Opinion
OPINION BY WECHT, J.:
The Estate of Harold Rood, David Rood, and Jane Elizabeth Lantz (respectively, “the Estate,” “Rood,” and “Lantz”; collectively, “Appellants”) appeal the orphans' court's September 4, 2014 order, which determined that two “payable on death” Vanguard investment accounts (“the Accounts”) opened by Harold Rood (“Decedent”), which named Rood and Lantz as beneficiaries of the Accounts upon Decedent's death, were subject to the spousal election of Hope Rood, Decedent's wife (“Wife”), pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S. § 2203. Appellants contend that the orphans' court erred in determining that Wife, who was bequeathed nothing in Decedent's will, could claim one third of the Accounts' proceeds under section 2203. Albeit for different reasons than those set forth by the orphans' court, we affirm.1
The orphans' court provided the following concise factual background, which is sufficient to contextualize this question of first impression:
Decedent died testate on December 8, 2013. At the time of his death, Decedent had been married to Wife for almost 27 years. He had two children from a previous marriage, Rood and Lantz. Decedent's Last Will and Testament (hereinafter the “Will”) named Rood as executor and devised one half of the Estate to Rood and the other half to Lantz. Although Decedent's Will acknowledged Wife ..., she was left nothing from the Estate.
Letters Testamentary were granted to Rood in his capacity as Executor on December 18, 2013[,] and notice was served upon Lantz and Wife. On December 27, 2013, Wife timely filed to claim her elective share of the Estate. The orphans' court is not aware of the existence of any prenuptial or postnuptial agreements [that] would preclude Wife's claim and her ability to claim against the Estate is not in dispute.
The dispute between Wife and the Estate centers on the Accounts [, which were] owned by Decedent[,] naming Rood and Lantz as beneficiaries. A hearing was held before the orphans' court on September 3rd with memorandums of law filed by both parties. On September 4th the orphans' court issued an order finding that the Accounts are subject to spousal election. [A] notice of appeal was filed by Appellants on September 25th and a [concise] [s]tatement of [m]atters [c]omplained of [on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) ] was received on October 17th.2
Orphans' court Opinion (“O.C.O.”), 11/5/2014, at 1–2 (nomenclature modified for clarity).
Appellants raise the following three issues:
1. Whether the orphans' court erred as a matter of law in determining that Wife is entitled to exercise her spousal election against Decedent's Accounts [,] under which Rood and Lantz are the named beneficiaries upon Decedent's death.
2. Whether the orphans' court erred as a matter of law in determining that an inter vivos interest was conveyed by Decedent in the Accounts given that Decedent designated Rood and Lantz as beneficiaries to receive the Accounts upon his death.
3. Whether the orphans' court erred as a matter of law in determining that a testamentary interest was conveyed by Decedent in the Accounts given that Decedent designated Rood and Lantz as beneficiaries to receive the Accounts upon his death.
Brief for Appellants at 5 (nomenclature modified). However, because the latter two issues are encompassed by the first, our discussion is addressed solely to the first issue and touches upon the others only to the extent necessary to complete our analysis.
The pertinent facts are undisputed. The matter at hand involves a pure question of law requiring us to interpret provisions of the Probate, Estates, and Fiduciaries Code (the “PEF Code” or the “Code”),3 and in particular the section governing spousal elections, 20 Pa.C.S. § 2203. Thus, we review the orphans' court's legal conclusions de novo and the scope of our review is plenary. Bowling v. Office of Open Records, 621 Pa. 133, 75 A.3d 453, 466 (2013) ; In re D.L.H., 606 Pa. 550, 2 A.3d 505, 513 (2010).
At issue in this case is whether the scope of Wife's right of election with regard to the Estate encompasses the Accounts, a matter governed by the Code. This case calls upon us to interpret a statute, which we do pursuant to the following time-honored rules and principles:
As with all questions of statutory interpretation, our object is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly, giving effect, if possible, to all provisions of the statute under review. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). Generally, the best indication of legislative intent is the statute's plain language. Malt Beverages Distributors Ass'n v. Penna. Liquor Control Bd., 601 Pa. 449, 974 A.2d 1144, 1149 (2009). Further, the plain language of each section of a statute must be read in conjunction with one another, construed with reference to the entire statute.
E.D.B. v. Clair, 605 Pa. 73, 987 A.2d 681, 684 (2009) (internal citations omitted). We presume that the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable, and that the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain. 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 922(1), (2).
When words of a statute are not explicit, but ambiguous, a reviewing court looks to other principles of statutory construction, among them: the occasion and necessity for the statute; the circumstances under which the statute was enacted; the mischief to be remedied; the object to be attained; the consequences of a particular interpretation; and the legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c).
Bowling, 75 A.3d at 466 (citations modified); see D.L.H., 2 A.3d at 513–14. Furthermore, “[w]hile it is true that the views expressed by those who draft or enact laws are not a safe guide when the courts are called upon to determine the meaning of the words employed therein ..., yet, in order to get at the old law, the mischief and the remedy, and properly to understand and construe a statute embodying the latter, the history of the enactment in question may always be considered.” In re Tarlo's Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 172 A. 139, 140 (1934), abrogated on other grounds by In re Estate of Klein's, 474 Pa. 416, 378 A.2d 1182 (1977) ; cf. In re Henderson's Estate, 395 Pa. 215, 149 A.2d 892, 897 (1959) (“[I]n ascertaining the legislative meaning, ... the report of a legislative commission or a Senate or House committee may, if obscurity or ambiguity exists, be considered.”).
Specifically at issue, albeit as informed by other provisions, is section 2203, which provides, in relevant part:
§ 2203. Right of election; resident decedent
(a) Property subject to election. —Except as provided in subsection (c), when a married person domiciled in this Commonwealth dies, his surviving spouse has a right to an elective share of one-third of the following property:
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(3) Property conveyed by the decedent during his lifetime to the extent that the decedent at the time of his death had a power to revoke the conveyance or to consume, invade or dispose of the principal for his benefit.
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In construing this subsection, a power in the decedent to withdraw income or principal, or a power in any person whose interest is not adverse to the decedent to distribute to or use for the benefit of the decedent any income or principal, shall be deemed to be a power in the decedent to withdraw so much of the income or principal as is subject to such power, even though such income or principal may be distributed only for support or other particular purpose or only in limited periodic amounts.
(b) Property not subject to election. —The provisions of subsection (a) shall not be construed to include any of the following except to the extent that they pass as part of the decedent's estate to his personal representative, heirs, legatees or devisees:
(1) Any conveyance made with the express consent or joinder of the surviving spouse.
(2) The proceeds of insurance, including accidental death benefits, on the life of the decedent.
(3) Interests under any broad-based nondiscriminatory pension, profit sharing, stock bonus, deferred compensation,disability, death benefit or other such plan established by an employer for the benefit of its employees and their beneficiaries.
20 Pa.C.S. § 2203.
Insofar as it illuminates the General Assembly's intent in enacting section 2203 in its current form, the committee commentary also warrants reproduction:
In one respect, the class of property subject to election is narrower than in present Pennsylvania law. It is intended that the spouse should have a right of election only with respect to assets which the decedent retained the right or power to enjoy during his lifetime. This should not include property which the decedent has given away absolutely and cannot recapture for his own benefit, even though he has retained a power of appointment which cannot be exercised in his favor during his life.
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In other respects the property subject to the spouse's election is broadened by the proposed provisions, as follows:
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(3) Revocable transfers. This conforms with present Pennsylvania law.
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The final provision in the subsection, equating beneficial powers to beneficial interests, is found neither in the Uniform Code nor present Pennsylvania law. It will make certain transfer[s] subject to the spouse's election which under present law might offer an easy escape from the rights of the surviving spouse, e.g. , discretionary trusts where a disinterested trus
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