burial plot "is in accord with 21 O.S. § 1151(A), in that the Decedent thereby made arrangements regarding the manner in which his body shall be disposed."¹¹ Granting a final restraining order, the trial court instructed Bailey to carry out the burial of Decedent's body in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions.

¶8 Bailey timely filed her appeal from the trial court's journal entry, and we retained the matter to address the proper reading of 21 O.S. 2011 § 1158. Sarita Downing (hereinafter "Appellee") was the only Movant to enter an appearance and file a brief in this appeal.

Standard of Review

¶9 At issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting Movants' request for injunctive relief. A judgment issuing or refusing to issue an injunction will not be disturbed on appeal unless the lower court has abused its discretion or the decision is clearly against the weight of the evidence. Sharp v. 251st St. Landfill, Inc., 1996 OK 109, ¶ 4, 925 P.2d 546, 549. Pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 § 952 (b)(2), we may reverse, vacate, or modify a judgment of the district court, where on review it appears from the nature of the case and all the facts properly before the Court, that the plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n, 2005 OK 88, ¶ 11, 125 P.3d 1219, 1225 (footnotes omitted). Entitlement to injunctive relief must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Sharp, ¶ 5, 925 P.2d at 549. Oklahoma law allows for injunctive relief in accordance with 12 O.S. 2011 § 1381. The "grant or denial of injunctive relief are of equitable concern," Dowell v. Pletcher, 2013 OK 50, ¶ 5, 304 P.3d 457, 460, and relief should not be granted where there is a full and adequate remedy at law. Marshall v. Homier, 1903 OK 84, ¶ 3, 13 Okla. 264, 74 P. 368, 369. Injunctive relief is "an extraordinary remedy that should not be granted lightly." Dowell, ¶ 6, 304 P.3d at 460.

¶10 When evaluating a trial court's ruling relating to injunctive relief, an examination of legal conclusions is essential. Scott v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n, 2013 OK 84, ¶ 16, 313 P.3d 891, 896. Our review of a lower court's legal conclusions pertaining to injunctive relief focuses on whether such ruling was clearly erroneous. Thomas v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 2004 OK 82, ¶ 7, 102 P.3d 133, 136. We assess such legal decisions under a de novo and non-deferential standard. Id. In exercising de novo review, "this court possesses plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority to examine the issues presented." Benedetti v. Cimarex Energy Co., 2018 OK 21, ¶ 5, 415 P.3d 43, 45.

Analysis

¶11 Bailey raises a number of alleged errors in this appeal, however, our opinion addresses only whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding injunctive relief. Ultimately, our resolution of this question hinges on the trial court's statutory interpretation of 21 O.S. 2011 §§ 1151 and 1158, and application of those statutes to the facts and evidence presented. As noted, the trial judge determined that Decedent satisfied the statutory requirements in 21 O.S. 2011 § 1158(1), by executing a written document that meets the requirements of the State of Oklahoma. Accordingly, the trial court ordered Bailey to proceed with burial of Decedent's body. This ruling was fatally flawed because there is simply no evidence in the record of any executed...