In re Eagle
| Decision Date | 18 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 69593–2–I,69593–2–I |
| Citation | 383 P.3d 1042,195 Wash.App. 51 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of Calvin Artie Eagle, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
195 Wash.App. 51
383 P.3d 1042
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of Calvin Artie Eagle, Petitioner.
No. 69593–2–I
Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.
FILED: July 18, 2016
Jeffrey Erwin Ellis, Oregon Capital Resource Center, 621 SW Morrison St. Suite 1025, Portland, OR, 97205–3813, Counsel for Petitioner.
Hilary A. Thomas, Whatcom County Prosecutors Office, 311 Grand Avenue Suite 201, Bellingham, WA, 98225–4038, Counsel for Respondent.
Trickey, J
¶ 1 Calvin Artie Eagle filed this personal restraint petition challenging his convictions of one count of first degree rape of a child and two counts of second degree rape of a child. He claims that the trial court violated his federal and state constitutional rights to an open and public trial when it arraigned him on an amended information in chambers prior to trial. He also claims that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise this claim on direct appeal.
¶ 2 We hold that the in-chambers arraignment on the amended information violated Eagle's right to a public trial. But, because Eagle fails to demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice from the violation to support his direct claim, and because Eagle fails to show that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the claim on direct appeal, we conclude that Eagle is not entitled to collateral relief. Accordingly, we deny Eagle's petition.
FACTS
¶ 3 In late 2009, a jury convicted Eagle of one count of first degree rape of a child and two counts of second degree rape of a child. The facts underlying these convictions are set forth in this court's prior unpublished opinion. State v. Eagle, noted at 162 Wash.App. 1008, 2011 WL 2179261. In March 2010, the trial court sentenced Eagle to an indeterminate sentence of 216 months to life.
¶ 4 Eagle appealed to this court. He argued, among other things, that a conference in chambers regarding jury instructions violated his right to a public trial, his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel, and the failure to give a unanimity or Petrich1 instruction violated his right to a unanimous jury verdict. Eagle, 2011 WL 2179261, at *1. On May 31, 2011, this court issued its opinion affirming Eagle's convictions. The Supreme Court denied Eagle's petition for review. State v. Eagle, 173 Wash.2d 1002, 271 P.3d 248 (2011). The mandate issued on December 14, 2012.
¶ 5 Eagle subsequently filed this personal restraint petition. He raised three claims regarding his right to a public trial. He claimed that his right to a public trial was violated when the trial court: (1) conducted voir dire of individual jurors in chambers and sealed juror questionnaires, (2) conducted a hearing in chambers regarding text messages that Eagle received during trial, and (3) arraigned Eagle on an amended information in a closed hearing in chambers. Eagle also claimed that appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise these issues on direct appeal.
¶ 6 On September 10, 2013, this court dismissed Eagle's claim regarding voir dire and juror questionnaires. It stayed Eagle's remaining claims pending resolution of two Supreme Court cases—State v. Shearer, 181 Wash.2d 564, 334 P.3d 1078 (2014) and State v. Frawley, 181 Wash.2d 452, 334 P.3d 1022 (2014).
¶ 7 On August 4, 2015, this court lifted the stay and dismissed all of Eagle's claims with the exception of whether the arraignment proceeding violated Eagle's right to a public trial, which it referred to a panel of judges for determination on the merits. At this court's request, the parties provided supplemental briefing on this issue.
ANALYSIS
Right to a Public Trial
¶ 8 Eagle argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights to an open and public trial when it arraigned him on an amended information in chambers. We agree with Eagle that the trial court violated his right to a public trial when it conducted the in-chambers arraignment on the amended information. However, because Eagle fails to show actual and substantial prejudice from this error, we reject this claim.
¶ 9 Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to a public trial.2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. The Washington Constitution also guarantees the right of an open trial to the public.3 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10. “These related constitutional provisions ‘serve complimentary and interdependent functions in assuring fairness of our
judicial system,’ ” and “are often collectively called ‘the public trial right.’ ” State v. Love, 183 Wash.2d 598, 605, 354 P.3d 841 (2015) (quoting State v. Bone–Club, 128 Wash.2d 254, 259, 906 P.2d 325 (1995) ), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1524, 194 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016).
¶ 10 “The public trial right is not absolute.” State v. Wise, 176 Wash.2d 1, 9, 288 P.3d 1113 (2012). The trial court may close the courtroom so long as it “justifies the closure by conducting an on-the-record balancing of several factors, commonly referred to as the Bone–Club factors.” State v. Njonge, 181 Wash.2d 546, 553, 334 P.3d 1068, cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 880, 190 L.Ed.2d 711 (2014).
¶ 11 “A three-step framework guides our analysis in public trial cases. First, we ask whether the public trial right attaches to the proceeding at issue.” Love, 183 Wash.2d at 605, 354 P.3d 841. Second, if the right attaches, we ask whether a closure occurred. Love, 183 Wash.2d at 605, 354 P.3d 841. Third, we ask whether the closure was justified. Love, 183 Wash.2d at 605, 354 P.3d 841. If we conclude that the right to a public trial does not apply to the proceeding at issue, we need not reach the remaining steps of the analysis. State v. Smith, 181 Wash.2d 508, 519, 334 P.3d 1049 (2014).
¶ 12 “[N]ot every interaction between the court, counsel, and defendants will implicate the right to a public trial or constitute a closure if closed to the public.” State v. Sublett, 176 Wash.2d 58, 71, 292 P.3d 715 (2012). To determine whether the public trial right attaches to a particular proceeding, courts utilize the two-part “experience and logic” test. Sublett, 176 Wash.2d at 72–75, 292 P.3d 715. The “experience” prong of this test asks “ ‘whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public.’ ” Sublett, 176 Wash.2d at 73, 292 P.3d 715 (quoting Press–Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (Press II)). “The logic prong asks ‘whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.’ ” Sublett, 176 Wash.2d at 73, 292 P.3d 715 (quoting Press II, 478 U.S. at 8, 106 S.Ct. 2735 ). Only if both questions are answered in the affirmative is the public trial right implicated. Sublett, 176 Wash.2d at 73, 292 P.3d 715. The defendant has the burden to satisfy the experience and logic test. In re Yates, 177 Wash.2d 1, 29, 296 P.3d 872 (2013).
¶ 13 On direct appeal, wrongful deprivation of the right to a public trial is structural error presumed to be prejudicial to the defendant. Wise, 176 Wash.2d at 13, 16, 288 P.3d 1113. “That is because such error ‘affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.’ ” Shearer, 181 Wash.2d at 572, 334 P.3d 1078 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wise, 176 Wash.2d at 13–14, 288 P.3d 1113 ).
¶ 14 On collateral review, however, a meritorious public trial violation is not presumed prejudicial. In re Pers. Restraint of Coggin, 182 Wash.2d 115, 119–20, 340 P.3d 810 (2014). Rather, a petitioner claiming a public trial violation for the first time on collateral review must show actual and substantial prejudice. Coggin, 182 Wash.2d at 116, 340 P.3d 810. The one “exception” to this rule is where petitioners allege a public trial violation by way of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Coggin, 182 Wash.2d at 119, 340 P.3d 810.
¶ 15 Here, Eagle claims that the trial court violated his right to a public trial when it arraigned him in chambers on an amended information. We begin our analysis by examining the relevant procedural history and the particular proceeding at issue.
¶ 16 The State originally charged Eagle with two counts of rape of a child in the second degree. On June 27, 2008, Eagle was arraigned in open court on this information.
¶ 17 On February 17, 2009, the State filed the first amended information. The first amended information charged four counts. It added two counts of first degree rape of a child and it erroneously increased the former counts of second degree rape of a child to first degree rape of a child.
¶ 18 Two days later, the trial court held a hearing on a defense motion to continue. At
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