In re Eaton
| Decision Date | 25 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | NO. 02-14-00239-CV,02-14-00239-CV |
| Parties | IN RE DANNY EATON |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
In this mandamus proceeding, relator Danny Eaton asks this court to order the respondent trial court to vacate its temporary orders awarding real party in interest Donna Eaton temporary spousal support and interim attorneys' fees contrary to Danny and Donna's separation agreement. Because we conclude that Danny does not have an adequate appellate remedy and that the trial court clearly abused its discretion, we conditionally grant mandamus relief.
After marrying on October 12, 2001, Danny and Donna formally separated over seven years later. At the time of the separation, they did not intend to divorce but signed a separation agreement on March 13, 2009, that would be "a full, final, fair and equitable division of their community estate effective as of [March 13, 2009]." The separation agreement provided that "all earnings, salary, wages, bonuses, commissions or dividends of either party received or earned after [March 13, 2009]" would be "the separate property of the parties." Each waived any claim to the separate property of the other. Danny agreed to provide medical insurance for Donna through his employer2 and to pay Donna a lump sum followed by periodic payments until March 13, 2011, which were for "general support, a travel allowance and money for uninsured medical expenses and dietary supplements." In exchange, Donna agreed that any claim she might have "to the community estate of the parties or the separate estate of [Danny]" was fully satisfied by the provisions in the separation agreement.
On May 16, 2014, which was three years after Donna received her last payment from Danny, Donna filed a divorce petition requesting a disproportionate share of the community estate and court-ordered spousal maintenance. Danny answered the petition and asserted that the separation agreement was a validmarital property agreement and that the property division in the agreement should be "enforced."3 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 4.102-.105 (West 2006); see also Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 15. The trial court set a hearing to determine whether Danny should be ordered to pay Donna temporary support until the divorce was final and whether Danny should "pay reasonable interim attorney's fees and expenses."
The trial court's associate judge presided over the May 30 hearing4 and entered a report for temporary orders requiring Danny to pay $6,000 per month in temporary spousal support for three months, ending in August 2014.5 E.g., Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 201.011 (West 2014). Danny was also required to pay Donna's attorney $5,000 in interim attorney's fees and expenses. The associatejudge specifically noted in her report that there was a 2009 separation agreement but that "the court did not rule and was not asked to rule on [its] validity today." Danny and Donna agree that a court reporter was not provided for the May 30 hearing. See id. § 201.009(a) (West 2014). Danny did not request a de novo hearing of the associate judge's report. See id. § 201.015 (West 2014).
Danny filed a motion to reconsider with the associate judge, however, and argued that the terms of the report "are inconsistent with the terms of the parties' Separation Agreement." On July 16, 2014, the associate judge denied Danny's motion to reconsider, entered temporary orders consistent with her prior report, and denied Danny's request to place the ordered payments into the trial court's registry. See id. § 6.502(a)(2), (4) (West 2006). Although signed by the associate judge, the temporary orders constituted an order of the referring court. See id. § 201.007(c) (West 2014).
On August 5, 2014, Danny filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting that this court vacate the trial court's temporary orders. Because there was no court reporter provided at the May 30 hearing, Danny included a statement that because the issues raised in his mandamus petition involve questions of law, the testimony adduced at the hearing was not relevant. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.7(a)(2). Danny also asked for temporary relief in the form of an order authorizing Danny to place the payments ordered into the trial court's registry. We granted Danny's requested temporary relief pending our action on thepetition. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.10(b). Because we reached the tentative opinion that a serious question concerning the relief required further consideration, we further requested that Donna respond to Danny's petition. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(b). After Donna responded as ordered, Danny filed a reply. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.4, 52.5.
As a preliminary issue, Donna asserts that the absence of a record from the May 30 hearing is fatal to Danny's mandamus request because testimony relevant to Danny's claim was elicited at the hearing. We conclude that Danny's claims center on whether the trial court's temporary orders violated the terms of the separation agreement, which is a question of law. Neither Danny's nor Donna's factual testimony at the May 30 hearing bears on the legal effect of the separation agreement on the resulting temporary orders. See generally Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 4.105(b) (). Additionally, the parties do not dispute what facts were adduced at the hearing. Therefore, a record from the May 30 hearing is not required in this instance. See, e.g., In re Carter, No. 01-13-01021-CV, 2014 WL 2809822, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 19, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (granting habeas corpus relief even though relator failed to file reporter's record from hearing because "the testimony adduced at the hearing is not relevant or necessary to the disposition of this petition"); In re Health Discovery Corp., 148 S.W.3d 163, 165-66 n.4 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, orig. proceeding) ("suspend[ing]" requirements of rule52.7(a)(1) "[i]n the absence of any dispute concerning the factual basis for Relator's request in this original proceeding"). See generally Tex. R. App. P. 52.7(a)(2) ().
Mandamus relief is available only if the relator establishes that the trial court abused its discretion and no adequate appellate remedy exists. In re State, 355 S.W.3d 611, 613 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). A trial court clearly abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply the law. In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839. Determining whether a party has an adequate remedy by appeal requires a balancing of the benefits and detriments of mandamus review. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
Temporary orders entered in divorce actions may not be immediately appealed. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.507 (West 2006). As a result, Danny lacks a clear and adequate remedy at law and, thus, has satisfied the first requirement for mandamus relief. E.g., In re Slanker, 365 S.W.3d 718, 721 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, orig. proceeding) (citing In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 334-35 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding)); In re J.W.L., 291 S.W.3d 79, 83 (); accord United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 263 (5th Cir. 2001) (), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002).
Donna asserts that Danny has not satisfied this prerequisite to mandamus relief because he failed to seek de novo review of either the associate judge's report or the associate judge's refusal to reconsider the report, which were adequate remedies at law. First, the family code clearly provides that the failure to seek de novo review before the referring court "does not deprive the party of the right to appeal to or request other relief from a court of appeals or the supreme court." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 201.016(a) (West 2014); see also In re S.G.S., 53 S.W.3d 848, 852 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) ( failure to seek de novo review of associate judge's denial of motion to transfer venue did not preclude appeal). Second, Danny does not challenge the associate judge's report but rather the referring court's temporary orders requiring payment of spousal support and attorney's fees. Although signed by the associate judge, the temporary orders constituted an order of the referring court. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 201.007(c) (). Even if de novo review were a necessary prerequisite to seeking mandamus relief in this court, Danny's failure to do so after the associate judge's report would not affect theavailability of the relief he seeks from the subsequent temporary orders of the referring court. Therefore, Danny's failure to seek de novo review before the referring court does not affect the lack of an adequate appellate remedy.
The associate judge's temporary orders, which constituted orders of the referring court, required Danny to pay Donna temporary spousal support for three months and interim attorney's fees and expenses. Of course, such orders are authorized under the family code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 6.502, 201.007(a)(14)(C).
Danny argues, however, that the referring court clearly abused its discretion by entering the temporary orders because the separation...
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