In re Estate of Miller
Decision Date | 24 September 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 51891.,51891. |
Citation | 216 P.3d 239 |
Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE AND LIVING TRUST OF Rose MILLER. Barbara Lepome, An Individual, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, v. Marilyn Berkson, An Individual and Gertrude Malacky, An Individual, Respondents/Cross-Appellants. |
Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Marquis & Aurbach and Terry A. Coffing, Micah S. Echols, and Tye S. Hanseen, Las Vegas, for Appellant/Cross-Respondent.
Cary Colt Payne, Las Vegas; Bruce L. Gale, Las Vegas, for Respondents/Cross-Appellants.
BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.1
This appeal presents three narrow but previously undecided issues concerning offer of judgment practice under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115. Reversing, we hold that (1) a judgment obtained on or after appeal can qualify as a "more favorable judgment" for purposes of the fee-shifting provisions of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115, (2) appellate fees are recoverable, and (3) an unrepresented party who serves an offer of judgment may recover fees later paid to a lawyer hired to prosecute or defend the case.
The underlying dispute involves a contest over the distribution of Rose Miller's estate. Shortly before her death, Miller amended her estate plan to name appellant/cross-respondent Barbara LePome as her main beneficiary. Before this amendment, respondents/cross-appellants Marilyn Berkson and Gertrude Malacky had been Miller's primary beneficiaries.
Alleging that LePome had exercised undue influence, Berkson and Malacky sued to invalidate Miller's estate plan revision. Proceeding without a lawyer, LePome made separate $12,500 offers of judgment to each of them. When her offers of judgment were rejected, LePome turned the defense of the suit over to counsel.
The jury favored Berkson and Malacky with a unanimous verdict. On appeal, however, this court reversed and ruled that because substantial evidence did not support the verdict, LePome deserved judgment as a matter of law. As a result, Berkson and Malacky ultimately failed to receive more favorable judgments than LePome had offered.
After the remittitur issued on our judgment of reversal, LePome moved the district court for attorney fees and costs pursuant to NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115. The district court initially determined that LePome's offers of judgment entitled her to $28,730.25 in costs and $100,000 in attorney fees. Upon reconsideration, the district court reversed its decision and held as a matter of law that the offer of judgment rules do not apply to judgments won by appellate reversal. In the district court's view, the Nevada Supreme Court settlement conference program is the appropriate mechanism for facilitating settlements on appeal, see NRAP 16, not the fee-shifting offer of judgment rules.
Although the award of attorney fees is generally entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court, Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 674, 856 P.2d 560, 563 (1993), when a party's eligibility for a fee award is a matter of statutory interpretation, as is the case here, a question of law is presented, which we review de novo. See, e.g., Barney v. Mt. Rose Heating & Air, 124 Nev. ___, ___, 192 P.3d 730, 733 (2008).
Berkson and Malacky first argue that a judgment rendered as the result of appellate reversal cannot serve as the predicate for an award of attorney fees and costs under Nevada's offer of judgment rules. In their view, the district court and appellate results are separate. Since the judgment they originally obtained in the district court was more favorable than the $12,500 judgments LePome had offered, they argue that the feeshifting provisions should not apply. Thus, despite our reversal and despite the judgment in favor of LePome that resulted from the prior appeal, they urge us to focus solely on the initial district court result.
Berkson and Malacky attempt to support their argument with the language of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115. Neither the rule nor the statute uses the word "final" in referring to "judgment." Rather, under NRCP 68(f), fee-shifting penalties are assessed against an offeree who "rejects an offer and fails to obtain a more favorable judgment." The language of NRS 17.115 is substantially similar. See NRS 17.115(4).
We conclude that the word "judgment" in this context connotes a final judgment. The trial and appellate stages are naturally related, and if an appeal is taken, the final outcome may change depending on the outcome on appeal. When this court reverses a judgment on a jury verdict for insufficient evidence and declares the appellant entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the reversal and remittitur comprise the judgment by which the parties and the district court are thereafter bound. See NRS 17.160 ( ); NRAP 36(a) ( ). Absent some language in NRCP 68 or NRS 17.115 that signifies a different interpretation of "judgment," we conclude that the policy of promoting settlement does not end in district court but continues until the case is resolved.
Although the procedural inverse of this case, Tipton v. Heeren, 109 Nev. 920, 924-25, 859 P.2d 465, 467 (1993), supports our conclusion. In Tipton, we held that, "[i]n view of our decision reversing the district court's judgment, attorney's fees are not available pursuant to NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 because on remand Tipton will obtain a judgment more favorable than Heerens' pre-trial settlement offer." Id. at 925, 859 P.2d at 467. The appellate reversal in Tipton resulted in the offeree obtaining a more favorable judgment than had been offered, and this defeated an award of attorney fees and costs. Id. In contrast, the appellate reversal on the prior appeal in this case produced a less favorable judgment for the offerees, resulting in a judgment that qualified the offeror for an award of attorney fees and costs. Despite being procedurally opposite, the basic principle of Tipton applies: The judgment looked to in determining whether the judgment obtained is more or less favorable than that which was offered is the final judgment in the case, which may or may not be the initial judgment entered by the district court. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire v. Mercer, 111 Nev. 318, 322, 890 P.2d 785, 788 (1995) () (emphasis added), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in RTTC Communications v. Saratoga Flier, 121 Nev. 34, 41-42 & n. 20, 110 P.3d 24, 29 & n. 20 (2005); Ramadanis v. Stupak, 104 Nev. 57, 59, 752 P.2d 767, 768 (1988) () (emphasis added), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in RTTC Communications v. Saratoga Flier, 121 Nev. at 41-42 & n. 20, 110 P.3d at 29 & n. 20.
Although the wording in NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 is somewhat unique, other jurisdictions with comparable statutes and rules similarly interpret their cost-shifting provisions to apply to judgments rendered on and after an appeal. See Pouillon v. Little, 326 F.3d 713, 718-19 (6th Cir.2003) ( ); Payne v. Milwaukee County, 288 F.3d 1021, 1024-25 (7th Cir. 2002) ( ); Mackie v. Chizmar, 965 P.2d 1202, 1204-05 (Alaska 1998) ( ).
Accordingly, we hold that the fee-shifting provisions in NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 apply to the judgment that determines the final outcome in the case which, in the event of an appellate reversal, may be different from the judgment originally entered by the district court.
Next, we determine whether an offer of judgment permits a party to recover post-offer fees and costs incurred on appeal, as well as in the trial court.
States with fee-shifting rules or statutes similar to Nevada's have held they apply to appellate fees. See Rosenaur v. Scherer, 88 Cal.App.4th 260, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 674, 693 (2001) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Berkson v. LePome
... ... HISTORY In 2001, respondent Howard Bloom filed a petition in the district court seeking the appointment of special administrators for the estate of Rose Miller. The petition was subsequently opposed by two of Miller's nieces, appellants Marilyn Berkson and Gertrude Malacky, on the grounds of ... ...
-
Mann v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC
... ... 1988). The Nevada Supreme Court has acknowledged that attorney fees award made pursuant to contract includes fees incurred on appeal. In re Estate & Living Trust of Miller , 216 P.3d 239, 243 (Nev. 2009) (citing Musso , 764 P.2d at 477-78). The decision to award attorneys' fees is left to the ... ...
-
Clark Cnty. Office of the Coroner/Med. Exam'r v. Las Vegas Review-Journal
... ... In re Estate & Living Tr. of Rose Miller, 125 Nev. 550, 552-53, 216 P.3d 239, 241 (2009). Thus, we review both orders at issue here de novo, and we begin with ... ...
-
Logan v. Abe
... ... In re Estate & Living Trust of Miller, 125 Nev. 550, 553, 216 P.3d 239, 241 (2009) ; see Casey v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., Nev. , , 290 P.3d 265, 267 (2012) ... ...