In re Estate of Cumbee, 2920.

Decision Date04 January 1999
Docket NumberNo. 2920.,2920.
Citation511 S.E.2d 390,333 S.C. 664
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesIn re ESTATE OF Lillian CUMBEE. Calvin Cumbee, Appellant, v. Melvin Cumbee, Respondent.

Shirrese B. Brockington, of Charleston, for Appellant. Benjamin Goldberg, of Charleston, for Respondent.

ANDERSON, Judge:

This case involves a will contest between two sons of the late Lillian Cumbee. The probate judge rejected wills Mrs. Cumbee executed in 1991 and 1994, finding both were the product of undue influence. The judge admitted for probate a will Mrs. Cumbee executed in 1987, and included in her estate funds her son Calvin Cumbee held in his own name. The circuit court affirmed in result. Calvin appeals. We affirm.1

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 6, 1987, Lillian Cumbee and her husband, Jasper L. Cumbee, Sr., executed a joint will in which each left the estate to the other. The will provided that in the event of their simultaneous deaths or upon the death of the survivor, their estate (with the exception of a few specific devises) was to be distributed to their son, Calvin Cumbee, to be held in trust for the lifetime care of their disabled daughter, Garnetta Cumbee. Upon Garnetta's death or, if Garnetta predeceased the Cumbees, upon the death of the Cumbees, the remainder was to be divided equally among the Cumbees' eight other children. Mr. Cumbee passed away on July 26, 1988, leaving Mrs. Cumbee over $140,000 in cash and property. Shortly after her husband's death, Mrs. Cumbee moved in with her son Calvin and his wife, Ruth. Mrs. Cumbee returned to her own home several times before finally taking up permanent residence with Calvin and Ruth in early 1989. Mrs. Cumbee was then in her early 80's, and Ruth was primarily responsible for taking care of Mrs. Cumbee's daily needs and administering her various medications. Mrs. Cumbee reportedly paid Calvin $150 per week to live in his home; Calvin acknowledged receiving only $100 per week. Within a year of his father's death, Calvin completely took over his mother's financial affairs.

On March 6, 1991, Mrs. Cumbee executed a second will, naming her son Melvin Cumbee as executor. The 1991 will expressly revoked all prior wills and the trust fund for Garnetta, and directed that her estate be distributed equally to all of her children who survived her. This will was made while Mrs. Cumbee was visiting with her son Melvin at his home in Hanahan.

Before her health started to fail, Mrs. Cumbee would occasionally spend the day with her sister-in-law, Myrtle Wright, or spend the week with one of her daughters, Maxine Nobles. However, after her health problems decreased her mobility, Mrs. Cumbee spent most of her time in her bedroom at Calvin's house. Although she was staying in his home, sometimes a week would pass where Mrs. Cumbee did not see Calvin.

On February 15, 1994, Mrs. Cumbee executed a third will which revoked all prior wills. Mrs. Cumbee named her son Calvin as her personal representative and left him her entire estate, with one dollar for each of the remaining children, including her disabled daughter Garnetta. In the event Calvin predeceased Mrs. Cumbee, Calvin's wife, Ruth, was to receive $30,000, and the other children were to take the residue of the property per capita.

Mrs. Cumbee died in Berkeley County on September 23, 1994 at the age of 89. Calvin offered the 1994 will for probate. He listed a residence valued at $35,900 as the only asset of the estate. Melvin offered the 1991 will for probate. A will contest ensued.

The probate judge found Mr. and Mrs. Cumbee contracted to make a joint will providing for the lifetime care of their incapacitated daughter Garnetta. The judge found the 1987 reciprocal will created a valid contract and Mrs. Cumbee must be held to the contractual obligations to her husband. As an additional sustaining ground, the judge found the 1991 and 1994 wills were invalid due to Mrs. Cumbee's diminished capacity2 and the evidence of undue influence. Accordingly, the judge denied probate of the 1991 and 1994 wills and ordered that the terms of the 1987 joint will be carried out. The judge determined Mrs. Cumbee's estate consisted primarily of a home worth around $35,000 and approximately $107,000 in cash which was held mostly in certificates of deposit. The money was left to Mrs. Cumbee by her husband and was originally deposited in accounts jointly held with her son Calvin. However, approximately one year after his father's death, Calvin transferred the money out of his mother's joint accounts and into accounts held solely in his own name. The probate judge found this money was an estate asset.

Calvin appealed to the circuit court, contending the probate judge erred in denying probate of the 1994 will on the ground of undue influence and in including the $107,000 held in Calvin's name in Mrs. Cumbee's estate. The circuit court rejected the probate judge's finding the 1987 will created a contractual obligation, stating under the South Carolina Probate Code, the execution of a joint will does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will. See S.C.Code Ann. § 62-2-701 (Supp.1997). However, the court affirmed the probate judge's ruling the 1994 will was vitiated by undue influence and, since the will was void ab initio, the 1987 will was not revoked and remained valid at the time of Mrs. Cumbee's death.3 The court affirmed in result the probate judge's decision to probate the 1987 will. Finally, the court affirmed the probate judge's decision to include in Mrs. Cumbee's estate the $107,000 held by Calvin in his own name. Calvin appeals.4

ISSUES
I. Did the circuit court err in finding the 1994 will was the product of undue influence?
II. Did the circuit court err in disregarding the fact Mrs. Cumbee had the opportunity to change her 1994 will after the alleged exercise of undue influence?
III. Did the circuit court err in finding S.C.Code Ann. § 62-2-508 (1987) addresses only revival of a former will in cases where a subsequent will has been revoked by a physical act?
IV. Did the circuit court err in finding the $107,000 in Calvin's name should be included in Mrs. Cumbee's estate?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

An action to contest a will is an action at law. Johnson v. Johnson, 235 S.C. 542, 112 S.E.2d 647 (1960); In re Estate of Weeks, 329 S.C. 251, 495 S.E.2d 454 (Ct.App. 1997); Golini v. Bolton, 326 S.C. 333, 482 S.E.2d 784 (Ct.App. 1997). If the proceeding in the probate court is in the nature of an action at law, the circuit court and this Court may not disturb the probate judge's findings of fact unless a review of the record discloses there is no evidence to support them. See In re Howard, 315 S.C. 356, 434 S.E.2d 254 (1993); Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773 (1976); In re Estate of Weeks, 329 S.C. 251, 495 S.E.2d 454.

Under the Probate Code, a circuit court hearing an appeal from the probate court must apply the same rules of law as an appellate court would apply on appeal. S.C.Code Ann. § 62-1-308(d) (Supp.1997); In re Howard, 315 S.C. 356, 434 S.E.2d 254.

LAW/ANALYSIS
I. EXISTENCE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE

Calvin first contends the circuit court erred in affirming the probate judge's finding the 1994 will was void on the ground of undue influence. We disagree.

"Proponents of a will have the burden of establishing prima facie proof of due execution in all cases and, if they are also petitioners, prima facie proof of death and venue. Contestants of a will have the burden of establishing undue influence, fraud, duress, mistake, revocation, or lack of testamentary intent or capacity." S.C.Code Ann. § 62-3-407 (Supp.1997). See also Hanahan v. Simpson, 326 S.C. 140, 485 S.E.2d 903 (1997) (the contestant has the burden of proof as to any alleged invalidity once due execution of the challenged will is proved).

In order to void a will on the ground of undue influence, the undue influence must destroy free agency and prevent the maker's exercise of judgment and free choice. Todd v. Woodard, 297 S.C. 264, 376 S.E.2d 276 (1989). "Undue influence, the influence necessary to void a will, `must amount to force and coercion, destroying free agency; it must not be the influence of affection and attachment; it must not be the mere desire of gratifying the wishes of another, for that would be a very strong ground in support of a testamentary act; [further, there must be proof that the act was obtained by this coercion;] by importunity which could not be resisted; that it was done merely for the sake of peace; so that the motive was tantamount to force and fear.'" Calhoun v. Calhoun, 277 S.C. 527, 532, 290 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1982) (quoting Floyd v. Floyd, 3 Strob. 44, 34 S.C.L. 44 (1848)). A mere showing of opportunity or motive does not create an issue of fact regarding undue influence. Todd, 297 S.C. 264, 376 S.E.2d 276.

"In cases where allegations of undue influence have been successful, there has been evidence of threats, force, restricted visitation, or an existing fiduciary relationship at the time of or before the will's execution." Hembree v. Estate of Hembree, 311 S.C. 192, 196, 428 S.E.2d 3, 5 (Ct.App.1993) (citing Byrd v. Byrd, 279 S.C. 425, 308 S.E.2d 788 (1983) and Moorer v. Bull, 212 S.C. 146, 46 S.E.2d 681 (1948)).

Our supreme court has recognized that "by the very nature of the case, the evidence of undue influence will be mainly circumstantial. It is not usually exercised openly so it can be directly proved." Byrd v. Byrd, 279 S.C. 425, 427, 308 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1983). However, the circumstantial evidence must point unmistakenly and convincingly to the fact that the mind of the maker was subject to that of some other person so the will is that of the latter and not of the former. Id.

Although Mrs. Cumbee had access to a telephone and visitors, Ruth and Calvin monitored her conversations with a baby monitor. Calvin admitted he told...

To continue reading

Request your trial
31 cases
  • Wilson v. Dallas
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • May 8, 2013
    ...undue influence must destroy free agency and prevent the maker's exercise of judgment and free choice.” In re Estate of Cumbee, 333 S.C. 664, 671, 511 S.E.2d 390, 393 (Ct.App.1999). The influence necessary to void a will must amount to force and coercion. Id. “A mere showing of opportunity ......
  • Wilson v. Dallas
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • February 27, 2013
    ...undue influence must destroy free agency and prevent the maker's exercise of judgment and free choice." In re Estate of Cumbee, 333 S.C. 664, 671, 511 S.E.2d 390, 393 (Ct. App. 1999). The influence necessary to void a will must amount to force and coercion. Id. "A mere showing of opportunit......
  • Fort v. Kibbey (In re Oaktree Med. Ctr.)
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Fourth Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of South Carolina
    • April 19, 2022
    ...... may assert a claim for a breach thereof on behalf of the. estate. The Amended Complaint's cause of action for. Breach of Fiduciary Duty alleges, in relevant ..., 732. S.E.2d at 173 (citing In re Estate of Cumbee , 333. S.C. 664, 511 S.E.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1999)). "The South. Carolina Supreme Court ......
  • Fort v. Kibbey (In re, LabSource, LLC)
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Fourth Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of South Carolina
    • April 19, 2022
    ...... may assert a claim for a breach thereof on behalf of the. estate. The Amended Complaint's cause of action for. Breach of Fiduciary Duty alleges, in relevant ..., 732. S.E.2d at 173 (citing In re Estate of Cumbee , 333. S.C. 664, 511 S.E.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1999)). "The South. Carolina Supreme Court ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT