In re Estate of Gates v. Gates, 2007 Ohio 5040 (Ohio App. 9/20/2007)
| Decision Date | 20 September 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 06 CO 60.,06 CO 60. |
| Citation | 2007 Ohio 5040 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Estate of John H. Gates, Sharon Gates, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John Matthew Gates, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Sharon Gates appeals the decision of Columbiana County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division, that upheld the prenuptial agreement between Sharon Gates and decedent John H. Gates (referred to as John). The issue in this case is whether the probate court abused its discretion in upholding the prenuptial agreement. For the reasons expressed below, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
{¶2} Sharon Gates and decedent John H. Gates were married on August 16, 1988. It was the second marriage for both of them. Sharon had no children from her first marriage. John, however, had one son, John Matthew Gates (referred to as Matthew) from his prior marriage. The union of Sharon and John produced no issue. John died intestate on June 10, 2005. At the time of John's death, Matthew was 25 years old.
{¶3} Sharon and John had known each other over two years prior to their wedding. Sharon indicated that they cohabitated at John's home located on Oak Ridge Road, Yellow Creek Township, Columbiana County, Ohio, for some period of time prior to the marriage.
{¶4} In July 1988, John and Sharon got a marriage license from the Columbiana County Probate Court. However, they had not set a date certain for the wedding. Sharon testified that after getting the marriage license she and John had discussed getting a prenuptial agreement. (Tr. 45). She indicated that John wanted to have her sign one because his first marriage ended in a divorce wherein John felt that he had lost everything to his first wife. (Tr. 45-46).
{¶5} On August 16, 1988, John informed Sharon that they were getting married that day; it was a surprise to Sharon. (Tr. 47). Sharon indicated that John wanted to get married on that date because it was his mom and dad's anniversary. (Tr. 48). John had arranged for them to be married by the Mayor of Wellsville at 11:30 a.m. After getting married John went to work; no honeymoon was scheduled.
{¶6} Prior to going to the mayor's office, John took Sharon to Attorney Cooper's office to sign a prenuptial agreement. (Tr. 50). They arrived at Attorney Cooper's office around 9:30 a.m. (Tr. 50). Attorney Cooper gave her a document labeled "ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT" to sign.1 Sharon testified that John told her that if she did not sign the agreement that they would not get married. (Tr. 53). She stated that she indicated that she would sign it because she loved him and she did not want a marriage like his first marriage. (Tr. 53). Sharon signed the prenuptial agreement. (Tr. 54-55).
{¶7} She stated that she did look through the document, however, she did not read it closely because she cannot read very well. (Tr. 55). She indicated that her husband knew that she could not read very well. (Tr. 55). She declared that no part of the prenuptial was explained to her, and that she was not advised that she could take the document to an attorney to look it over before she signed it. (Tr. 55).
{¶8} The antenuptial agreement listed John's real and personal property as: 1) Eight Acres in Yellow Creek Township; 2) 1980 Eldorado Cadillac; 3) Checking account less than $1,000; 4) Four IRA's $10,500; and 5) $14,000 in Employer plan at Jones & Laughlin. The agreement listed Sharon's property as: 1) 1985 Ford Escort. The document then stated, "WHEREAS, the parties hereto have mutually agreed that neither party shall have any right, interest or claim in/or to the property of the other either during their marriage or upon the death of the other." The document further indicated that each party may freely sell or otherwise dispose of any or all of his or her own property now owned or hereafter acquired. The next clause of the document specified that each party relinquished their rights or claims as widow or widower and surviving spouse rights. The document also acknowledged that each party waived the right to administer the estate of the other party upon their death.
{¶9} After signing the agreement Sharon and John proceeded to get married at the mayor's office. No family or friends were invited to witness the ceremony. After they were married for a short period of time, Sharon threw away her copy of the antenuptial agreement.
{¶10} John died suddenly in June 2005. During the marriage, both Sharon and John were actively employed and they jointly and individually acquired assets of significant value. They acquired a restaurant and bars. The property in Yellow Creek appreciated in value due to inflation and the parties' active improvement and development. After John passed, a copy of the antenuptial agreement was found in his safe at the marital home.
{¶11} On July 1, 2005, Matthew filed an Application for Authority to Administer the Estate of John. On July 29, 2005, Sharon also filed an Application for Authority to Administer the Estate of John. On October 24, 2005, Sharon filed an action for declaratory judgment to determine the validity of the prenuptial agreement; she requested that the agreement be set aside. Matthew opposed the motion. A hearing was held before the probate court on February 15, 2006 and June 28, 2006. On September 27, 2006, the probate court upheld the validity of the prenuptial agreement. Sharon timely appeals that ruling.
{¶12} The probate court upheld the antenuptial agreement. All assignments of error address the validity of the antenuptial agreement. As such, the standard of review for each assignment of error is the same.
{¶13} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the validity of an antenuptial agreement is a question of fact for the trial court, and the trial court's decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Bisker v. Bisker, 69 Ohio St.3d 608, 6096-10, 1994-Ohio-307. An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 218. Thus, we review the probate court's upholding of the antenuptial agreement for an abuse of discretion.
{¶14} "THE PROBATE COURT PREJUDICIALLY APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD WHEN DETERMINING THE ASSETS LEFT TO SHARON L. GATES WERE NOT GROSSLY AND WHOLLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE TOTAL ASSETS OF THE JOHN H. GATES ESTATE."
{¶15} It is well settled in Ohio that public policy allows the enforcement of antenuptial agreements. Gross v. Gross (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 99. An antenuptial agreement that is freely and voluntarily entered into will not be invalidated because it makes a disproportionate distribution. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 68 Ohio St.3d 464, 466, 1994-Ohio-434, citing Juhasz v. Juhasz (1938), 134 Ohio St. 257, paragraph four of syllabus. "A perfect or equal division of the marital property is not required to withstand scrutiny under this standard." Gross, 11 Ohio St.3d at 109. Moreover, a strict application of the law of contracts is not appropriate, rather, the terms of the agreement and the intent of the parties at the time of execution of the agreement is of prime importance. Id. at 107.
{¶16} The test in Ohio for the validity of an antenuptial or prenuptial agreement is set forth in Gross, paragraph two of the syllabus: "Such agreements are valid and enforceable (1) if they have been entered into freely without fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching; (2) if there was full disclosure, or full knowledge and understanding of the nature, value and extent of the prospective spouse's property; and (3) if the terms do not promote or encourage divorce or profiteering by divorce." Id. These conditions precedent to the enforcement of a prenuptial agreement arise in part from the fact that parties who have agreed to marry stand in a fiduciary relationship to each other. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶17} Sharon acknowledges that this tripartite test is the applicable standard. However, she argues it was applied incorrectly. She contends that in determining the validity of a prenuptial agreement, the situation must be viewed as of the time the agreement was made, rather than at the time of John's death. She contends that while the probate court indicated that it was applying the Gross test in that manner, in reality, it did not. As support for that contention, she directs this court to the following statement:
{¶18} 09/27/06 J.E.
{¶19} She argues that if the probate court had applied the correct standard, meaning it would have looked at the situation as if John died immediately following the wedding, it would have determined that the assets left to Sharon by the antenuptial agreement would be wholly and grossly disproportionate to what she would have received if there was no antenuptial agreement.
{¶20} To a certain extent, Sharron is correct that, when determining the validity of a...
To continue reading
Request your trial