In re Equinor Tex. Onshore Props.
| Decision Date | 07 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-20-00578-CV,05-20-00578-CV |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
| Parties | IN RE EQUINOR TEXAS ONSHORE PROPERTIES F/K/A STATOIL TEXAS ONSHORE PROPERTIES LLC; EQUINOR MARKETING & TRADING (US) INC.; AND EQUINOR NATURAL GAS, LLC, Relators |
Before Chief Justice Burns, and Justices Partida-Kipness and Reichek
Opinion by Chief Justice Burns
Before the Court is relators' petition for a writ of mandamus regarding the trial court's denial of their plea in abatement. In resolving this dispute we must decide whether a plaintiff who initiates separate lawsuits in the same county against different defendants can claim dominant jurisdiction in one of those cases, after agreeing to transfer venue of that case to a different county and subsequently joining the defendant from the case still pending in the transferor county. Relators (collectively "Equinor") assert that the transferred case lacks dominance over the interrelated case still pending in the original venue. We agree and conditionally grant the writ.
Unique procedural developments gave rise to relators' petition. The predecessor in interest to RPI BOKF, N.A. d/b/a Bank of Texas, as trustee for the South Texas Syndicate ("Bank"),1 owned certain rights to oil and gas in approximately 9.5 million acres in LaSalle County, Texas. Bank leased some of those rights to Whittier Energy Company. The Lease specified the production on which royalties were due, described the manner of calculating royalties, and required the lessee to pay royalties directly to Bank. Whittier sold its leased interests to Repsol Oil & Gas, USA, LLC, f/k/a Talisman Energy USA, Inc. Sometime later, Repsol assigned part of its leased interest to Equinor Onshore, f/k/a Statoil Texas Onshore Properties LLC ("Equinor").
Pursuant to a Joint Development Agreement between Equinor and Repsol, each agreed to pay separately its respective share of royalties owed to Bank. The companies agreed that whichever company was designated as operator for any given year would pay royalties of other working interests to Bank. Over the course of several years, Equinor and Repsol traded the role of operator.
Bank filed separate lawsuits in LaSalle County against Equinor and Repsol alleging each respective defendant had failed to accurately measure, calculate, andreport production, failed to pay or underpaid royalties due Bank, improperly commingled oil and gas production from the Lease with production from other properties, and breached the Lease in other respects. Bank's suit against Repsol was assigned cause number 18-03-00042 in the 218th District Court (the "Repsol Lawsuit"). The file stamp on the Repsol Lawsuit reflected a 10:17 a.m. March 3, 2018 file date and time. Bank's lawsuit against Equinor was assigned cause number 18-03-00043 in the 81st District Court (the "Equinor Lawsuit"), a higher number. The file stamp on the Equinor Lawsuit, however, reflects February 28, 2018 at 8:13 p.m. as the file date, which was three days before the file stamp reflected on the Repsol Lawsuit. Equinor was not named as a defendant in the Repsol Lawsuit, and Repsol was not named as a defendant in the Equinor Lawsuit.
In both lawsuits, Bank initially relied on sections 15.002(a)(1) and 15.011 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code for venue. At some point not clearly reflected in the record, in the Equinor Lawsuit (but not in the Repsol Lawsuit), Bank amended to also allege mandatory venue in LaSalle County pursuant to sections 91.404(c) and 88.131 of the Texas Natural Resources Code. Equinor did not challenge venue.
Repsol, on the other hand, challenged venue in LaSalle County, and Repsol and Bank ultimately agreed to transfer venue. On February 27, 2019, the Repsol Lawsuit was assigned to the 101st District Court in Dallas County, as cause number19-3022. None of the Equinor entities were parties to the Repsol Lawsuit at the time of transfer, but, on December 30, 2019, Bank filed a third amended petition that added the Equinor entities as defendants. In that third amended petition, Bank relied only on section 115.002 of the property code, which relates to suits by or against trustees or involving trusts, for proper venue.
Equinor filed an objection, a motion to transfer venue, and, subject to the objection and motion, a plea in abatement.2 Specifically, Equinor objected to Repsol's venue facts in its third amended petition; argued that Bank had judicially admitted mandatory venue for the claims against it lay in LaSalle County; asserted that because the Repsol Lawsuit had been transferred to Dallas, the Equinor Lawsuit was first-filed; and that dominant jurisdiction therefore existed in LaSalle County where the Equinor Lawsuit was pending.3 After a hearing, the trial court denied the plea in abatement.
Equinor challenges the trial court's ruling, asserting the trial court abused its discretion because as between the concededly interrelated lawsuits: 1) the Equinor Lawsuit, pending in LaSalle County, was first-filed; and 2) no equitable exception to dominance in LaSalle County exists. Equinor seeks a writ as its only remedy to correct the trial court's abuse of discretion. Bank contends: 1) the Repsol Lawsuit,filed originally in LaSalle County but subsequently transferred by agreement to Dallas County, is dominant as the first-filed lawsuit; 2) that trying the lawsuits separately would result in "gross inefficiencies"; and 3) that dominance in Dallas County upholds the purposes of the doctrine.
Mandamus provides the appropriate remedy when a trial court abuses its discretion by failing to abate a case if an inherently interrelated, earlier filed case is also pending in a Texas court. In re Red Dot Bldg. Sys., Inc., 504 S.W.3d 320, 322 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); In re JB Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding). Trial courts possess considerable discretion in making factual determinations, and errors with respect to factual issues demonstrate an abuse of discretion only when they essentially demonstrate "clear error." JB Hunt, 492 S.W.3d at 294.
On the other hand, trial courts lack discretion in ascertaining the law or applying the law to the facts, even when the law is unsettled. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). Accordingly, a trial court must grant a motion to abate if the facts underlying the requested abatement are undisputed and the law and facts support abatement. JB Hunt, 492 S.W.3d at 294, 299-300 (); Red Dot Bldg. Sys., Inc., 504 S.W.3d at 322. All relevant facts in this matter are undisputed.
Texas follows the general rule that with respect to interrelated suits, the "court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts." JB Hunt, 492 S.W.3d at 294. Obvious reasons, like the "conservation of judicial resources, avoidance of delay, comity, convenience, and the necessity for an orderly procedure in the trial of contested issues, [and] . . . to prevent races from court to court by vigilant counsel," support abating a later-filed suit. Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 252 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding) (internal quotations omitted).
Several of the underlying policy reasons for the rule also provide clarity for the analysis required here. For instance, once a court of competent jurisdiction assumes jurisdiction over a matter, that court should necessarily possess exclusive jurisdiction "because it is impossible that two courts can, at the same time, possess the power to make a final determination of the same controversy between the same parties." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Likewise, simple fairness supports abatement of later-filed suits. "[I]n a race to the courthouse, the winner's suit should have dominant jurisdiction." Id.
The dominance analysis requires that we determine, first, whether the lawsuits are interrelated; and second, if interrelatedness exists, whether the trial court abused its discretion if interrelation exists; and third, whether relator has demonstrated entitlement to mandamus relief. JB Hunt, 492 S.W.3d at 292. Here, the parties do not dispute the Repsol and Equinor Lawsuits are interrelated4 but instead focus primarily on which suit is the first-filed and therefore dominant. Because we agree the lawsuits are interrelated, we consider which suit qualifies as first-filed to determine whether an abuse of discretion occurred.
Bank contends that the Repsol Lawsuit is the first-filed case and argues Equinor concedes this point. On the contrary, however, while Equinor concedes the cause number assigned in LaSalle County indicates the Repsol Lawsuit was filed in that county before the competing Equinor Lawsuit, it argues that once transferred to Dallas County, the later Dallas County file date controls.
Neither party provides any authority with comparable facts. Unlike the usual scenario in which two different lawsuits are filed in two different counties, both competing lawsuits at issue here were initially filed in the same county. Likewise,we have not found and the parties do not identify any authority where one of the competing jurisdictions received the case pursuant to a voluntary transfer. Moreover, in contrast to every other dominant jurisdiction case, here, the same plaintiff filed both lawsuits. We conclude that as between a LaSalle County court that acquired jurisdiction in 2018 and a Dallas County court that acquired jurisdiction pursuant to a voluntary transfer in 2019, where both...
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