In re Election of District Judges
Decision Date | 18 May 1888 |
Citation | 11 Colo. 373,18 P. 282 |
Parties | In re ELECTION OF DISTRICT JUDGES. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Opinion rendered pursuant to the following request of the governor. To the Honorable Judges of the Supreme Court:
GENTLEMEN By section 3 of a constitutional amendment adopted November 2, 1886, it is provided that the supreme court shall give its opinion upon important questions, upon solemn occasions, when required by the governor. The general assembly, by an act approved thereof March 24, 1887, divided the state into nine judicial districts. In accordance with the power given it by section 12 of the amendment to the constitution adopted November 2, 1886, the county of Arapahoe constitutes the Second judicial district, and by section 15 of the aforesaid act said Arapahoe county became entitled to two judges. By section 9 of said act the counties of Boulder, Weld, Larimer and Logan constitute the Eighth judicial district; and by section 10 the counties of Pitkin, Garfield, Grant, and Routt constitute the Ninth judicial district. At the last general election a judge was elected in each of said districts, and each of said judges now claims that he is entitled to hold the office for the term of six years by virtue of his election. I have been requested by the secretary of state upon whom are devolved certain duties under general section 1168, p. 414, Gen. St., in regard to notice of election, to exercise my prerogative, and request of the supreme court an opinion in the premises. The question submitted, therefore is: 'For what length of time were the judges of these three districts elected?' And to the end of removing all doubt in the premises at as early a date as possible, in the interest of the public good, you are respectfully requested to give such an opinion at your earliest convenience.
Truly yours.
ALVA ADAMS, Governor.
Prior to the act of March, 1887, referred to, the state was divided into seven judicial districts. The act of 1887 increased the number of districts to nine, and the Eighth and Ninth districts referred to were new districts, in which there was no district judge, and for which the governor was authorized under the provisions of the act, to appoint a judge, as in case of a vacancy, who should hold his office until the next general election, and until his successor was elected and qualified. For each of these new districts a judge was elected at the last general election, and the claim they make presents the question whether they hold for a full term of six years, or for a fractional or unexpired term ending at the time fixed by law for all the terms of district judges to expire. The question is not without difficulty, and must be determined by a consideration of a number of provisions contained in article 6 of the constitution, wherein the framers of that instrument outlined a general judicial system for the state. As originally adopted, article 6 of the constitution provided, inter alia, (1) by section 12, that the term of office of district judges should be for six years; (2) by section 15, that the term of office of all judges of the district court elected in the several districts throughout the state should expire on the same day. The legislature of 1877, the first which assembled under the constitution, provided that at the general election in 1882 and every six years thereafter, there should be elected in each judicial district one judge of the district court. Section 1157, Gen. St. It was also provided that the regular term of office of all state, district, and county officers and of the judges of the supreme court, should commence on the second Tuesday of January next after their election, except as otherwise provided by law. Gen. Laws, § 936. This secured the uniformity in the commencement, duration, and termination of the terms of office of district judges which the constitutional provisions cited contemplated. Having prescribed the two foregoing rules respecting the duration of term and the end of term of district judges as permanent rules regulating the district system, it became necessary for the framers of the constitution to provide for certain contingencies that were liable to interrupt the regular working of the system which they had established. Among the contingencies foreseen and provided for was (1) the contingency of vacancies in judicial offices; (2) the contingency of a demand for an increased number of judicial districts. To meet the first contingency they adopted section 29 of article 6, as follows: To meet the second contingency they adopted section 14 of article 6, as follows: It is clear, under the provisions of section 29 as originally adopted, that, in case of a vacancy and an election to fill it, the election would be for an unexpired term. Such is the express language of the section. The first legislature, however, submitted for adoption an amendment to section 29 of this article, which was adopted in 1878, and which provides, inter alia, that 'the judges of the supreme, district, and county courts appointed [to fill vacancies] under the provisions of this section shall hold office until the next general election, and until their successors elected thereat shall be duly qualified.' The section, as amended, does not use the phrase 'unexpired term,' possibly and presumably for the plain reason...
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Commonwealth ex rel. Elkin v. Moir
...term as dispenses with an election at the time fixed by the constitution, viz: the next municipal election in February: In re Election of District Judges, 11 Colo. 373; Com. McCarthy, 3 W.N.C. 477; Brooke v. Com., 5 W.N.C. 416. The act is unconstitutional because it gives to the governor a ......
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State ex rel. Burdick v. Schnitger
...and South Dakota provide that the terms of all judges shall expire on the same day. (State v. Gardner, (S. D.) 54 N.W. 606; In re Election, 11 Colo. 373.) And in the constitution authorizes the Legislature to fix judicial terms. (Burks v. Hinton, 77 Va. 1; Fitzpatrick v. Kirby, 81 Va. 467.)......
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The State ex inf. Hadley v. Burkhead
...uniformity is a paramount consideration in the interpretation of statutes like the one now before us for construction. [In re Election of Judges, 11 Colo. 373, 18 P. 282; People ex rel. v. Le Fevre, 21 Colo. 218, 40 882.] In support of the opposing view we are cited to numerous cases in oth......
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State v. Burkhead
...uniformity is a paramount consideration in the interpretation of statutes like the one now before us for construction. In re Election Judges, 11 Colo. 373, 18 Pac. 282; People ex rel. v. Le Fevre, 21 Colo. 218, 40 Pac. In support of the opposing view we are cited to numerous cases in other ......