In re Erickson

• Decision Date: 08 August 1986
• Docket Number: No. 86-C-329-C.,86-C-329-C.
• Citation: 63 BR 632
• Parties: In re Marie ERICKSON, Debtor.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin

63 B.R. 632 (1986)

In re Marie ERICKSON, Debtor.

No. 86-C-329-C.

United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin.

August 8, 1986.

Russell & Tlusty, Merrill, Wis., for appellant Dorchester State Bank.

Amelia Ramirez, Wausau, Wis., for debtor-appellee Marie Erickson.

Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field — John E. Knight and James E. Bartzen, Madison, Wis., amicus curiae, for Wisconsin Bankers Ass'n.

ORDER

CRABB, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court granting debtor Marie Erickson's application for exemption under Wis.Stat. § 815.18(6) of a baler and haybine, and permitting Erickson to avoid appellant Dorchester State Bank's liens on these implements pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). The bank contends that the baler and haybine do not qualify for the exemptions provided in § 815.18(6) for a hay loader and mower.

Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to choose either the exemptions listed in § 522(d) of the Code or the exemptions permitted under state law. Erickson elected the exemptions available under Wisconsin law, which exempts, among other farm implements, one hay loader and one mower, and claimed these exemptions for her baler and haybine.¹

Following a hearing on the bank's objections to these exemptions, the bankruptcy court made the following findings of fact:

Traditionally, "hay loader" is the term used to describe the machine that loads hay, after it is dry, from the windrow to the wagon as part of the hay harvesting process. A baler performs this same function and, in addition, compacts and ties the hay into a bale. The traditional "hay loader" is obsolete and is not used in modern farming. The baler has entirely replaced the "hay loader" and might be considered the new and improved hay loader.

The term "mower" is traditionally used to describe the machine that is used to cut hay. A haybine performs this same function of cutting hay and, in addition, conditions the hay. The mower is considered an obsolete piece of machinery. The haybine is the technological successor to the mower and has entirely replaced the mower in modern farming.

The court concluded that the baler and haybine were exempt under § 815.18(6) as the modern equivalents of a hayloader and mower.

As an initial matter, the bank contends that it was clearly erroneous for the bankruptcy court to find that a baler and a haybine (also known as a mower-conditioner) are the modern equivalents of a hayloader and a mower, respectively. The bank relies on the testimony of Gerald Baker, a Dorchester area implement dealer. However, on cross-examination, Baker admitted that the mower and hay loader were obsolete, and that the haybine and the baler were the modern equivalents of these implements.² Other witnesses, including an agricultural agent for the University of Wisconsin, Marathon County, testified that the baler and haybine are the technological successors to the hay loader and mower, and that the hay loader and mower are not used in modern agriculture. The bankruptcy court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous.

Next, the bank contends that the bankruptcy court erred when it construed § 815.18(6) to provide exemptions for the modern equivalents of the implements named in the statute. The bank argues that the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, that the court must give the words of the statute their obvious and ordinary meaning, and that only a mower and hay loader are exempt under the plain language of the statute. The debtor contends that the archaic language of the statute must be interpreted not only by its exact words, but according to its purpose, and that exemption laws should be construed to allow a debtor the full benefit of the law.³

Although there are no reported decisions expressly holding that § 815.18(6) should be construed to permit an exemption for the modern successors to the listed exempt implements, Judge Martin's decision in In re Flake, 33 B.R. 275 (Bankr.W.D.Wis. 1983) is suggestive. In Flake, the debtor claimed a "baler with thrower" under the exemption for "one binder," a "row corn picker" under the exemption for "one corn binder," and a "bale elevator" for the exemption of a "hay loader." After hearing testimony from expert witnesses, Judge Martin concluded that the implements identified in the statute performed functions substantially different from those performed by implements claimed as exempt, and that "there was no evidence presented . . . that the modern implements of the debtors are the direct successors in farm operations to the now rarely used implements of the statute." 33 B.R. at 276. Implicit in this opinion is the proposition that if the debtor's implements had been the modern successors to the implements listed in the statute, they would be exempt.

In a well-reasoned opinion, Judge Frawley explained his conclusion that § 815.18(6) should be construed to exempt the modern counterparts of the named implements.

The court must decide the issue of whether the Wisconsin exemption statutes allow the debtor to exempt the particular items in dispute. It is a principle of statutory interpretation that "a statute is to be interpreted, not only by its exact words, but also by its apparent general purpose." Dialectric Corporation v. Labor and Industry Review Commission, 111 Wis.2d 270, 330 N.W.2d 606, 610 (1983); Davis v. State, 134 Wis. 632, 643, 115 N.W. 150, 155 (1908). It is apparent that the purpose of this legislation was to make the machine used to cut hay and the machine used to load hay exempt from execution. The fact that the machines used for these functions have been technologically improved does not alter the purpose of this legislation.

When interpreting exemption laws, a construction should be used that will allow the debtor to utilize the full benefit of the law. Opitz v. Brawley, 10 Wis.2d 93, 102 N.W.2d 117 (1960). "It is well settled that exemption laws must have a liberal construction, within the limits contemplated by the Legislature, so as to secure their full benefits to the debtor." Julius v. Druckey, 214 Wis. 643, 649, 254 N.W. 358, 361 (1934). If the court were to interpret the exemptions as the bank suggests, the debtor would be deprived of the benefits that the Legislature intended to provide.

Another principle of statutory interpretation is that courts should avoid interpreting statutes so as to render the statute meaningless. State v. DILHR, 101 Wis.2d 396, 304 N.W.2d 758, 762 (1981). "A construction of a statute rendering a portion of it meaningless must be avoided." Id. If the court were to interpret the exemption laws as the bank suggests, the statute would become meaningless as to anything but antiquated machinery.

The bank alleges that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and only refers to a mower and a hay loader. The bank cites caselaw supporting the proposition that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous it is the duty of the court to give the words their obvious and ordinary meaning. . . . The court disagrees with the bank\'s assertion that the language of this statute is clear and unambiguous.

The language of the exemption statute might have been very clear when drafted, but time has cast a haze of ambiguity on the wordage. It is doubtful that if the drafters were drafting this statute today they would use precisely the same language. At the time of the drafting of this statute the machine used to mow hay was called a mower and the machine used to load hay was called a hayloader. Obviously, the reason that the drafters provided these exemptions was that these machines performed these very essentional respective functions. Today the machine that mows hay is called a haybine and the machine that loads hay is called a baler. The debtor should be allowed to take the exemptions that the Legislature intended her to have. Consistent with these notions of statutory construction and interpretation, it is the conclusion of this court that the haybine and the baler are exempt property under Wisconsin exemption laws.

I agree with Judge Frawley that the construction of § 815.18(6) urged by the bank would render the statute virtually meaningless, and would prevent debtors from obtaining the protections the legislature intended to give to farmers. Accordingly, I conclude that § 815.18(6) should be construed to exempt from execution the modern equivalents of the obsolete farm implements named in the statute. A debtor claiming an exemption under § 815.18(6) has the burden of proving that the implement for which an exemption is claimed is the modern successor to an obsolete implement listed in the statute. Cf. In re Flake, 33 B.R. at 276. In this case, the debtor has met that burden.

The bank and amicus curiae Wisconsin Bankers Association contend that broadly construing § 815.18(6) will have harmful effects on farm financing, because lenders will be unsure whether a given farm implement qualifies for a statutory exemption and, consequently, whether a security interest in that implement is enforceable. Appellant and amicus also suggest that the cost of farm bankruptcy proceedings will increase as expert testimony about the...