In re Empire Way in City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 02 April 1918
• Docket Number: 14355.
• Citation: 171 P. 1010,100 Wash. 636
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In re EMPIRE WAY IN CITY OF STATTLE.

171 P. 1010

100 Wash. 636

In re EMPIRE WAY IN CITY OF STATTLE.

No. 14355.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 2, 1918

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Boyd J. Tallman Judge.

Petition by the City of Seattle to condemn property for a street to be known as Empire Way and for change of grade. From a decree reducing assessments, petitioner appeals. Affirmed.

Hugh M Caldwell, Walter F. Meir, and Geo. A. Meagher, all of Seattle, for appellant.

Martin Korstad, Edward Von Tobel, L. H. Legg, Z. B. Rawson, Morris &amp Shipley, Paul S. Dubuar, Donworth & Todd, and Hastings &amp Stedman, all of Seattle, for respondent.

FULLERTON J.

In the year 1913 the city of Seattle by ordinance instituted proceedings to establish a street, to be known as Empire way, extending from the intersection of Rainier and Winthrop streets to the southern boundary of the city, a distance of 5.35 miles. From its point of beginning to its intersection with Holden street, 3.1 miles, the proposed street is 90 feet wide, and from the last-mentioned point to its terminal it follows Renton avenue, which it widens from 40 feet to 70 feet. The ordinance contained the following provision:

'That the entire cost of the improvement provided for in this ordinance shall be paid by special assessment upon the real property specially benefited in the manner provided by law, and that no portion shall be paid from the general fund of the city of Seattle.'

After the enactment of the ordinance condemnation proceedings were begun in the superior court of King county to acquire the property necessary to be taken in the establishment of the street, and to ascertain the compensation necessary to be paid for the property taken and the property damaged by reason of the taking. This proceeding resulted in awards, which, with costs and accruing costs added, required approximately $171,000 to satisfy. Subsequent to the entry of the judgments on the awards a supplemental petition was filed by the city, pursuant to statute, praying the court that an assessment be made on the property benefited sufficient to pay the awards with costs and accruing costs, and the court referred the matter to the board of eminent domain commissioners of the city of Seattle for the purpose of making the assessment. The commissioners, following the direction of the improvement ordinance, assessed the entire cost of the proceedings to the local property bordering on the street. When the assessment roll was returned by the commissioners, objections thereto were filed by a number of property owners on grounds, among others, that their property was assessed in excess of benefits. A hearing was had on the objections to the roll, at the conclusion of which the court found that certain of the property was benefited by the improvement to the extent of 70 per centum of the amount assessed therein and no more, and that the remainder of the property was benefited to the extent of 80 per centum of the amount assessed therein and no more, and entered a decree reducing the assessments accordingly, the reduction including the property of the nonobjecting owners as well as the property of the objecting owners. The decree left a considerable part of the condemnation award unprovided for, but no judgment or order was made concerning it. The city, feeling itself aggrieved by the decree entered, appealed therefrom.

The principal contention of the appellant is that the evidence does not justify the conclusion reached by the trial court. The evidence we shall not review in detail. On the part of the city was the assessment roll returned by the commissioners, made by the statute competent evidence of the matters therein recited, and the testimony of each of the eminent domain commissioners to the effect that the property was not in his opinion assessed in excess of the benefits conferred on it by the establishment of the streets. On the part of the objections was the evidence of a number of witnesses testifying to assessments in excess of benefits on individual tracts of property, and the evidence of a number of others testifying to an assessment in excess of benefits upon the property of the district as a whole. The witnesses for the objections for the greater part gave the reasons for their conclusions, which upon the face of the record seem as cogent and persuasive as do the reasons given by the commissioners for a contrary view. All of the witnesses testifying on the subject moreover agree that the way was in the nature of an arterial highway, wider...