In re Ellis

Decision Date16 April 1940
PartiesIn re ELLIS.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Proceeding in the matter of Jerome O. Ellis, admitted as an attorney as Jerome Ellis. From a nonunanimous order of the Appellate Division, 258 App.Div. 558, 17 N.Y.S.2d 800, in which motion for stay was granted in App.Div. , 18 N.Y.S.2d 746, confirming the report of an official referee and suspending the attorney from the practice of law, the attorney appeals.

Reversed and proceeding dismissed. Harold H. Corbin, of New York City, for appellant.

Harold M. Kennedy, of Brooklyn, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This is a disciplinary proceeding which was argued with Matter of Grae, 282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d 963, a proceeding of similar character decided herewith.

On June 8, 1938, the Appellate Division, second department, upon petition by the Richmond County Bar Association, ordered an inquiry into certain alleged unlawful and unethical practices impairing the administration of justice in Richmond county. The order also directed that the inquiry should be conducted by a Special Term of the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Francis G. Hooley, presiding, and designated Harold M. Kennedy, Esq., as counsel.

Upon the present appeal from an order of the Appellate Division suspending the appellant from pracice, we regard the single question of law involved as controlled by our decision in Matter of Grae, supra. It appears from the records in both Matter of Grae, supra, and the present proceeding that disciplinary action was sought because of the fact that, when called as a witness upon the Richmond county inquiry, each appellant declined to sign a waiver of immunity. The only substantial difference in the two records is that it appears in the present proceeding that on July 11, 1938, Mr. Ellis, appearing as a witness at the inquiry, not only declined to sign a waiver of immunity which was the only charge against Mr. Grae but in addition Mr. Ellis declined to answer any questions upon the ground that such answers would tend to incriminate or degrade him. However, it is not disputed that on July 14, 1938, three days after such declination, the appellant Ellis wrote to Mr. Justice Hooley as Presiding Justice at the inquiry, stating in part: ‘My position was then, and is now, that while I should not injustice to myself sign a waiver of immunity, I am, nevertheless, perfectly willing, if you so direct, to...

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4 cases
  • Sheiner v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 29 Julio 1955
    ...case of In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782. It is an interesting case on other phases of the matter of disbarment. In Matter of Ellis, 282 N.Y. 435, 26 N.E. 2d 967, the status of lawyers resorting to protection of the Fifth Amendment is discussed and the conclusion reached that generall......
  • Cohen, In re
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 1 Abril 1960
    ...Appellant's counsel replied that he was relying on Matter of Grae (282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d 963, 127 A.L.R. 1276) and Matter of Ellis (282 N.Y. 435, 26 N.E.2d 967) as holding that there could not be any 'consequence' to lawyers for 'doing what they had an absolute legal right to do'. Appella......
  • Cohen, In re
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 31 Diciembre 1959
    ...the Court of Appeals reversed the orders of this Court (Matter of Grae, 282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d 963, 127 A.L.R. 1276; Matter of Ellis, 282 N.Y. 435, 26 N.E.2d 967). Such reversal, however, was based solely on the second ground stated. It was held that the attorneys' refusal to yield their c......
  • In re Grae
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 16 Abril 1940
    ... ... As was said by Presiding Justice Lazansky, in Matter of Ellis, 258 App.Div. 558, 572, 17 N.Y.S.2d 800, 813, expressing the minority view at the Appellate Division: The constitutional privilege is a fundamental right and a measure of duty; its exercise cannot be a breach of duty to the court.It follows that, upon the facts disclosed by the record, the present ... ...

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