In re Engle Cases
| Decision Date | 12 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 09–10000–WGY. |
| Citation | 45 F.Supp.3d 1351 |
| Parties | In re: ENGLE CASES. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Andrew S. Brenner, Javier Angel Reyes, Stephen Neal Zack, Steven W. Davis, Luis E. Suarez, Mark J. Heise, Patricia Melville, Boies, Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Kelly Anne Luther, Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman, LLP, Kenneth J. Reilly, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, Stacey Koch Lieberman, Rafael Cruz–Alvarez, Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, LLP, Miami, FL, Andrew J. Knight, II, David Clifford Reeves, Joseph W. Prichard, Jr., Robert B. Parrish, Moseley, Prichard, Parrish, Knight & Jones, Charlie Easa Farah, Jr., Farah & Farah, PA, Dana G. Bradford, II, Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Gregory H. Maxwell, Cronin & Maxwell, LLC, Janna B. McNicholas, Norwood Sherman Wilner, Stephanie J. Hartley, Richard J. Lantinberg, The Wilner Firm, PA, Jeffrey Alan Yarbrough, John Andrew Devault, III, Patrick P. Coll, Bedell, Dittmar, Devault, Pillans & Coxe, PA, Jacksonville, FL, Antonio C. Castro, Infante Zumpano, LLC, Coral Gables, FL, Benjamin H. Hill, III, Hill Ward Henderson, PA, Terri L. Parker, James B. Murphy, Jr., Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, Tampa, FL, David M. Monde, John M. Walker, John Fachet Yarber, Stephanie E. Parker, Jones Day, Atlanta, GA, Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Robert J. Nelson, Scott P. Nealey, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann, & Bernstein, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Henry G. Garrard, III, Blasingame, Burch, Garrard & Ashley, PC, Athens, GA, John J. Rimes, III, Attorney General's Office, Phillip T. Howard, Howard & Associates, PA, John K. Londot, Lorence Jon Bielby, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Tallahassee, FL, Joshua Reuben Brown, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Karen C. Dyer, Boies, Schiller & Flexner, LLP, Stephen C. Sawicki, Stephen C. Sawicki, PA, Orlando, FL, Kathryn E. Barnett, Kenneth S. Byrd, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Nashville, TN, Keith Ashford Clinard, Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, LLP, Winston Salem, NC, Keri L. Arnold, Arnold & Porter, LLP, Michael London, Douglas & London, PC, New York, NY, Kevin P. Riddles, Mark A. Belasic, Jones Day, Cleveland, OH, Raymond Douglas Gentile, Douthit, Frets, Rouse, Gentile & Rhodes, L.L.C., Kansas City, MO, Richard Daynard, Boston, MA, Wilfred P. Coronato, Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, LLP, Jersey City, NJ, Lance V. Oliver, Motley Rice, LLC, Mount Pleasant, SC, for Engle Cases.
These two consolidated motions address the same factual situation: cases where a living plaintiff had timely filed an Engle action before subsequently passing away, and where the decedent's personal representative had not amended the complaint to reflect the changed status or cause of action before Florida's two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions had expired. They then pose the same legal question: does a wrongful death claim relate back to the original complaint, such that it is not barred by the statute of limitations, or is it independent, such that the wrongful death claim is time barred? While this question appears to be unanswered, at least by controlling authorities, there is helpful guidance from the Florida Supreme Court and district courts of appeal. After careful consideration, this Court holds that the wrongful death claims in question relate back to the filing of the original complaint, and are not time barred.
This opinion also addresses a secondary question concerning survival actions, and then makes several case management determinations as to how complaints ought be handled where the plaintiff dies between the case's original filing and its eventual activation.
This opinion addresses ninety-one of the thousands of so-called Engle -progeny cases created when the Florida Supreme Court, in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla.2006), decertified for future purposes a class action brought by a group of smokers against several tobacco companies, but held that certain jury findings in earlier stages of class litigation had preclusive “effect for common issues decided against the tobacco companies and in favor of the smokers.” Walker v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 734 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir.2013), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2727, 189 L.Ed.2d 779 (2014).
This Court is managing the Engle cases filed in the Middle District of Florida toward trial. See Mem. & Order, Aug. 1, 2013, ECF No. 1120; see also Walker, 734 F.3d at 1281–84 ().
Turning to the issue in the cases at bar, on January 31, 2014, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Philip Morris USA Inc., and Lorillard Tobacco Company (collectively, the “Defendants”) moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment on, ninety-one allegedly time-barred cases pending before this Court. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, Or Summ. J. On, 91 Time–Barred Claims ( ), ECF No. 1386; see also id., App. A (“Death App.”), ECF No. 1386–1 (identifying cases) (reproduced below as Appendix A). The cases in question are spread across multiple waves and are currently categorized as personal injury cases. Defs.' Mot. 4 n. 2. On January 17, 2014, forty-three of these cases were activated pursuant to this Court's case activation order. Case Activation Order, Jan. 17, 2014, ECF No. 1371; Mot. Amend Compls. (“Mot. Amend”) 2 n. 1, ECF No. 1412.
The plaintiffs in these cases (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) filed an opposition on February 18, 2014. Pls.' Resp. Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, Or Summ. J. On, 91 Time–Barred Claims ( ), ECF No. 1400. On February 27, 2014, this Court announced that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), it would treat this motion as a motion for summary judgment, and it granted the Plaintiffs fourteen days to file any additional materials. Elec. Notice, Feb. 27, 2014, ECF No. 1411.
On that same day, the Plaintiffs moved to amend the ninety-one listed complaints in an effort to cure the statute of limitations problem identified in the Defendants' original motion. Mot. Amend. Defendants opposed on March 17, 2014. Defs.' Resp. Pls.' Mot. Amend 91 Compls. (“Opp'n Amend”), ECF No. 1453. No further materials were filed.
This Court heard these motions on April 3, 2014, at which time it took the matter under advisement. See Minute Entry, Apr. 3, 2014, ECF No. 1485.
All of these cases were timely filed as personal injury suits by living plaintiffs. See Defs.' Mot. 4 n. 2. The only relevant facts at issue in this motion are the dates on which each plaintiff allegedly died, and whether that date is more than two years ago. See id. at 1 n. 1. The Defendants have used the Court's Case Management Questionnaire to determine the date of death for each of the ninety-one plaintiffs at issue here, and have concluded that all of those events occurred more than two years ago.2 See id.; Death App. The Plaintiffs do not dispute this conclusion. See Defs.' Mot. 1 n. 1; Pls.' Opp'n 12.
There are two separate standards of review at issue here: one governing the Defendants' summary judgment motion, and one for the Plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaints at issue. Under both standards, however, the motions rise or fall based on whether the complaints comply with the statute of limitations.
Turning first to the Defendants' motion: summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) ; see also Galvez v. Bruce, 552 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir.2008). If a claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, summary judgment is proper. See, e.g., Merle Wood & Assoc. v. Trinity Yachts, LLC, 714 F.3d 1234, 1237–38 (11th Cir.2013) ; Bell v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 521 Fed.Appx. 862, 864–65 (11th Cir.2013).
Turning next to the Plaintiffs' motion, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, a party “may amend its pleading once as a matter of course” within twenty-one days of service, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1)(A), or after receiving the court's permission, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).3 The court must “freely give leave when justice so requires,” id., and the amendment ought be allowed unless there is a “substantial reason to deny leave.” Thomas v. Town of Davie, 847 F.2d 771, 773 (11th Cir.1988) (quoting Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (Former 5th Cir.1981) ). These reasons are narrowly prescribed, and the Supreme Court has stated that they include “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment, etc.”Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962).
If a claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, however, amendment is “futile,” and leave to amend ought be denied. See, e.g., Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 296 (3d Cir.2001) ; United States v. Pittman, 209 F.3d 314, 318–19 (4th Cir.2000). Under those circumstances, an amendment may be allowed only if it “relates back to the date of the original pleading,” either because “the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back,” or “the amendment asserts a claim ... that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1) ; see also Tie Qian v. Sec'y, Dep't. of Veterans Affairs, 432 Fed.Appx. 808, 810–11 (11th Cir.2011).
The wrongful death statute at issue in this case was originally written to close a loophole where:
[a]t common law a person's right to sue for personal injuries terminated with his death. This created the anomaly that a tortfeasor who would normally be liable for damages caused by...
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